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Firstly, I dedicate this Thesis to the Almighty God for His unwavering promise 
and fulfilment; “Ask, and it will be given to you; seek, and you will find; knock, 
and it will be opened to you” (Mathew 7:7). I asked God that I pursue a PhD 
programme to support my positive contribution in making Malawi a more secure 
and safer nation. He has guided me through.  
 
Secondly, with my patriotic value, this study, which does not discuss secret 
information but unclassified strategic issues, is dedicated to our beloved nation, 
Malawi, for her greater prosperity. 
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Abstract 
 
Collaborative leadership (CL) is a managerial concept that entails full inter-
agency coordination in order to achieve enhanced security goals. The problem in 
Malawi, however, is limited collaboration among security actors (SAs), which has 
resulted in breakdown of some security issues such as border disputes, illegal 
migration, internal crime, violent demonstrations, corruption and political 
intolerance. Using a combination of both in-depth comparative security case 
studies and surveys of fifteen security organisations and 100 individual 
respondents, this study examined the effectiveness of CL among SAs for 
achieving sustainable NS and prosperity (SNS) in Malawi. The empirical findings 
show that while SAs are working together and making Malawi one of the most 
peaceful countries in Africa, adoption of CL approach for SNS management is 
still limited. In turn, these issues have affected economic development of Malawi. 
Based on the research findings, the study recommends a practical policy 
framework (PPF) called “NACUSSEPA” which is an inter-agency collaborative 
model for CL, SNS, and hence prosperity in Malawi. The recommended PPF is 
rooted in the strategic focus on SNS priorities, promotion of national cultural 
practices and mind-set change, sharing power, information and training security 
officers together for effective decision making and establishment of collaborative 
structures with legal mandate. Others include evaluation measures and 
parliamentary approval of the practical NS policy framework. 
 
Keywords: Collaborative Leadership, Sustainable National Security, Security 
Actors, Inter-agency coordination, Practical Policy Framework, 
Malawi. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the framework within which the study is set. It engages with 
the National Security Sector effectiveness together with the paradigm of 
organisation action and discusses how my professional role, values and beliefs are 
integrated in the study. The strands and journeys that infuse the study are also 
introduced in this chapter. 
 
“The days of agencies at all levels of government, operating primarily as singular 
entities, are over. In an increasingly globalised world, policy challenges transcend 
geopolitical, socio-economic, cultural, and generational boundaries. Issues such 
as pandemics, aging populations, climate-change, rising citizen expectations and 
public safety are both global and local in nature. These types of complex 
challenges will increasingly test government interactions than ever before in the 
years to come.”  - Paul MacMillan (2007) 
 
The above quote from Macmillan (2007, p.7) opened the discussion on which this 
study was formulated and designed.  Indeed, the days of government agencies 
operating primarily independently are over globally in general and in particular, 
Malawi. It is recognised in this study that leaders have to create strategies, build 
systems and align people across many different organisational boundaries in their 
management duties in order to achieve specific objectives. Archer and Cameron 
(2013, p.9) define this arrangement as collaborative leadership (CL). The concept 
of CL has attracted considerable scholarly arguments, mainly in the private 
business sector and academic fellowship research. This study, however, focused 
on CL in the public policy arena, its application to the National Security Sector, 
which is very limited in its publication (Coates, 2011, p.24). This view sees CL as 
part of a continuum of change in the security sector, where bureaucracy is moving 
from being hierarchical, separated, specialised and inwardly focused towards a 
system that is flexible, responsive and efficient. In the security sector, this system 
proves to respond to the dictates of upholding successful national security policies. 
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This study explored the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership and factors that 
would improve national security (NS) and inter-agency collaboration. The study 
also examined the challenges that hinder effective collaboration in the NS. More 
importantly, the study also aimed at developing the first ever-practical inter-
agency policy framework that would enable the security sector in Malawi to 
collaborate efficiently and effectively, which is non-existent at the moment 
(Kuwali, 2012, p.89). To attain this, it is important to look at the specific setting 
for Malawi as a country. 
 
1.1. Setting the scene 
“Great countries need to secure their borders for national security purposes, for 
economic purposes and for rule of law purposes.”- Jeb Bush (12 May 2013) 
 
Malawi is one of the most peaceful countries in the sub-Saharan Africa, which has 
not experienced any civil war and is generally known as the “Warm Heart of 
Africa” (Kayira, 2010, p.3). While this is true, however, it still faces a number of 
threats to National Security (NS). According to Curtis and McBride (2011, p.3), 
threats and issues of NS vary from country to country due to different 
environment. Malawi, like other African countries is faced with threats to NS as 
evidenced by border disputes with Tanzania, terrorist bombings in the 
neighbourhood countries of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Nigeria (Zegart, 2007, 
p.24; Omolo, 2012, p.1; Straziuso, 2014, p.1 & 2; Mahony et al., 2014, p.14), acts 
of terror in Malawi (Muheya, 2011, P.1), cross border crime and armed robberies 
(Malawi Police report, 2010, p.4), increased illegal immigrants (Nkhoma, 2013, 
p.29), political violence (Musuva, 2009, p.1) and disasters including earthquakes, 
floods and droughts (Mijoni, 2009, pp.490-503). 
 
According to Chalabi (2013, p.4), in the year 2013, Malawi was ranked at position 
10 in Africa and 74 on the world peace index basing on absence of violence and 
some threats mentioned above among other factors. This was in comparison with 
other countries like Iceland at position one, Botswana at 32, United Kingdom 
(UK) number 44, United States of America (USA) at 99 and Somalia ranked 161. 
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In Malawi, threats to NS are further compounded by its central geographical 
location, which makes Malawi more vulnerable to transnational trafficking routes 
and other clandestine threats. 
 
1.1.1.  Malawi’s geographical context 
Malawi is a constitutional peaceful and progressive democratic land-locked 
country in Southern Africa (Map 1) bordered by Zambia, Tanzania and 
Mozambique (Map 2). The geographical location makes Malawi as one of the 
main routes for migrations from war torn countries in North Africa going to South 
Africa for greener pastures (Map 3; Kainja, 2012, cited by Nkhoma, 2013, p.35).  
 
Maps (1, 2 and 3) Location of Malawi in Africa, Neighbouring Countries and 
Migration Routes 
Maps (1, 2 and 3) Location of Malawi in Africa, Neighbouring countries and  
Migration routes. 
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Malawi is also located in the Great Rift Valley with rich agricultural land; and 
recently, the discovery of various precious minerals including uranium, coal, rare 
earth metals, iron, and oil in Lake Malawi makes a lucrative destination for 
different development partners. These resources could also be a source of conflict 
(Omolo, 2013, p.1; Mahony et al., 2014, p.17). According to Nkhoma (2013, 
pp.38-40), these threats require effective coordination at both central government 
and regional level to effect meaningful security and economic development. 
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1.1.2. Economic development and national security context 
The Government and security organisations in Malawi are increasingly 
acknowledging the importance of NS as a requirement for economic development 
(Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8). According to Nkosi (2012, p.2) Malawi‟s economic 
growth averaged 8% between 2007 and 2010. Nkosi (2012, p.2) adds that this was 
driven by positive growth in the various sectors of agriculture, building and 
construction, transport and communication, financial and professional services, 
manufacturing, but also due to a stable environment. While these were 
commendable developments, they also contributed to more illegal immigrants 
flocking into Malawi and increasing criminal activities and scramble for 
resources, which affect economic growth (Nkhoma, 2013, p.29). Nkosi (2012, 
p.2) contends that in 2012, Malawi‟s economic growth dropped to 4.3 % due to 
unavailability of foreign exchange on the domestic markets among other factors. 
Myers and McConnell (2009, p.316) previously noted that the ability for a nation 
to function and prosper relies heavily on its level of national security.  
 
1.1.3.  What is National Security? 
According to Watson (2008, p.5), National Security (NS) is the concept for 
promoting freedom, justice, human dignity and confronting the challenges of 
leading a growing community of democracies. For purposes of this study, NS is 
defined as the requirement to protect Malawi‟s National Interests and Values by: 
 Using diplomacy to rally allies and isolate threats. 
 Marshalling economic power to facilitate cooperation through peaceful 
environment. 
 Maintaining effective armed forces to deter external aggression. 
 Implementing civil defence and emergency preparedness measures including 
disasters and anti-terrorism. 
 Using intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats and 
 Using the police to protect the nation from internal threats and crime. 
According to Shanahan (2011, p.17), achieving effective national security requires 
the involvement of several stakeholders through collaborative leadership that 
focuses on workable policy responses. 
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1.2.  Collaborative Leadership 
“Alone we can do so little; together we can do so much." -Helen Keller (Quoted 
by Dorothy Herrmann, 1999) 
 
As the quote alludes to, the concept of Collaborative Leadership (CL) is the 
management that focuses on leadership skills to get more results and came into 
use in the 19th Century as a result of industrialization (Wanna, 2008, p.8). This 
culminated into the emergence of more complex organisations that created 
division of labour and increase in management of tasks. According to Archers and 
Cameron (2013, p.10), collaborative efforts cross many boundaries, participants 
are not members of a single organisation, but rather come from many different 
organisations and their training, experiences, and values differ markedly. 
Rabinowitz (2013, p.2) defined CL as an influence relationship and process, 
which promotes safety, trust and commitment, among leaders and their partners 
who intend substantive or transforming change that reflect their mutual purpose, 
shared vision and common goals. For proper understanding, this study defined 
collaborative leadership as the capability of several security organisations and 
actors to enter into, establish and sustain inter-agency systems in pursuit of NS. 
The study then explored the need for CL in the Malawian NS, which are discussed 
in the following sections. 
  
1.3. What is the need for Collaborative Leadership in the National 
Security of Malawi? 
“Threats that are brought by illegal immigration, terrorism, cyber-crime, human 
rights abuse, or indeed poverty, disease and hunger, affect every aspect of our 
society as they negatively impact on the economy and the whole social fabric of 
our Malawian citizens. It’s therefore pleasing that this realisation has brought us 
together to share this knowledge and experience to come up with meaningful 
interventions to deal with the threats that we face today.” –Former President Dr 
Joyce Banda (September 12, 2012) 
 
The need for more collaboration among the security organisations in Malawi 
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cannot be over emphasised if it has to compare with the most peaceful countries in 
the world and champion as a model. Most security threats to Malawi include 
external aggression, transnational and cross border crime, corruption, acts of terror, 
internal security challenges, disasters and effects of international conflicts 
(Gondwe, 2003; Ngoma, 2008; Phimbi, 2011; Masina, 2012; Mutharika, 2014, 
p.9). The following sub-sections explain the need for effective collaboration by 
the security sector in Malawi, as leaders mainly concentrate on their Ministerial or 
departmental duties as stipulated in the Constitution of Malawi (2010). The need 
for collaboration is also amplified by some of the direct quotes by top political and 
security leaders, who have different threat perceptions and priorities to deal with 
them. 
 
1.3.1. Threats of external aggression and support international peace 
“Our borders are top security issues and Malawi would not give an inch of its 
land.”- Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Ephraim M’ganda Chiume 
(September 2, 2012).  
 
Malawi being a Sovereign State has the responsibility of defending itself from 
external aggression. An example of external aggression was the statement by the 
Chairman of the Tanzania Parliamentary Standing Committee for Defence, 
Security and Foreign Affairs, who stated that the Tanzania People‟s Defence 
Forces were well prepared for any operation to safeguard the country‟s borders 
against Malawi‟s claims on the Lake Malawi wrangles (Omolo, 2012, p.1; 
Mahony, 2014, p.17). Although the chairman later on advised the government to 
use diplomacy to resolve the conflict amicably after considering the cost of war 
experience in Uganda, he emphasised that Tanzania was ready to go to war and 
defend her sovereignty at any cost. The Malawi Government also cannot stand 
idle, but defend its territory and citizenry using all its powers of national security 
(Constitution of Malawi, 2010). According to Mahony (2014, p.17), these disputes 
of sovereignty could end up costing the two countries more than they might 
receive from resources exploitation for economic prosperity if not well 
coordinated. 
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This was one of the reasons that study explored effective and lasting solution on 
such important issues. Malawi also has to look at international cooperating 
partners that understand its national interests and make strategies for full 
collaboration, as the Treaty between Germany and Britain in 1890 clearly stated 
that the whole Lake Nyasa, now Lake Malawi, belonged to Nyasaland, the current 
Malawi (Mahony, 2014, p.14). 
 
The need for effective collaboration was also evident between 1987 and 1996, 
when Malawi deployed its troops and members of Malawi railways to construct 
and protect the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique against the armed bandits during 
the Mozambican Civil War (Rupiya, 2005, p.123). This was an important 
undertaking economically as Malawi is a landlocked country had to safeguard her 
interest through protection of this import and export trade route. Additionally, 
Malawi had to demonstrate to the Mozambican Government that they supported 
peace to prevail in Mozambique by working with the Frelimo Party led 
Government and troops to fight the opposition Renamo bandits that were 
destroying the railway line (Mandiza, 2002, p.125). During this operation called 
“Kwaeni,” some soldiers and servicemen from the Malawi railways lost their lives 
through direct combat and explosion of landmines, as witnessed by the author, 
who was also deployed in this operation. Thanks to these servicemen and other 
stakeholders for their dedicated duty that enabled the Nacala corridor to re-open in 
1997 after over 10 years closure (Malonda, 2002, p.29). 
 
According to Brigadier Malonda, who was a senior staff officer in the Directorate 
of Military Operations in Malawi responsible for coordinating Operation Kwaeni, 
some of the personnel from Malawi Railways were killed in Mozambique through 
direct combat fire because they had no joint training with security organisations 
prior to deployment and limited communication procedures to alert them of the 
upcoming dangers (Malonda, 2002, p.2). This study also seeks to explore practical 
measures that will strengthen collaborations between private and public security 
organisations and institutions, which could mitigate a number of problems. 
Terrorist attacks in Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and political uprising in Egypt, 
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Tunisia and wars in Democratic Republic of Congo are also examples that Malawi 
always needs to be prepared to respond to the impact of external threats (Zegart, 
2007, p.24; Gondwe, 2012, P.2; Nkhoma, 2013, p.29; Straziuso, 2014, p.1 & 2). 
For instance, Kainja (2012) observed that cross border crime and illegal migration 
are also problems for Malawi and a concern for collaboration. 
 
1.3.2. Mitigate cross border crime and illegal migration 
“Illegal migration is a major threat to Malawi’s security. Currently, there are 
more than 300 illegal migrants being held at Maula prison from the Great Lakes 
Region that need to be repatriated. This is part of our international obligations, 
but we are facing resource constraints”. -Honourable Minister of Home Affairs 
Mr Atupele Muluzi (August 1, 2015). 
 
According to Kainja (2010, p.8), illegal immigrants include foreigners that enter 
into Malawi through chartered or legal means, but they decide to remain in the 
country after the expiry of their visas given to them. Migration in Africa is 
dynamic and extremely complex (Nkhoma, 2013, p.30). This is reflected in the 
feminisation of migration, diversification of migration destinations, 
transformation of labour flows into commercial migration and the brain drain 
from the region. Complicating this picture are trafficking in human beings, the 
changing map of refugee flows, and the increasing role of regional economic 
organisations in fostering free flows of labour. Malawi is keeping over 14, 000 
migrants and refugees at Dzaleka Refugee camp in Dowa District in Central 
Region (Kachale, 2012, p.1).  According to Malawi Police report (2010, cited by 
Nkhoma, 2013, p.29), the country receives about 5,000 illegal immigrants per 
annum, who mainly come from Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Mponda (2012, p.1) adds that on 18th June 2012, 
about 60 Ethiopians and Somalis drowned while trying to cross Lake Malawi into 
Karonga using unchartered route by a Tanzanian boat. 
 
Kachale (2012, p.1) adds that some illegal migrants even operate businesses in 
Malawi and are not confronted due absence of individual identity cards and 
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limited coordination by the Malawi Government to share information and engage 
the United Nations Commission for refugees to repatriate them. This is further 
compounded because of the old and lenient laws to punish illegal immigrants with 
a fine of MK 25,000 (equivalent to $60) or one year imprisonment as per 
Immigration Act 15:03, Section 36 cited by First Grade Magistrate Court (Mtika, 
2013, p.1; Nkhoma 2013, p.38). Wezi (2011, p.1) also quoted the Inspector 
General (IG) of Malawi Police Service, who said “Efforts to deal with crime in 
Malawi are rendered useless because some lawyers quickly defend suspects. He 
gave an example of 136 Ethiopians and Somalis who were arrested in April 2010 
after hiding in a forest in Nkhatabay district who were being aided by human 
traffickers to go to South Africa for greener pastures. 
 
The IG of Police also deplored acts of some immigration officials who aid illegal 
migrants (Kufa, 2012, p.1 & 2). Nkhoma (2013, p.30) adds that in Malawi, there 
is ample, yet unsubstantiated evidence of the crimes related to these illegal 
immigrants such as human trafficking, armed robberies and smuggling. In 2007, a 
car was hijacked in Mzuzu and when the robbers were caught, it was found that 
they were from Tanzania (Nkhoma, 2013, p.35). 
 
Efforts to control this situation is being a problem in Malawi as there are conflicts 
of interests and approaches among players such as the Office of President and 
Cabinet, the Malawi Police Service, United Nations Human Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR), trade and industry, civil society, immigration, army and the 
intelligence (Nkhoma, 2013, p.39). For example, the police accuse the army of 
interfering in domestic security, which falls exclusively under their domain. The 
UNHCR considers the immigrants as refugees that need their protection, while the 
police consider them as illegal immigrants who have to be arrested, fined and 
deported to their countries of origin. Meanwhile, the Malawi Revenue Authority 
(MRA) enjoys the custom revenue, which immigrants bring into the country 
through international trade (Nkhoma, 2013, p.40). Whether founded or not, there 
is a belief held by immigrants, especially from Tanzania and Nigeria, that it is 
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easy to obtain a passport in Malawi with which to travel to countries like South 
Africa and USA, where their entry is highly regulated (Nkhoma, 2013, p.34).  
In Malawi, a lot of lessons were learnt from this illegal migration. If security 
actors do not collaborate, more illegal migrants will enter Malawi, a case for 
increasing crime rate and deprive Malawians of economic prosperity as they 
scramble for limited resources (Kakhobwe et al., p.11). Malawi will also continue 
to be blamed by other countries, as it would be acting as a safe transit route to 
countries like South Africa (Kainja, 2010, p.12). One example of the blame was in 
2009, when South African security leaders called for a joint meeting in Pretoria 
with Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia to find solutions for stopping 
illegal migrants transiting these countries into South Africa. The author as NSA at 
that time coordinated Malawi‟s attendance from the MDF, Police and 
Immigration. Follow up reports indicated effective coordination among these 
countries and reduced transit of illegal migrants, although the issue remains a 
security challenge.  
 
1.3.3.  Prevent threats to internal security and acts of terrorism 
“Acts of cash gate, human trafficking, albino killings and human body parts were 
all sophisticated crimes and emerging threats that Government will crackdown”. -
Hon. Minister of Home Affairs Mr Atupele Muluzi (July 13, 2015). 
 
Internal crime is becoming a significant threat to the country‟s societies, 
communities and economy (Musa, 2013, p.4). In their earlier survey on crime 
statistics in Malawi, Gondwe et al. (2003, p.20) reported that a total of 2,984 
respondents representing 43.5%, experienced one or more crimes over the 12 
month period between 1st May, 2002 and 1st May, 2003. These were mostly theft 
of crops and livestock, corruption, murder, theft of motor vehicles, robberies, 
sexual assault and vandalism to buildings and vehicles. This study used this 
survey to advance the argument that there are internal threats in Malawi as it was 
one of the first academic studies on security in Malawi. The survey, however, did 
not address the need for collaboration, which this study addressed. 
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To support the author‟s concern, the Malawi Police Service Annual Report (2010, 
p.4) also indicated that some of the crimes they mainly dealt with were motor 
vehicle thefts, cross border crime, demonstrations, theft of livestock and 
smuggling among others. The report also acknowledged the successful 
achievements in dealing with these crimes through the support of other partners 
like International Police, National Intelligence Bureau, members of the local 
communities and donor partners (pages 4 and 55). The Malawi Police report 
(2010, p.246) further outlined that one of the objectives in year 2013-14 was to 
reduce crime from 85,728 to 69,632 incidents, which was evidence that internal 
crime is still prevalent and needs improved collaboration. 
 
The report also observed that the police efforts to deal with crime were hampered 
due to lack of collaboration and support from other stakeholders like political 
parties, urban community committees and health committees among others 
(Malawi Police report, 2010, p.57). Muheya (2011, p.1) adds that the subsequent 
burning of the vehicle belonging to Zodiak Broadcasting Station and individual 
houses for some Malawian citizens with differing political views is also a security 
concern that requires a cultural mind-set and support of the general public. The 
political violence in Mangochi in 2009 (Musuva, 2009, p.1) and in Thyolo on 16th 
March, 2014 where a police officer and one civilian were killed, are some 
examples of internal threats (Nyirongo, 2014, p.1). 
 
Musa (2013, p.4) also outlined a number of crimes that happened just in the month 
of September, 2013, which included; burning of four houses in Thyolo following 
chieftaincy wrangle (Sep. 1), petrol bomb on Traditional Authority Nsamala‟s 
house (Sep. 6), killing of George Maluwa in a failed attempt to steal a vehicle 
(Sep. 9), shooting of Paul Mphwiyo, who was the government Budget Director 
(Sep. 23) and several cash gate cases on corruption as examples to indicate 
internal threats to NS. 
 
The study also contends that when there is security breakdown and security actors 
are not coordinating enough to end these threats, people resort to mob justice, as 
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was the case of the burning of Msundwe police unit, allegedly because the police 
could not arrest a murder suspect (Muheya, 2011, p.1). In the author‟s view, these 
terrorist incidents, which are secretive in nature (Zagart, 2007, p.91), lead to the 
argument that it is only through effective collaboration that security organisations 
can be able to identify and mitigate them. 
 
1.3.4.  Manage and mitigate disasters 
“In Malawi, intensive rain and flooding have challenged communities, damaged 
infrastructure and continue to threaten many livelihood and loss of life. In 
addition to extreme rain and floods, the country also experiences severe droughts 
that continue to threaten food security and availability and access to water 
resources. These need to be mitigated with utmost priority” -Honourable Minister 
of Environment and climate change management Ms Halima Daudi (November 19, 
2013). 
 
There have been disasters caused by floods, earthquakes and accidents including 
burning of produce markets in Malawi that require coordinated response. Banda 
(2012, p.1) testified that about 6,157 families lost their property, over a thousand 
hectares of crop fields were ruined and 343 houses were destroyed in a matter of 
minutes when tropical cyclone hit Nsanje district in the southern region of Malawi. 
 
The region is hit annually by high rainfall, as was also the case in 2015, where 
over 176 people were killed, over 200,000 displaced and several property 
destroyed (Nyondo, 2015, p.1).In Karonga, there was also a wave of earthquakes 
of magnitude5 and 6 on the local magnitude scale from 6th and 27th December 
2009 respectively, where over 24,000 people were affected, four dead and a lot of 
property damaged (Nyirongo, 2009, p.1). The challenge has been when and how 
quickly to respond and how resources are managed (Kuwali, 2012, p.85; Mijoni, 
2009, pp.490-503).  
 
The author contends that the problem is limited written protocols and legislation 
on joint training and procedures that would enable first line respondents or actors 
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in the security sector to act instantly and collaboratively in pursuit of NS. The 
following section outlines more on security actors. 
 
1.4.  Security Sector and Actors 
“We cannot continue to rely only on our military in order to achieve the national 
security objectives that we've set. We've got to have a civilian national security 
force that's just as powerful, just as strong, just as well-funded.” -President 
Barack Obama (May 12, 2013) 
 
Cawthra (2009, p.22) defined the Security Sector as a cluster of actors and 
agencies that provide security to the state, people and/or the environment. Watson 
(2008, p.15-29) previously provided a clarification that the security sector 
comprises core institutions that are mandated to use fire-arms such as the Military, 
Police and Intelligence organisations. She adds that Ministries of Defence and 
Internal Affairs are also part of the security sector because of their management 
roles, whereas Parliament is an important legislative and oversight body that 
passes and promulgates state policies including the passing of security policy. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is another arm of the state that is responsible for 
Foreign Policy, which guides Security Policy for international involvement. 
Additionally, Ministry of Justice plays a role for the Security Sector as guarantor 
of rule of law. Non-State actors including Civil Society also play a crucial role in 
security. Cawthra (2009, p.23) emphasises that all these institutions need to 
collaborate in order to realise effective national security. The author, however, 
found this as a challenging task in Malawi as security organisations do not 
collaborate fully (Kakhobwe et al., 2012, pp.7-9), hence motivation for this study. 
 
1.5.  Motivation for this Research 
The author was once a National Security Advisor (NSA) to the President of 
Malawi and his roles included coordinating the agenda for NS. In the course of 
duties, the author realised that today‟s threats are dynamic, diffuse and ambiguous, 
making it difficult for any single security organisation to address them alone. For 
instance, illegal migration, child trafficking, robberies and money laundering just 
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to mention but a few required concerted efforts by various organisations and 
individuals, but these were not well coordinated (Kainja, 2010, p.17; Osman, 2012, 
p.1). 
 
Both political and security leaders openly talk about these problems and they 
appeal to the general public to assist in security improvements and collaboration. 
However, there are several challenges including limited written practical 
guidelines to cement the collaboration (Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8). The need for 
someone to champion the practical process is, therefore, an important step to take, 
which the author has initiated. The author was motivated by what other countries 
like the United States of America (USA), Australia and Japan just to mention but a 
few, are doing to deal with these threats; for example, the formulation of 
integrated National Security Policy, which Malawi does not have. In 2009, the 
author started working on developing a National Security Policy, but realised that 
it required more research and input for it to be more effective. 
 
Whilst the Government of Malawi has made some commendable provision on 
collaboration in National Security through the establishment of a Parliamentary 
Committee on Defence and Security (Malawi Constitution, 2010, chapter XV1, 
section 62) and the office of the National Security Advisor (Tenthani, 2011, p.1), 
which is one of the first countries in Africa, there are still several gaps in the 
collaborative system that require proper and practical arrangements to be put in 
place to guide the security actors to meet the objectives.  For example, when the 
author was the National Security Advisor (NSA), there were no written 
documentation on mandates and procedures for liaising with other organisations. 
Every time the author made the initiative to coordinate, some leaders of security 
organisations wondered and challenged the legitimacy, despite the roles assigned 
to him by the appointing authority. 
 
The author was also a senior lecturer at Mzuzu University (MZUNI) Centre for 
Security Studies and noted that there was limited literature in this field in Malawi 
and globally, that added strong impetus for this study. 
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1.6.  Research Problem 
The research problem was to examine the effectiveness of Collaborative 
Leadership among Security Actors in Malawi. In turn, the findings were sought to 
provide inputs to improve Collaborative Leadership in order to achieve 
sustainable NS and prosperity in Malawi. As stated earlier, Kakhobwe et al.,(2012, 
p.7) show that the major security challenge in Malawi was limited collaboration 
among the security actors due to different culture and roles, which resulted in 
continued threats to NS. There were cases where a number of illegal immigrants 
entered Malawi and were given business permits without checking their visa 
status as relevant security organisations did not collaborate effectively on such 
security clearances (Nkhoma, 2013, p.29). Worst still, others use Malawi as a 
transit route to other countries, such as South Africa, because of limited 
collaborative structures to check on these illegal immigrants, resulting in other 
nations blaming Malawi for such safe passages (Kainja, 2010, p.12).  
 
The other gap was lack of information sharing and joint threat analysis among 
leaders of security organisations and other actors (Chirwa, 2013, p.10). The 
violent mass demonstrations of 20th July, 2011 over governance, which resulted in 
destruction of valuable property and deaths of 20 people, was one of the examples 
of limited collaboration (Kapito et al., 2011, p.10). 
 
Another challenge was transforming values, attitudes and skills in the security 
sector of Malawi. Security organisations have their own roles, cultures and 
structures to follow, and therefore difficult to make them understand the need to 
work together (Northouse, 2013, p.5). According to Chrislip (2002, p.44), 
Collaborative Leaders work as peer participants and they do not have authority. 
The author saw this as a huge problem that needed new mechanisms with 
sufficient legal authority if organisations have to collaborate effectively. The other 
problem facing Malawi, like most countries in the world, was the absence of an 
Integrated Practical Framework and National Security Policy that would outline a 
more cohesive approach to guide inter-agency collaboration and procedures for 
the Security Sector (Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8).  
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Compounding these research problems was that the top five threats to global 
National Security in the coming decade have been recognised to also include 
biological and nuclear weapons, cyber-attacks, climate change and transnational 
crime (Erwin et al., 2012, p.1 & 2). For Malawi to achieve a sustainable National 
security, collaborative leadership responds significantly to these domestic and 
external challenges. In this respect, this study precisely answered the following 
research problem: 
 
What is the effectiveness of collaborative leadership and how could it be improved 
among the security actors of Malawi, while encompassing the individual 
organisations’ mandates and roles? 
 
1.7.  Hypothesis 
This study sought to prove that effective Collaborative Leadership (CL) provides 
better security to the Nation than other styles of leadership to achieve sustainable 
peace and economic development. 
 
1.8.  Aim 
The aim of this research was to develop a holistic strategic framework for 
practicing CL by the Security Actors (SAs) of Malawi to enhance National 
Security and Prosperity. To attain the research goal, the following objectives were 
addressed in this study. 
 
1.9.  Objectives 
a. To understand the extent of collaborative leadership within the security 
sector of Malawi and its effectiveness on National Security and economic 
development.  
 
b. To identify key factors that would influence greater collaboration across 
security actors of Malawi during both crisis and peaceful periods to 
achieve highest national security, particularly on domestic level. 
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c. To understand the new concept of national security, threats and relevant 
security actors. 
 
d. To identify barriers that hinder effective collaboration among the security 
actors and solutions to mitigate them. 
 
e. To develop a holistic and strategic practical policy framework for 
achieving successful CL in Malawi in order to be number one (1) most 
peaceful and prosperous country in Africa. 
 
1.10.  Research Methodology 
A mixed methodology of in-depth case studies and surveys were the two 
approaches adopted for this study to generate quantitative and qualitative data 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p.153). The use of mixed research methods in the same 
study has the advantages of enabling triangulation, can be complementary and is a 
powerful mix (Miles et al., 2014, p.42). In the first phase of the study, a 
conceptual framework was developed by analysing literature and case studies in 
collaborative leadership in the security sector. This framework was further 
enhanced by incorporating the findings from questionnaires and interviews of 
professional and experienced leaders from fifteen security organisations and 
actors. The questionnaire was distributed personally, by e-mail and use of three 
research assistants (Yin, 2014, p.89). The methods of this study are explained in 
more detail in Chapter three. 
 
1.11.  Theoretical and practical contribution 
“It is by what we ourselves have done, and not by what others have done for us, 
that we shall be remembered in after ages.” - Francis Wayland (1796-1865, cited 
by Lawrence M. V. Feb. 8, 2007) 
 
While there have been some collaboration among the Security actors in Malawi, it 
has been to a limited scale. The author contributed to knowledge through:  
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1.11.1. Factors to improve CL on domestic and international level 
A comprehensive list of factors to effectively improve collaborative leadership for 
sustainable national security, particularly on domestic level, where more security 
threats are emerging, as security leaders mainly uses autocratic style of leadership 
and manage single organisations to achieve tactical and very clear objectives  
 
1.11.2. Empowering collaborative leaders with legal mandate 
Empowering collaborative leaders such as the National Security Advisor (NSA) 
with legal mandate to coordinate with other organisations, unlike the current 
practice where they work as mere participants. This would enable the NSA to 
collate vital information and advise the President accordingly on appropriate 
actions. 
 
1.11.3. Strategic fusion of NS information in peace and crisis period 
Systematic fusion of strategic information for the security professionals through a 
central national security coordinating office and joint security committees that 
would enhance long term capability and rightful decision making process on 
domestic and international level; and during both peacetime and crisis periods. 
 
1.11.4. Addition to knowledge on effective CL 
Filled the literature gap and created a better understanding of the benefits of 
collaborative leadership in the security sector of Malawi on domestic level and 
globally. In the academia, the departments of Security Studies at Mzuzu 
University and Political Affairs at Chancellor College in Malawi would greatly 
benefit from this study. 
 
1.11.5. Development of national security policy framework with 
parliamentary approval 
Development of the first ever integrated National Security Policy Framework for 
Malawi with written protocols and parliamentary approval to guide collaboration, 
which is very critical at the moment for sustainable peace and prosperity. 
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1.12.  Thesis Structure 
This study is structured in six chapters, references and appendices. 
 
1.12.1. Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter provides an outline review on the current literature on leadership 
theories for achieving the desired objectives. Leadership styles such as autocratic 
and bureaucratic, which are mostly used in the security sector, have been 
discussed. The review concludes with an introduction to collaborative leadership, 
which is a desired concept in order to achieve SNS and prosperity in Malawi. 
 
1.12.2. Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
This chapter provides an in-depth discussion on the methodological foundations 
and design. It provides arguments for the selection of the research approach and 
strategy for data collection and analysis used in this study. Based on the analysis, 
the author used mixed methods for both quantitative and qualitative data 
collection and analysis procedure. This enabled the research to answer why, what, 
how, who, where and many other questions (Yin, 2014, p.134). 
 
1.12.3. Chapter 4: Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion 
In this chapter, findings of the study were analysed. Based on the analytic findings 
of the study, a comprehensive list of factors for practicing CL among the security 
actors was identified. The chapter also critically discussed the findings against the 
current Collaborative Leadership literature and National Security.  
 
1.12.4. Chapter 5: Practical framework for CL and NS. 
A practical national security policy and strategy framework termed 
“NACUSSEPA” model was developed and presented here basing on the findings 
of this study to guide collaborative leadership in pursuit of national security 
management of Malawi. 
 
1.12.5. Chapter 6: Conclusions and Further Research Work 
This chapter provides a summary of findings of the research project with critical 
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discussion on its benefits and challenges. It discusses the contributions made by 
this study to CL body of knowledge, and also outlines recommendations for 
further research work to enhance the findings of this empirical study. 
 
1.13.  Summary 
This chapter provided a concise introduction to the Collaborative Leadership 
arena. It started by defining the concept of CL and its effectiveness in achieving 
National Security goals. The chapter then outlined the need for CL among the 
security actors of Malawi, as various security organisations have different 
priorities in their perception on security threats according to their roles and 
responsibilities as per the Constitution of Malawi (2010). The chapter also 
highlighted the research problem and set the objectives for this study. It has also 
briefly described the research methodology adopted for this project. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2. Introduction 
“The old leadership model, in other words, just being a manager-doesn’t work. 
Now schoolteachers, have to know teaching inside and out. They have to know 
best practices. They have to know how to structure a school to support teaching 
and learning. They have to know about professional development for on-going 
learning-job-embedded, collaborative types of learning.” - Wendy Katz (1987) 
 
This chapter discussed the new concept of National Security (NS), its providers 
and the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership (CL) to achieve extraordinary 
NS goals. It also presents other leadership styles used in the security organisations 
and their implications on National Security. A number of successful cases that 
helped to achieve NS in Malawi and at international level due to effective 
collaboration have been illustrated. Case failures, where there was limited inter-
agency collaboration have also been highlighted.  This chapter focuses on the 
challenges to effective collaboration and explored best mechanisms and models to 
resolve them, after noting the gaps in the success and failure cases as mentioned 
above. 
 
For comparative purposes, the national security strategic planning frameworks of 
the United States of America (USA) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) are described to highlight the analytical rigor and coherent 
mechanisms that support long-term strategic thinking and collaboration in those 
countries and multilateral setting. MacFarlane (2012, p.6) advises that for 
stakeholders to understand the need for effective Collaboration in the security 
sector, it is essential to clarify the definition of National Security and its providers. 
 
2.1.  Concept of National Security 
The concept of security of a nation goes back to the dawn of nation-states 
themselves after the Second World War in 1945 (Watson, 2008, p.3). The modern 
term of national security came into common parlance in the 20th Century during 
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the cold war (Charrett, 2009, p.9). Since then, methodologies to achieve and 
maintain the highest desired state of national security have been consistently 
developed over the modern period to this day (McFarlane, 2012, p.6). 
Consequently, the simultaneously terrorist attacks on New York, Pennsylvania, 
and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, and other threats 
also signalled the emergence of some striking changes in America and in the 
world (Vigoda-Gadot, 2003, p.5). 
 
The concept developed in the United States of America  (USA) after World War 
II, initially focused on military might, but now it encompasses a broad range of 
facets, including the non-military and economic security of the nation and the 
values espoused by the national society (Watson, 2008, p.5). Charrett (2009, 
p.13), however, warns that not everything should be considered as a security issue, 
hence the need for appropriate analysis of the securitisation process. According to 
Buzan et al. (1998, cited by Charret, 2009, p.13), securitisation is a method of 
understanding the threats to security for the survival of the nation and initiating 
priority policies, which demand urgent attention as well as the use of 
extraordinary measures to counter these threats.  
 
Cawthra (2009, p.20), further clarifies that security issues are categorised in four 
components; National Security, Societal Security, Human Security and 
Environmental Security (Table 2.1). While the author commends this concept as it 
outlines components of security and its providers, it has some difficulties in that 
the heading for these components should have been components of National 
Security as all other security elements are covered in this new concept (Watson, 
2008, p.12). The author is of the opinion that Cawthra (2009, p.23) has described 
the national security in a narrow view, covering military attack, economic and 
terrorist threats only. Elements of political and information security are also 
missing in this table, which are critical in National Security (McFarlane, 2012, 
p.3). 
 
In Malawi, issues of NS cannot be over-emphasised as there are threats of external 
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aggression by Tanzania over Lake Malawi border (Omolo, 2012, p.1), cross 
border crime (Kainja, 2012) and violence (Musa, 2013, p.3). While Malawi has 
been developing fast, there have been some challenges due to illegal immigrants 
who have depleted the available resources from the local citizens (Nkhoma, 2013, 
p.31). On political security, issues of bad governance have at times caused the 
withholding of international donor aid resulting in negative impact on economic 
growth, scarcity of fuel, foreign exchange and price increase in basic commodities 
(Kapito et al., 2011, pp.7-9; Ntata, 2013, p.51). 
Table 2.1. Components of Security and Actors 
Source: Cawthra (2009, p. 20) 
 
Form of Security Threats Security Actors 
National International 
National 
security 
Narrow Military attack Armed forces, 
Intelligence, 
agencies 
United Nations 
(UN) 
Alliances 
Expanded Economic  
threats 
State Treasury 
Customs services 
World 
Bank,World 
Trade 
Organisations 
Terrorism Police, Military, 
Intelligence, 
Judiciary 
International 
Police, UN 
Societal security Genocide 
Ethnic 
cleansing 
Armed forces 
Self-defence 
groups 
Intervention 
forces 
Peacekeepers 
Discrimination Lawyers, Human 
rights and 
NGOs 
UN, Non-
Government 
Organisations 
(NGOs) 
Human security Crime Police, Militias 
and Courts 
International 
Criminal Court 
of Justice 
Disease Doctors; 
Hospitals 
World Health 
Organisation 
Poverty Private 
companies 
Charities 
Donors; 
Diasporas 
Environmental 
security 
Security 
from the 
environment 
Natural  
Disasters and 
Global 
warming 
Rescue agencies 
Planning 
agencies 
UN, States and 
NGOs. 
Security of 
the 
environment 
Global 
warming 
Poaching 
Planning 
agencies 
Game wardens 
UN 
NGOs 
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According to Cawthra (2009, p.21), human security is people centred and entails 
protection from crime, freedom from violence and from the fear of violence. It 
also includes a broader range of threats, including environmental pollution, 
infectious diseases, and economic deprivation. Ideally, national security and 
human security should be mutually reinforcing, but in the last 100 years, far more 
people have died as a direct or indirect consequence of the actions of their own 
governments or rebel forces in civil wars than have been killed by invading 
foreign armies (Carafano and Smith, 2006, p.6). Acting in the name of NS, 
governments can pose profound threats to human security (Schnabel, 2008, pp.87-
95; Charret, 2009, p.25). The author feels that if all these components of NS are to 
be achieved, there is need for effective leadership by various stakeholders and 
agrees with Northouse (2013, p.3). 
 
2.2.  Leadership Defined 
“Leadership: the art of getting someone else to do something you want done 
because he wants to do it.” -Eisenhower, D. D. (2012). 
 
According to Northouse (2013, p.5) “Leadership” is a process by which a person 
influences others to accomplish an objective and directs the organisation in a way 
that makes it more cohesive and coherent. Halligan (2010, p.91) earlier stated that 
leadership comes when people need to be shown a new way ahead with 
motivation, even if their instinct is to stick with the familiarity of the old 
tendencies. Northouse (2013, p.6) adds that leadership should effect meaningful 
change for a particular course of action. This makes it different from normal 
management, which is usually misinterpreted to mean the same as leadership. 
According to Northouse (2013, p.12), leadership is far more critical for an 
industry or organisation to realise more profits and achieve desired objectives as it 
concentrates on vision, change and strategies. Archer and Cameron (2013, p.9), 
however, points out that leadership is probably the most researched and yet the 
least understood topic in the context of management, hence the need to understand 
the leadership styles and compare their positive-negative impacts. 
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2.3.  Leadership Styles 
Leadership styles encompass how leaders relate to others within and outside the 
organisation, how they view themselves and their position and to a very large 
extent, whether or not they are successful as leaders (Northouse, 2013, pp.4-5). If 
a task needs to be accomplished, how does a particular leader set out to get it 
done? If an emergency arises, how does a leader handle it? If the organisation 
needs the support of the community, how does a leader go about mobilising it? All 
of these questions could best be answered depending on the leadership style. 
Factors that also influence the style to be used include:  how much time is 
available, whether relationships are based on respect and trust or on disrespect, 
who has the information; you, your employees, or both, how well your employees 
are trained and how well you know the task, internal conflicts, stress levels, type 
of task whether it is structured, unstructured, complicated, or simple and laws or 
established procedures and training plans (Miller, 2008, p.5). For purposes of this 
study and to remain focused on the current topic of study, only leadership styles 
more practiced in the security sector with a few cases in other sectors have been 
discussed. These are autocratic, bureaucratic, transformational and collaborative 
leadership. 
 
2.3.1. Autocratic Leadership Style 
Autocratic is a classic/tactical model of “military” style of leadership termed, 
“Commanding”, probably the most often used because the objective is very clear, 
such as “defeat the enemy”, but the least effective (Chrislip, 1994, p.127; 
Goldman, 2000). Autocratic management style operates with the manager in 
control and issues orders because he/she feels more knowledgeable. Subordinates 
are given some level of flexibility in carrying out their work, but within specific 
limits and procedure (Bass, 2008, p440). The communication in groups led by 
autocratic leaders is top-down and individuals are promoted on favouritism and 
office politics (Chrislip, 1994, p.128). Since it rarely involves praise and 
frequently employs criticism, it undercuts morale, job satisfaction and leads to 
absenteeism of employees (Nordmeyer, 2012, p.1).In security organisations, this 
leadership style is, however, used in time of critical missions or during 
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emergencies, where taking the time to debate orders would cause property damage, 
mission failure or injury (Nordmeyer, 2012, p.1). 
 
While the author understands the need for autocratic directives in combat 
scenarios, it is important to look at long-term strategic leadership when it comes to 
broader issues on NS in peacetime that involves several actors and not just a 
single organisation. In Malawi, the autocratic directive by the one party state 
government in 1983 where 3 Ministers (Aaron Gadama, Dick Matenje and Twaibu 
Sangala) and a Member of Parliament (David Chiwanga) were brutally killed by 
the Malawi Police Mobile Force in Mwanza district because of their democratic 
opinion in parliament (Kalinga, 2012, p.175) was a good example of the problems 
of this leadership. According to the author‟s knowledge, who was working at the 
MDF headquarters, the MDF and other security actors were not consulted to find a 
peaceful solution to this tragedy, as is also indicated by Kalinga (2012, p.339). 
 
2.3.2.  Bureaucratic Leadership 
According to Bass (2008, p.30), the bureaucrat knows the rules of the institution 
and has the team abided by them. When there are rigid policies and guidelines in 
place, the bureaucrat makes sure that they are maintained and used to the best of 
their ability. Northouse (2013, p.100) show that leaders in organisational 
departments that used coercive/directing and bureaucratic styles of leadership had 
low productivity. This seems to be in line with what the author is arguing that 
these are routine responsibilities in a similar organisation and not effecting 
meaningful change for inter-agency functions. Lamb and Marks (2010, p.16) point 
out that in the USA, bureaucratic leadership has affected most international 
operations as intelligence officers report to their headquarters in Washington 
instead of their immediate commanders or Ambassadors or working partners. 
These are similar challenges to Malawi as was the case stated earlier (Paragraph 
2.3.1) where the Police killed prominent Malawian politicians. The Inspector 
General of Police at that time did not share this information with his counterpart 
the Army General in order to seek a better solution to this problem, but only got 
orders from his top authorities (Mandiza, 2002; Kalinga, 2012, p. 339). 
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2.3.3. Transformational leadership 
Transformational leadership is defined as a leadership approach that causes 
change in individuals and social systems (Northouse 2013, P.186).  Enacted in its 
authentic form, transformational leadership enhances the motivation, morale and 
performance of followers through a variety of mechanisms.  These include 
connecting the follower‟s sense of identity and self to the mission and the 
collective identity of the organisation; being a role model for followers that 
inspires them; challenging followers to take greater ownership for their work, and 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of followers, so the leader can align 
followers with tasks that optimise their performance (Bass 2008, P.618). 
Burns (1978) first introduced the concept of transforming leadership in his 
descriptive research on political leaders, but this term is now used in other 
organisational systems as well.  Burns related to the difficulty in differentiation 
between management and leadership and claimed that the differences are in 
characteristics and behaviours.  He established two concepts; “transforming 
leadership” and “transactional leadership”.  According to Burns, the transforming 
approach creates significant change in the life of people and organisations.  It 
redesigns perceptions and values, and changes expectations and aspirations of 
employees.  Unlike in the transactional approach, it is not based on a “give and 
take” leadership, but on the leaders‟ personality, traits and ability to make a 
change through example, articulation of an energising vision and challenging 
goals.  Transforming leaders are idealised in the sense that they are a moral 
exemplar of working towards the benefit of the team, organisation or community 
and can change organisational culture (Northouse 2013, P187). 
Archer and Cameron (2013, p.11) are quick to observe that in complex 
organisations with different tasks, there is need for more professionalism and 
characteristics of collaborative leadership styles. They add that most leadership 
styles used only focus on one organisation, maybe with different departments or 
sections. They suggest, therefore, that all leadership styles should culminate into 
collaborative leadership which would include various skills and working with 
different organisations and stakeholders.  
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Equally, in Malawi, transformational leadership has been a topic for discussion by 
various studies. According to Kakhobwe et al. (2013, p.2), Malawi needs to 
transform in the conduct of NS issues to enable stakeholders to work together. 
This is echoed by Chirwa (2013, p.12) that security actors need to transform and 
share relevant information in order to respond to threats in a coordinated manner. 
Chilima et al. (2015) also emphasise on transformed leadership in the Public 
Service in Malawi by initiating a number of reforms that include promotion of NS 
interests through effective collaborative leadership that this study aims to achieve.  
2.3.4. Collaborative leadership 
“Collaborative Leadership is about leading as a peer, not as a supervisor, excite 
and influence a group to achieve a shared goal.” -Russell Linden (2010, p.77) 
 
Collaborative leadership (CL) refers to taking a leadership role in a coalition, 
organisation, or other enterprise, where everyone is on an equal footing and 
working together to solve a problem or create something new (Archer and 
Cameron, 2013, p.10). It has more benefits of money savings, increased capacity, 
waste is reduced and investment can be made once so that the wheel is not re-
invented (McKenna, 2011, p.1). According to Chrislip (2002, p.44), the leader is 
not in control of the group, with no distinction for position or money, but has 
responsibility for guiding and coordinating the process by which the group 
decides upon and carries out actions to accomplish its goals. Collaborative leaders 
usually have no formal power or authority and they exercise leadership in what is 
perhaps the most difficult context.  
 
Archer and Cameron (2013, p.213) adds that CL involves listening and 
understanding possible answers from various perspectives, unlike Autocratic 
Leadership which tends to do all the talking and “has the answer” and imposes 
solutions and decisions. Chrislip (1994, p.52) earlier explained that collaborative 
leaders share common qualities as they are willing to take risks, share knowledge 
and power; and acknowledge the achievement of others and emphasise the success 
of the group over the success of specific individuals. Collaborative leaders 
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understand that the benefits of success outweigh the setbacks that may be 
encountered along the way. They are, thus, comfortable with risk and will see 
routes that others avoid as potential opportunities for advantage in order to get 
things done. Table 2.2 by Linden (2010, p.xxvi) illustrates the levels of 
collaboration.  
Table 2.2. Levels of Collaboration Scale 
Levels Purpose Structure  Process 
Networking • Dialog and common 
understanding 
• Clearinghouse for 
information 
• Create base of 
support 
• Non-hierarchical 
• Loose/ flexible link 
• Roles loosely defined 
• Community action is 
primary link among 
members 
• Low key 
leadership 
• Minimal decision 
making 
• Little conflict 
 
 
Cooperation 
or 
Alliance 
• Match needs and 
provide coordination 
• Limit duplication of 
services 
• Ensure tasks are 
done 
• Central body of 
people as 
communication hub 
• Semi-final links 
• Links are advisory 
• Group leverages/ 
raises money 
• Facilitative 
leaders 
• Complex decision 
making 
• Some conflict and 
some little 
communication 
Coalition • Share ideas and be 
willing to pull 
resources from 
existing systems 
• Develop 
commitment for a 
minimum of three 
years 
• All members 
involved in decision 
making 
• Roles and time 
defined 
• Links formal with 
written agreement 
 
• Shared leadership 
• Decision making 
formal with all 
members 
• Communication is 
common and 
prioritised 
Collaboration • Accomplish shared 
vision and impact 
•  Benchmarks 
• Build 
interdependent 
system to address 
issues and 
opportunities 
 
• Consensus used in 
shared decision 
making 
• Links are formal and 
written in work 
assignments 
• Leadership high, 
trust level high, 
productivity high 
• Ideas and 
decisions equally 
shared 
• Highly developed 
communication 
Source: Linden (2010, p.xxvi) 
 
The table above outlines a good explanation of various levels and this study is 
emphasising on full collaboration in order to accomplish shared vision and 
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decision-making. The author, however, finds some gaps in this collaboration 
model, as it does not mention about the effectiveness of CL and strategies in 
decision making. Archers and Cameron (2013, p.142) comments that CL is not 
easy; as up to 70% of strategic alliances fail due to various factors. This study 
examined strategy and decision making process for effective collaboration, which 
are discussed in the following sections.  
 
2.4. Strategy and Decision Making 
The concept of Strategy has been adopted from the military and adapted for 
decision making in management, leadership, and business development (Nickols 
2012, p.2). According to Strachan (2013, p.235), Strategy is a declaration of intent 
or plan and an indication of the possible means required to fulfil that requirement. 
Freedman (2013, p.554) adds that Strategy is a position; that is; it reflects 
decision(s) to offer during different situation(s) to accommodate a changing 
reality for better. While both definitions of strategy by Strachan (2013, p.235)  and 
Freedman (2013, p.554) are appropriate, Freedman‟s definition  conforms well 
with this study as it is concerned with processes for making appropriate strategic 
decisions and actions in the interest of NS and prosperity for Malawi.  
Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.1) defined Decision Making as a thought process of 
selecting a logical choice from the available options. They constructed three 
different ways through which analysts can examine events: the "Rational Actor" 
model, the "Organizational Behaviour" model, and the "Governmental Politics" 
model. To illustrate the models, Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.4-6) posed three 
questions in the case study of the Cuban crisis that took place in 1961: First, Why 
did the Soviet Union decide to place offensive missiles in Cuba? Second, why did 
the United States respond to the missile deployment with a blockade? And Third, 
Why did the Soviet Union withdraw the missiles? In order to synthesize the 
concept of decision making while taking into account of the case of Soviet Union, 
each of the model proposed by Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.1) are hereinafter 
described with appropriate literature:  
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2.4.1. The "Rational Actor" Model 
Basically, under this model, Governments are treated as the primary actors. The 
Government examines a set of goals, evaluates them according to their utility 
maximizing potential, then picks the one that has the highest "payoff (Allison, 
1999, p.18). While this is a good model, Allison (1999, p.24), however, described 
that at times, using rational actor models are dangerous as they ignore a lot of new 
emerging facts. By using such models and modes of thinking, leaders may make 
unreliable assumptions about reality, which could have disastrous consequences. 
In Essence of Decision, Allison (1999) suggests that one reason for the popularity 
of rational actor model is that, compared to other models; it requires relatively 
little data and provides researchers with an "inexpensive approximation" of the 
situation. However, humans are not inextricably bound to act in a rational manner, 
which history has proven time and time again; hence the need to look at other 
alternative models. 
 
2.4.2. The Organizational Behaviour Model 
Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.143) noted there were many facts that the rational 
model had to ignore, such as why the Soviets failed to camouflage the nuclear 
sites during construction, but did so only after U-2 flights pinpointed their 
locations. Allison (1999) cited work by James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, 
which argue that existing governmental bureaucracy places limits on a nation's 
actions, and often dictates the final outcome. According to the „bureaucratic 
politics‟ paradigm, one cannot safely assume that security functions will always 
be the ones determining the actual behaviour of such agencies, as all agencies are 
selfish in the sense of promoting their own corporate interests (Allison 1971; 
Halperin et al. 2006 cited by Cawthra 2009, p.27). To improve the same, Allison 
and Zelikow (1999) then urged the following "organizational process" model 
propositions: 
 When faced with a crisis, government leaders don't look at it as a whole, 
but break it down and assign it according to pre-established organizational 
lines, 
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 Because of time and resource limitations, rather than evaluating all 
possible courses of action to see which one is most likely to work, leaders 
settle on the first proposal that adequately addresses the issue, 
 Leaders gravitate towards solutions that limit short-term uncertainty, that is 
emphasis on "short-term" solutions, 
 Organizations follow available set "repertoires" and procedures when 
taking actions, and 
 Because of the large resources and time required to fully plan and mobilize 
actions within a large organization or government, leaders are effectively 
limited to pre-existing plans. 
Under this theory, the crisis is explained that since the Soviets never established 
nuclear missile bases outside of their country at the time, they assigned the tasks 
to established departments which, in turn, followed their own available set 
procedures. However, their procedures were not adapted to Cuban conditions, and 
as a result, mistakes were made that allowed the U.S. to quite easily learn of the 
program's existence. Such strategic mistakes included such gaffes as supposedly 
undercover Soviet troops decorating their barracks with Red Army Stars viewable 
from above. Without any back-up plan, the Soviets had to withdraw (Allison and 
Zelikow 1999, p.121). 
4.2.3. The "Governmental Politics" Model 
Furthermore, Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.255) proposed a third model, which 
takes into account of "palace politics". While statesmen don't like to admit they 
play politics to get things done, especially in high-stakes situations such as the 
Cuban missile crisis, they nonetheless do. Allison and Zelikow (1999) proposed 
the following propositions for this model to work optimally: 
 A nation's actions are best understood as the result of politicking and 
negotiation by its top leaders, 
 Even if they share a goal, leaders differ in how to achieve it because of 
such factors as personal interests and background, 
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 Even if a leader holds absolute power, such as the President of the United 
States, is technically the commander-in-chief, the leader must gain a 
consensus with his underlings or risk having his order misunderstood or, in 
some cases, ignored, 
 Related to the above proposition, the make-up of a leader's entourage will 
have a large effect on the final decision such as an entourage of "yes men" 
will create a different outcome than a group of advisors who are willing to 
voice disagreement, 
 Leaders have different levels of power based on charisma, personality, 
skills of persuasion, and personal ties to decision-makers, 
 If leaders are certain enough, they will not seek input from their advisors, 
but rather, approval. Likewise, if leaders have already implicitly decided 
on a particular course of action, an advisor wishing to have influence must 
work within the framework of the decision the leaders have already made, 
 If a leader fails to reach a consensus with his inner circle or, at least, the 
appearance of a consensus, opponents may take advantage of these 
disagreements. Therefore, effective leaders must create a consensus, and 
 Because of the possibilities of miscommunication, misunderstandings, and 
downright disagreements, different leaders may take actions that the group 
as a whole would not approve of. 
Whilst Allison and Zelikow (1999) did not claim that any of their additional two 
models could fully explain anything, they noted that policymakers and analysts 
alike would benefit from stepping away from the traditional model and exploring 
alternate viewpoints. Another argument is that the information needed for 
bureaucratic and political models is so large that it is impractical to use in such a 
crisis. Although Allison (1999, p.401) has conceded that this is true, he argued that 
this does not mean that a person should automatically revert to the rational actor 
worldview. Moreover, he pointed out that the "rational actor" model continues to 
be applied even in long-term analyses including analyses that take place long after 
the event or "crisis" is past. Considering the three decision making models 
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outlined in the three sections above, this study also explored the decision making 
process for Malawi. The brief explanation is provided for in the next section. 
2.4.4. Political Decision Making in Malawi 
Like other democratic countries, the Republic of Malawi is institutionally 
governed by the Constitution which was formulated and passed in 2010 by the 
majority citizens of Malawi. Consistent with the constitutional mandate, the 
Constitution of Malawi (2010, Chapter 1, Sections 7-9) provides the establishment 
of the three arms of Government; the Executive, the Legislature or the Parliament, 
and the Judiciary. These institutions have different roles and are also required to 
work independently without interfering into the mandate of the other. The 
Executive, which comprises the State President, the Cabinet Ministers, 
Government Ministries, and Departments, formulates policies, goals, and 
objectives. The Parliament discusses and passes bills and regulations that reflect 
the interest of the majority people of Malawi. The president is further mandated 
by the Constitution (2010, Chap. 7, Sec. 89) to assent to these bills to be enacted 
into laws of Malawi. In turn, the Judiciary interpret and protect these laws and 
policies and make the necessary implementation measures including punitive 
rewards for those that breach NS programmes. This study arrangement contends 
that there is the highest support and endorsement from both political and 
government leadership for NS related issues in Malawi.  
 
According to the Inspector General of Police, however, at times, these institutions 
in Malawi have had problems in working together to promote inclusive NS 
(Mtika, 2012, p.1). He cited a case, where illegal immigrants and criminals were 
arrested by the Malawi Police, which is part of the Executive arm of the 
Government, but they were quickly defended and awarded very lenient 
punishments by the Judiciary. Explaining the possible reasons for the NS 
implementation problems in Malawi, Chirwa (2013, p.4) argue that information 
failure is one of the main causes to the problems. He points out that there is 
limited sharing of information among the security stakeholders in order to make 
effective informed decisions in Malawi. For better understanding in strategies and 
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realistic decision making processes, this study also examined other models in the 
NS set up on the international scene, which can also be borrowed by Malawi for 
promotion of NS and prosperity of Malawians. 
 
2.5.  Inter-organisational collaborative models on national security 
“Benchmarking models are useful to determine who is very best; how good are 
they and how do we get that good.”- F. John Rey (2002). 
 
Thomas et al. (2011, p.3) defined an Inter-organisational Collaborative Capacity 
model as the capability of organisations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-
organisational systems in pursuit of collective security outcomes. This usually 
functions without an over-arching command authority and is used to a limited 
extent in NS (Coates, 2011, p.4). As such, it requires leadership engagement to 
guide, motivate, and structure the collaborations needed to be successful in the 
complex security environment. In this study, the author examined a comparative 
case of the USA National Security collaborative model as benchmark, which has 
been successful in achieving both the domestic and international security agenda 
(Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6). 
 
2.5.1. The United States National Security collaborative model 
The USA National Security organisation was first established on 26th July 1947, 
when U.S. President Harry Truman signed the National Security Act after the 
Second World War. Together with its 1949 amendment, this act created the 
Department of Defence, and the Department of the Air Force from the existing 
United States Army Air Forces. It subordinated the military branches to the 
Secretary of Defence, established the National Security Council (NSC) and 
chartered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The NSC is the President's 
principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with 
his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The Council also serves 
as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various 
government agencies. According to Lamb and Mark (2010, p.8) today, the United 
States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and 
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political influence because of this collaborative arrangement and recognition of 
lead agencies. 
 
While the USA model is a good example to benchmark with other collaborations, 
Lamb and Mark (2010, p.3), however, observe that most national security systems 
have several problems. They point out that at the heart of the problem is the 
inability to reconcile a desire for a clear chain of command from the President 
down through the heads of the departments, organisations and agencies with the 
need to empower new mechanisms with sufficient authority to integrate efforts 
across the departments. The national security advisor is just an advisor to the 
President and neither the advisor nor staffs have any directive authority over the 
departments and agencies to be able to integrate inter-departmental efforts (Kanter 
et al., 2006; Lamb and Marks, 2010, p.5). According to Myers and McConnell 
(2009, p.281), the USA has, however, greatly improved its inter-departmental 
coordination with the appointment of the National Director of Intelligence (DNI) 
after the 2001 terrorist incident. 
 
Impediments to inter-agency integration are rooted in the basic structure of the 
national security system, which is hierarchical and based upon a functional 
division of labour among powerful departments and agencies with authorities and 
prerogatives codified in law and often protected by corresponding congressional 
committees (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.7).These departments and agencies resist 
cooperation with one another and the heads of department assert tight control over 
their subordinates and strong organisational cultures. The clear line of authority 
from the President down through the department and agency heads and their 
subordinates, often referred to as “unity of command”, comes at the expense of 
unity of effort because, for fear of losing their powers, departments refuse to work 
together, even on missions of national importance. 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the USA National Security model (Lamb and Mark, 2010, 
p.6).It must be mentioned here that competition for power and authority for any 
National Security System rests on the President; thus, the President has the 
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authority to direct integrated efforts (Lamb and Marks, 2010, p.5). According to 
Zegart (2007, p.59), the limited collaboration in the USA national security 
structure, especially between the CIA, the Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI) and 
the Defence Force, resulted in the breakdown of information exchange. 
 
Figure 2.1. USA National Model 
 
 
As a result, in September, 2001, Al-Qaeda made simultaneous attacks using 
hijacked commercial aircrafts and destroyed the World Trade Centre in New York, 
the Pentagon headquarters in Washington DC and Pennsylvania and there were 
little or delayed responses from the security sector (Zegart, 2007, P.40). 
Complicating this issue was that attempts to increase collaborative leadership in 
the intelligence community were also dismissed by the Pentagon and Defence 
oversight officials, who succeeded in obstructing intelligence reform bills in both 
the House and the Senate to enable security organisations to work together 
(Coates, 2011, p.36). The Malawi National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), which is 
equivalent to the combination of the CIA and FBI in the USA, is also yet to 
develop a Parliamentary Act to guide its collaborative activities with other 
organisations. At the time of this study, the NIB was operating under the Police 
Act 2009. 
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According to the Constitution of Malawi (2010) the structure and command of the 
security organisations are similar to the American model. The President is the 
Commander In-Chief of the Malawi Defence Force (Malawi Constitution, 2010 
Chap. V111, Sec. 78) and directs other organisations and departments as head of 
the Executive branch. In 2008, the Office of the President and Cabinet established 
the office of the National Security Advisor (NSA), one of the few positions in 
Africa. The author was appointed the first NSA with the responsibility of 
coordinating the agenda for National Security.  
 
The author, however, observed that collaborative efforts in Malawi were 
challenging like the USA model as practical frameworks for inter-agency 
collaboration at horizontal levels were limited and that the NSA has limited 
binding authority to coordinate with other security actors (Lamb and marks, 2010, 
p.5). The author tried to initiate written and practical guidelines for collaboration 
with other organisations including the formulation of the National Security Policy 
and Strategy. The President, Professor Bingu Mutharika, approved this process in 
2008 and consultations and meetings to draft the policy had commenced. There 
were, however, some setbacks in that some leaders from other organisations like 
the NIB could not send their representative despite the president‟s approval and 
directive, which the author had communicated to them. They verbally claimed that 
they had their own mandate and way of doing things. These are some of the 
challenges experienced due to limited legal mandate and authority for 
collaborative leaders to drive the coordination. Considering that the effective USA 
model example was outside the African continent, this study further explored the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Defence and Security Pact to 
benchmark in the African context. 
 
2.5.2. SADC Mutual Defence Pact model 
The SADC model is an example of collaborative success on the African Security 
regional context. It was chosen because there were no other individual country 
case study models in the sub-Saharan Africa. The climax of the long evolution 
towards regional security in the SADC occurred at the organisation's August, 2003 
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Summit with the signing of the community's Mutual Defence Pact to enable 
Defence and Security organisations to work together (Ngoma, 2007, pp.411-423). 
The SADC is now able to coordinate Defence and Security programmes through 
enforcement of peace in the region, joint training and exercises among multi-
country security organisations and sharing of information through its headquarters 
in Botswana. This is an effective arrangement to learn from as Malawi is a 
member of SADC and participates in these programmes. This study, however, 
noted some challenges in that at present, there are only two individuals at the 
Secretariat with a mandate to deal with issues of peace and security (Schalkwyk, 
2005, p.37). There is need for more staff from other security organisations that 
would ensure effective analysis of the threats and coordinated action. 
 
The other problem is separation of the secretariat. According to the SADC Treaty 
(1992, articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol), the SADC Secretariat is responsible for 
providing services to the Organ of Politics, Defence and Security Council 
(Adebajo et al., 2013, p.38). As an interim measure, the country chairing the 
Organ has been providing secretarial and administrative support. This 
arrangement has created problems of continuity and institutional memory that 
need to be addressed at the earliest possible stage through the creation of relevant 
processes and policies to manage the transfer of control to the Secretariat. 
According to Adebajo et al. (2013, p.38), the Executive Secretary is also accorded 
little authority for decision-making, which also creates power vacuum, a problem 
that this study is addressing.  
 
It is also noted that the Defence Pact Model still lacks some detailed written 
modalities on exactly how to share information with codes and what measures to 
be taken to those that do not contribute as required. These are clear examples that 
without written protocols, whilst such collaborations are good, they would be 
questioned and cannot be very successful. The other challenge is that this is a 
regional security model and may not address specific collaboration for a single 
country. The author suggests that the arguments presented above could perhaps be 
addressed if stakeholders have a clear understanding of the need for CL and its 
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impact through practical case studies in Malawi and other countries. This led the 
author to study some practical examples, where Collaborative Leadership made 
positive impact on National Security and prosperity. 
 
2.6. Positive Impact of Collaborative Leadership in the Security Sector of 
Malawi 
In the following sections, cases indicating the positive impact of collaborative 
leadership have been discussed including the joint operations to combat crime in 
Malawi and efforts to prevent proliferation of small arms. Challenges that hinder 
their great successes have also been highlighted. 
 
2.6.1. Successful Case A: Joint operations to combat crime 
Operations code named “Chotsa Mbabva” (Remove criminals) in 1995, 2013 and 
2014 jointly conducted by the Malawi Defence Force and Police service in 
Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu cities are examples of good collaboration in 
combating crime and maintaining law and order (Msiska and Lazarus, 2014, p.4). 
The National Intelligence Bureau was also involved to provide information for 
criminals and suspects, while the departments of immigration and Local 
Government officials were tasked to inspect resident permits and trade licenses for 
suspected illegal immigrants, who were doing businesses. According to police 
report by Nankhonya (2013, p.1), in the joint operations conducted in the cities of 
Lilongwe and Mzuzu in October 2013, over 800 criminals and illegal immigrants 
were arrested, while several stolen properties were recovered. In 2014 joint 
operations, 218 illegal immigrants were arrested and 2 illegal rifles recovered. 
 
The author, however, observed some problems here because there are limited 
detailed written joint documents on allocation of tasks in joint operations apart 
from organisational roles stipulated in the constitution (1995). Kuwali (2012, 
p.85) also stated that while the Malawi constitution provides that the Military 
assist the civil authorities in combating crime, the questions that still need to be 
worked on are when and how? These operations are only temporarily measures to 
silence criminals at a certain period and could not sustain the required NS (Lusinje, 
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2014, p.1). This supports the view that if these operations will continue without 
proper guidance on who is the lead agency and how to measure success, one day 
there could be a breakdown in civil-military relations as it could create power 
struggle and non-satisfaction on the common goal resulting into a democratic 
coup de tat as was the case in Egypt (Varol, 2013, p.1). The author feels that these 
could be sustained if there were clear written joint inter-agency procedures for 
coordinated plans as is the case with small arms committee in Malawi. 
 
2.6.2. Successful Case B: Prevention of proliferation of illegal small arms 
The study conducted by independent experts Mwakasungura and Nungu (2005), 
showed an increase in violent armed crime and recommended that the matter be 
urgently addressed through coordinated effort. Of singular importance, the study 
undertook to shed light on the sources of small arms. Among other sources, some 
illicit arms like AK 47, pistols and homemade muzzle-loaded guns came from 
Malawi's neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, which had been at war 
(Mwakasungura, 2005, p.80). This arrangement was a great success as a number 
of firearms were recovered and over 1,000 illegal firearms were destroyed in 2006 
and 3,127 were destroyed in 2014 (Chauwa, 2014, p.1). This is a good revelation 
that supports the author‟s view that transnational threats are real and need a 
number of actors to collaborate to be effectively mitigated. 
 
Based on the study of Mwakasungura and Nungu (2005), Malawi established the 
inter-Ministerial committee on anti-proliferation of small arms in 2006 (Kayira, 
2010, p.2). Members of the National Committee comprise the Malawi Police 
Service as the lead agency, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, President‟s Office, 
Education, Police, Defence, Malawi Revenue Authority, Immigration, Justice, 
Trade and Industry, Economic Development and Planning, Intelligence, Parks and 
Wildlife, Ombudsman, Malawi Human Rights Commission and Malawi Law 
Commission. Civil society organisations that are incorporated on the National 
Focal Point are: Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), Public 
Affairs Committee, National Initiative for Civic Education and Regional 
Community Policing Forums. 
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The problem, however, is that, again, there are limited tasks laid out in a joint 
written document to clarify this collaborative effort. There have been some armed 
robberies in the recent past, which is an indication that this collaborative 
committee need to work more to eradicate illegal firearms. Kayira (2010, p.3) 
adds that the challenge is also that the national focal point has no supporting staff 
secretariat and gets more support from CHRR. There are also limited written 
strategies on how security actors could jointly respond to this threat apart from 
conducting ad-hoc inter-departmental meetings to share information and respond 
to the United Nations requirement on ratification of illicit proliferation of small 
arms. Sometimes these meetings are not conducted at all depending on the 
relations of various leaders at the time. These limited written details to outline 
collaborative actions where several organisations need to be involved have 
resulted in serious breakdown and negative impact in National Security in various 
countries including Malawi. 
 
2.7.  Negative impact due to limited collaborative leadership among 
security organisations. 
The clashes between the Malawi Defence Force (MDF) and Malawi Young 
Pioneers (MYP) and civil mass demonstrations of 20th July 2011, are some 
examples, which required more collaboration among security actors. The 
following sections outline these cases. 
 
2.7.1. Unsuccessful Case A: Clashes between Malawi Defence Force and 
Malawi Young Pioneers, worked as rivalries 
Malawi is one of the few African countries that have not experienced a military 
coup or a civil war. However, the country experienced clashes between the MDF 
and MYP due to competition for power and limited policies to enable them work 
collaboratively (Mandiza, 2002, p.127). The MYP was a party militia; trained by 
the Israelis in 1964, whose main roles included the development of engineering, 
mechanics, agriculture and development of the youth (Rupiya, 2005, p.119). On 
31st October, 1964, speaking at a graduation of pioneers, the former president Dr 
Kamuzu Banda, recorded that he wanted „tractors and rifles‟ for the MYP; tractors 
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to till the soil and rifles to defend the nation, and indeed the pioneers paraded with 
their rifles on that day (Mandiza, 2002, p.121). According to Phiri (2008, p.24), 
the MYP was the president‟s most favoured organisation, it became an auxiliary 
organ of the presidency and subordinated to the president alone. Its main purpose 
was to ensure that everyone conformed to political party policy and in doing so it 
became increasingly secretive and militarised.  
 
In 1985, there was an attempt to turn the MYP into an overt military organisation 
along the lines of the army, a departure from the territorial concept as stipulated 
by the president in 1964. Their rank structure was militarised with their 
commander holding the rank of Lieutenant General. However, the army resented 
this move and when the media began to carry reports of Majors, Colonels and 
Brigadiers from the MYP addressing political party meetings, the army had 
serious reservations and political leaders became uneasy. The MYP then 
discontinued the use of military ranks but with reservations and resistance.  
 
In 1990‟s, there was a global wave of multi-party democracy. The National 
Consultative Council (NCC), the most effective forum for managing the transition, 
resolved to have MYP delinked from the ruling party and its members absorbed 
into either the police or the army, but the Army declined as the issue was not like 
reconciliation after civil war. The pioneers became increasingly hostile to the 
army as they sought to maintain the status quo. According to Phiri (2008, p.29), on 
1
st
 December, 1993 members of the MYP deliberately shot and killed two soldiers 
in Mzuzu after a disagreement at a local drinking place. When a senior official of 
the MYP, speaking on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) said that the 
MYP were preparing to deal with any reaction from the army, the conflict erupted.  
 
On the morning of 3rd December, 1993, the army attacked the MYP headquarters, 
the ruling party headquarters in Lilongwe and Mzuzu office in an operation that 
was code named “Bwezani”, meaning return all (Chazema, 2010, p.1). This was 
like an act of rebellion, but technically, it was legitimate since the NCC, the only 
credible body at the time, had called for the dissolution of the MYP (Chiziko, 
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2006, cited by Phiri, 2008, p.29). According to Mandiza (2002, p.124), during 
operation “Bwezani”, the Army retrieved secret documents that indicated that the 
MYP intelligence operatives kept dossiers on every army officer and mostly 
reported on personal negative issues to the President instead of issues of national 
importance. In addition to this anomaly, the MYPs did not collaborate much with 
the police special branch and worked as rivalries (Rupiya, 2005, p.120). 
According to historian Richard Mkandawire (2008, cited by Kachipande, 2013, 
p.2), the MYPs were extremely unpopular among the general population for their 
sometimes ruthless and coercive manner in mobilising local communities for 
supporting the ruling party. According to Phiri (2000, pp.1-15), the MYPs were, 
however, useful in economic development and youth empowerment programmes. 
 
The author noted that there are many lessons to be learnt here. Initially, the MYP 
did a very commendable job in improving economic development, agriculture and 
security because of their professional training and that they were deployed 
throughout the country even in rural areas (Mandiza, 2002, p.121). However, there 
are several challenges as seen by their ruthless intimidation (Kachipande, 2013, 
p.2), competition for power and limited written protocols on how the MYP would 
work together with other security organisations in addition to their initial role of 
youth and economic development. Kachipande (2013, p.3) suggests that the youth 
programme could still be revived, but need to be non-partisan if it has to be 
productive. What is also very worrisome is that while the disarmament of the 
MYP was done, there has been no post-mortem among stakeholders on how best 
to resolve such future challenges within the security sector (Chazema, 2010, p.3).  
 
2.7.2. Unsuccessful Case B: Violent civil demonstrations of 20th July, 2011 
and death of 20 People 
According to the Malawi government commission of inquiry (Khoviwa et al., 
2012), the civil demonstrations on 20th July 2011, resulted in the death of 20 
citizens and destruction of several properties in the cities of Mzuzu, Lilongwe, 
Blantyre and Karonga. The Malawi Human Rights Commission report by Kapito 
et al. (2011, p.7), which is a government parastatal organisation (Malawi 
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Constitution, Section 129), indicated that the problem started after the Civil 
Society Organisations (CSO) supported by the opposition political parties 
compiled a petition that was submitted to government prior to the July 20 
demonstrations. The petition outlined some issues including the acute shortage of 
foreign exchange and fuel, the need for holding of Local Government Elections, 
sale of the Presidential Jet and raising the minimum salary wages to MK25, 000 
among others (Kapito et al., 2011, p.10). 
 
What really happened to provoke this situation to violent demonstrations cannot 
conclusively be put to light in this study, as some issues were political in nature. 
However, what can vividly be recognised is that there was lack of collaboration 
between the leadership from the CSO organising the demonstrations on one hand; 
and the executive and security arms of government on the other (Kapito et al., 
2011, p.10). For example, both leaders of the CSO and core security organisations 
were not at the major demonstration scenes to closely monitor the security 
situation and advise effective strategies to control them. It also appeared that there 
was limited sharing of information and practical collaborative procedures as the 
Defence Force only came in the following day to assist the Police when valuable 
property and life were already lost.  
 
The Commission of Inquiry established that this violence was precipitated because 
some media houses conducted themselves in an unprofessional manner that 
contributed to the public disorder (Khoviwa et al., 2012, p.10). For instance, the 
media houses carried live coverage of the looting, arson and the consequent deaths 
and injuries as they unfolded, which in the opinion of the Commission incited 
violence in other parts of the country. Sometimes, there was lack of balanced 
information, which entails the important role that non-military institutions could 
play in promoting or betraying national security (Kapito et al., 2011, p.11; 
Kakhobwe et al., 2013, p.9). While demonstrations are people‟s rights and may 
not be denied as they achieve some desired objectives, violent demonstrations 
usually have negative impact on the economy as property is destroyed and some 
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investors lose confidence, as was the case in Egypt (Varol, 2013, p.1; Abdou and 
Zaazou, 2013, p. 92). 
 
It is observed that violent civil demonstrations are defined as an incident that 
requires practical ways to mitigate. For example, the Defence Force Act (2006), 
states that the Army will assist the Police in maintenance of law and order, but 
there are limited written procedures to determine exactly when and how to 
intervene (Kuwali, 2012, p.76). This problem may not just be for Malawi as a 
similar scenario occurred in the United Kingdom on 9
th
August, 2011, when the 
worst violence broke out. Rioters damaged property worth over 100 million 
pounds and there was no practical framework to deploy the military to assist the 
police (Hawkes, et al., 2011, p.1). This was a hot debate in the Parliament House 
of Commons and a concrete solution is yet to be resolved.  
 
Further, this study illustrates a concern on how Malawian stakeholders sometimes 
debate on issues of national security and development. For example, the demand 
to sell a presidential jet was a step backwards. Leaders should avoid individual 
interests, political affiliations and organisational differences in key national issues. 
A presidential jet is an important facility for Malawi, although others have 
different opinion due to Malawi‟s low level of economic development (Kapito et 
al., 2011, p.10), which also need to be respected. It should be recalled, however, 
that the contested jet was a replacement of the old one that was sold because it 
was used for over 30 years by the former Presidents Dr Kamuzu Banda and Dr 
Bakili Muluzi.  
 
Moreover, it is contended that, “why should the jet not be used by President Prof 
Bingu Mutharika and other presidents?” A presidential jet, which is a fixed wing 
aircraft, is considered more convenient for safety particularly during longer 
distances, such as flying between Blantyre and Chitipa districts, as well as use 
within Africa. A jet is also preferred in bad weather like heavy rain and limited 
visibility instead of using a helicopter. Other countries and leaders also support 
this observation, as was the case, where the former Malawi President Dr Joyce 
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Banda was assisted by the Nigerian President with a jet to fly from Lagos to 
Lilongwe on March 1st, 2014 instead of using a commercial aircraft (Chiumia, 
2014, p.1). Similar jets are also used by several African countries, which are 
equally operated by their Defence Forces. While this could be a long debate, some 
stakeholders were of the view that Malawians need to be more patriotic in 
understanding the importance of national sovereignty and provision of essential 
security services for the State President regardless of political differences. Malawi 
replaced and maintained a smaller jet, unlike other more developed countries, 
which use big jets according to their financial status. 
 
Whilst this study is also mindful that legal provisions are clear in violent scenarios, 
where lives of security personnel and destruction of valuable property are at stake, 
the public need to be aware that security officers need to defend themselves and 
protect these vital properties through use of firearms (Police Act, 2009, Sec. 44; 
Defence Act, 2006). This is another reason that this study is emphasising on 
practical collaborative measures to prevent such mishaps, but still achieve the 
desired national security. In supporting such a view, Linden (2010, p.38) argues 
that, unless there are practical frameworks and procedures to enable collaboration, 
there will always be challenges to collaborative leadership. 
 
2.8.  Challenges (Barriers) to effective collaborative leadership 
“There has never been a great athlete who died not knowing what pain is.”        
Bill Bradley quoted by Nobulele Phuza (October 29, 2012) 
 
Several barriers have been identified in the literature by those implementing and 
evaluating collaborations (Linden, 2010, p.14). They include lack of clear focus 
and results, political and social climate, different culture, trust, information 
sharing, power dynasty and funding.  
 
2.8.1.  Lack of clear focus on results: Leaders miss priority targets 
While CL is the most desirable, it is not always applied (Cabayan, 2009, p.96). 
According to the American Army General Myers and McConnell (2009, p.284), 
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the major problem is that top leaders have failed to identify and define their 
adversaries. This makes organisations fail to deal with the threat and only 
concentrate on tactical operations and not long-term strategies. Compounding this 
problem is that some leaders see collaboration as the goal, rather than a process 
that facilitates the achievement of a company goal (Archer and Cameron, 2013, 
p.11). People and organisations collaborate just for the sake of collaboration just 
to say they are partnering.  When they are asked about what changes will be 
achieved as a result of their collaboration, they usually say that they are 
collaborating and integrating programs, but they do not tell about improved 
results. This problem is further complicated when the political leadership is 
unfavourable and tries to make security organisations work independently 
(Mandiza, 2002, p.127). 
 
2.8.2. Unfavourable political and social climate 
Linden (2010, p.15) states that in some cases, political public opinion may not 
support collaborative mission as well as support individuals and independence.  In 
Malawi, Mandiza (2002, p.124) gives an example that during the rule of one party 
system of government between 1964-1994, security organisations were 
encouraged to work independently as a way to balance security checks amongst 
themselves. The MYP had an intelligence branch, which was mainly reporting on 
their fellow security organisations (Mandiza, 2002, p.124). This made it difficult 
for the soldiers to cooperate with the MYP and the police. Phiri (2011, p.33) add 
that President Dr Kamuzu Banda used the party and security structures as 
instruments to control and eliminate political opponents. The mysterious deaths of 
the three Ministers and a Member of Parliament in 1983 in an alleged car accident 
because they expressed opposing views, were examples of the unfavourable 
political climate and limited collaboration among the Malawi Police, MYP and 
MDF (Robinson, 2009, p.11). Locke (2003, pp.271-284) warned that there is only 
one thing which gathers people into seditious commotion, and that is 
“oppression.” This is yet another reason that this study emphasised on exploring 
best factors that would enable security organisations to collaborate and achieve 
sustainable security in order to prevent re-occurrence of the previous atrocities. 
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Cheema and Popovski (2010, p.6) also observed that unfavourable political 
climate leads to limited trust and sharing of information. 
 
2.8.3. Limited information sharing and fear of leakage 
Security intelligence or information is used to warn the government about 
activities that may threaten security. Information sharing includes providing 
information, confirming that the information has been received, and confirming 
that the information is jointly understood. When information is not effectively 
shared, which is mainly the case, collaborative group work fails as there is limited 
informed decision making (Linden, 2010, p.59). This study intended to provide an 
appropriate mechanism for sharing information to deal with the current problems 
that may have resulted in the loss of confidence and fear of leakage of sensitive 
information due to limited procedures (Linden, 2010, p.59). In Malawi, for 
example, during the joint operation “Chotsa Mbabva”, some criminals had 
vacated their houses a night before the operation because they were fore-warned 
by some sympathisers.  
 
According to Riggio (2011, pp.1-3), mistrust and accusations have also been 
evident between the US and Pakistan governments over the harbouring of Osama 
Bin laden, the former leader of Al-Qaida terrorist group. Osama Bin Laden was 
killed in a raid by the US marines on 1st May 2011, inside Pakistan without 
involving the Pakistan Defence Forces. The US said that they did the operation 
alone because some Pakistan military officials alerted the al-Qaida terrorist on 
pending operations. They also blamed Pakistan for harbouring the most wanted 
person in their territory and yet they were working together to combat terrorism, 
although Pakistan denied that she was not aware of Osama hiding in their country. 
The CIA chief met the Pakistan‟s army chief and intelligence head in a move to 
remove the mistrust caused by the US unilateral raid, but had a lot of challenges as 
there was no proper framework for sharing information (Riggio, 2011, p.1). The 
CIA chief eventually called on the Pakistan Chief of Army Staff to discuss the 
framework for future “intelligence and sensitive security information sharing.” 
These discussions support this study‟s observation that leakage of information can 
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be controlled if security organisations have ultimate trust and confidence in the 
system through effective collaboration practices, legal frameworks to deal with 
offenders and classification codes. 
 
The President of USA in 1982, Ronald Regan, identified three classification levels 
for information: “Top Secret” - expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to 
national security; “Secret” - expected to cause serious damage; and “Confidential” 
– expected to cause some damage. According to members of the senate Obey and 
Sabo in their letter to the US Government Executive, while admitting that 
sensitive material needs to be protected, they said that; the public also needs to be 
informed because it affects their safety and security (Blogger, 2004, p.1). While 
some authors agree that some information should be shared, others want to hold 
such information to boost their organisations‟ power at the expense of national 
security (Shanahan, 2011, p.22). This is a challenge as it also affects use of 
available limited resources. 
 
2.8.4.  Limited funding and resources 
Adequate funding to all responsible organisations throughout the nation is an 
important process to strengthen national security collaboration and achieve 
national prosperity (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.314). In Malawi, funding for 
National Security Organisations has been on average scale at 3.3% of the total 
National Budget and 1.9% for Malawi Defence Force (Kruger and Martin, 2013, 
p.3). They argue that this is a low figure to cover the programmes for 
collaborative activities among National Security actors such as compatibility of 
equipment and other technology systems. The challenge of limited funding and 
resources is, however, further complicated when there are limited regulatory 
frameworks on the source of funding and how these would be used in time of 
collaborative work. 
 
2.8.5.  Lack of regulatory and institutional framework 
According to Cabayan (2009, p.96), key challenges to collaboration are as a result 
of absence of framework, definitions, standing operational procedures (SOPs) and 
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vocabulary. Hiwa (2009, p.10) notes the importance of law reform that strengthens 
the legislative processes in terms of shaping the security sector prowess and 
cannot be over-emphasised. Most countries in Africa inherited their present laws 
from the colonial masters, hence the bulk of it is out-dated and archaic laws are 
hidden in the statute books (Katopola, 2009, p.1).This is supported by Archers and 
Cameron (2013, p.142) that 70% of CL fails because of insufficient structures and 
limited legal authority, which adds more voice to this study. 
 
The challenge observed by the author is that there are few practical frameworks 
that are documented to enable all security actors to effectively collaborate when 
there is security breach (Kuwali, 2012, p.89). According to Osman (2012, p.1), 
one of the country‟s top human rights lawyers in Malawi, add that one of 
seemingly simple but significant security breach is child abuses. He points out that 
every year almost 1,500 children and women from Malawi are being trafficked 
within and to other neighbouring countries, such as Zambia, Mozambique and 
South Africa, where they are forced into the sex trade and/or domestic slavery 
because there are limited laws to mitigate this. The literature study that was 
undertaken in view of this research, points to a lot of lessons. First, lack of 
regulatory framework is one reason that Malawi is not collaborating well to 
improve national security.  Secondly, laws are non-consistent as at times they are 
not specific on what the security actors need to do in joint efforts. A clear example 
is when an under aged child is employed in Malawi; there are no guidelines how 
best the security actors could address the problem. (Osman, 2012, p.1) The author 
observes that there is need for several strategies and mechanisms that need to be 
put in place to resolve these many challenges to collaboration. 
 
2.9.  Strategies to facilitate successful collaboration 
In the opinion of Archer and Cameron (2013, pp.131-139), the success of 
collaboration depends on the existence of a number of strategies, including 
sharing credible information, ground rules concerning power sharing and 
communication and policies ensuring mutual empowerment and collective action. 
The following sections outline some of these mechanisms relevant to this study. 
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2.9.1.  Share credible information 
Myers and McConnell (2009, p.305) state that information is “Soft power”. 
Information needs to be adequate, relevant, not excessive, and accurate and up to 
date (Linden, 2010, p.60). There should be proper procedures for checking that 
information is of good quality before it is shared, methods for making sure that 
shared information is recorded in a compatible format and methods for making 
sure that any problems with personal information, such as inaccuracy, are also 
rectified by all the organisations that have received the information. Thomas 
(2007, p.15) sheds more information on source reliability matrix and verification 
methods to attain the highest standard of information (Table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.3 Source Reliability Matrix and Information Methods 
Source Reliability 
A: 
Knowledgeable 
with direct 
access to 
information 
B: 
Knowledgeable 
with no direct 
access to 
information 
C: 
Usually 
reliable 
D: 
Source is 
not 
usually 
reliable 
E: 
Source is 
not 
reliable 
F: 
We do 
not 
know 
O:  
Open 
source 
Information Validity 
1:  
Suggested 
by several 
independent 
sources 
2: 
Very 
likely 
3: 
Likely 
4: 
Not 
likely 
5: 
Probably 
wrong 
information 
6: 
We do 
not 
know 
NFDK: 
No 
further 
details 
known 
GNK: 
Grid or 
location 
not 
known 
 
Source: Thomas (2007, p. 15) 
 
This study accepts the need to verify source reliability and validity of information, 
which can best be done through efficient fusion of information and professional 
skills of the informer. When these important elements are overlooked, there is 
distortion of information and leaders do not make informed decisions; but instead, 
they generate more problems than resolving threats. Further, this study has 
highlighted that most leaders may not accept this arrangement, but this is where it 
is very important to have some degree of transparency in sharing information and 
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this will usually result in credible national security system as it eliminates 
unnecessary gossips and serving personal interests (Coates, 2011, p.33). A good 
example was in 2005, when the author was amazed at one of the joint security 
meetings, which were called for by the State President. When the president asked 
one of the security leaders from NIB to explain the information that was reported 
to him to call for the meeting, he simply answered; “As I briefed Your 
Excellency”. The author is of the view that a brief synopsis of the situation based 
on proper analysis of information would have been presented, even without 
disclosing the source, if it was for security reasons. 
 
This literature has informed the study to critically examine the research problem 
and formulate research questions for this study. 
 
2.10.  Research Questions 
The main research questions addressed by this Thesis were twofold. First, what is 
the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership (CL)? And second, how could it be 
improved in Malawi to achieve sustainable National Security and economic 
development? Specifically, the research was guided by the following six research 
questions: 
 
Q1. How is CL practised among security actors in Malawi and what is its 
effectiveness in the National Security context? 
 
Q2. What are the key factors that would influence greater collaboration among the 
security actors of Malawi to enhance National Security and prosperity? 
 
Q3. How do security leaders in Malawi understand the term “National Security?” 
 
Q4. Who are the actors to be involved in achieving National Security in Malawi? 
 
Q5. What are the barriers to effective collaborative leadership in Malawi and how 
can they be resolved? And, 
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Q6. How do security leaders in Malawi see the need for an inter-agency 
collaborative and practical national security policy framework? If yes, what 
critical issues should it comprise of to improve effective CL and NS in 
Malawi? 
 
2.11.  Summary 
“The measure of intelligence is the ability to change.”-Albert Einstein (1879-
1955). 
 
In summary, Chapter 2 defined the concept of NS and styles of leadership. It also 
outlined the strategies and decision making models that have been used by various 
organisations and individuals to achieve their desired goals, although others failed 
due to prevailing situations (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, pp.4-6; Strachan and 
Freedman, p.235). The chapter then identified a number of examples where 
effective CL led to successful measure to national security such as joint operations 
to combat crime and proliferation of illegal firearms. Cases on breakdown in 
security due to limited collaboration were also unveiled like the clashes between 
the Malawi defence Force and Malawi Young Pioneers, illegal migration and the 
violent civil demonstrations of 20th July 2011. This study has revealed that while 
Malawi is one of the most peaceful countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa, it still 
faces a number of threats to National Security including border disputes, crime, 
corruption, political intolerance and disasters among others (Omolo, 2012, p.1; 
Mulata et al., 2013, p.287; Mahony et al., 2014, p.14). There are, however, still 
some misunderstanding on what the new concept of National Security (NS) and 
Collaborative Leadership (CL) means and therefore difficult to clearly agree on 
the national security players (Coates, 2011, p.4; Myers and McConnell, 2013, 
p.84).  
 
This study‟s literature review has further indicated that there are several barriers 
that hinder effective collaboration including different cultures and absence of an 
overarching national security policy and strategy (Kuwali, 2009, p.89; Kakhobwe 
et al., 2012, p.8).The study has also highlighted that the current practice is that 
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security actors mainly collaborate and share information during crisis period, 
which does not achieve the desired NS (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6; Kakande, 
2012, p.1). It has been noted that leadership style is the way in which a leader 
accomplishes his/her purposes. It can have profound effects on an organisation 
and its staff members, and can determine whether the organisation is effective or 
not. Some very stereotyped possibilities are: Autocratic - totally in control, 
making all decisions himself and Collaborative - sharing leadership, involving 
others in all major decisions and spreading ownership of the inter-organisational 
goals.  
 
To close the gaps and improve collaborative leadership and national security in 
Malawi, this study embarked on a practical research design and methodology 
outlined in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
“There is one thing even more vital to science than intelligent methods; and that is, 
the sincere desire to find out the truth, whatever it may be.” -Charles Sanders 
Pierce (1878) 
 
3. Introduction 
This Chapter provides a comprehensive description and rationale for the research 
methodology adopted in this study. The way in which research is conducted may 
be conceived of in terms of the research philosophy subscribed to, the research 
strategy employed and the research instruments utilised in the pursuit of a goal, 
the research objectives and the quest for the solution of a problem. The research 
problem was outlined in chapter one as follows: 
 
“What is the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership and how could it be 
improved in the national security of Malawi while encompassing the individual 
organisations’ mandates and roles?” 
 
The following goal was, therefore, formulated for this study: 
 
“To develop a strategic practical policy framework for effective and sustainable 
Collaborative Leadership and National Security in Malawi.” 
 
3.1.  Research Philosophy 
A research philosophy is a framework that guides how scientific research should 
be conducted to gain the required knowledge (Saunders et al., 2009 p.107). There 
is, an agreement in the scientific research community that a philosophy constitutes 
four major ways of thinking: ontology, epistemology, axiology and methodology 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p.109). 
 
Ontology is concerned with the beliefs about physical and social reality, views and 
assumptions of what actually exists (Saunders et al., 2009, p.110). This author 
used this to find out the actual practical procedures in Malawi for coordinating on 
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security issues. Epistemology focuses on the study of the nature of knowledge by 
asking questions about what is true or false, and what constitutes valid 
information. The author found this valuable by designing research methods to 
investigate on whether security organisations have inter-agency policies to effect 
collaboration and not just mere speculation that they are collaborating (Lawson et 
al., 2003). Axiology is the researcher‟s view and interpretation of the role of 
values in research. This enabled the author to use personal knowledge and 
experience in the study‟s contributions and to read between the lines of 
respondents who may not have provided the holistic picture in their responses 
(Yin, 2014, p.168).  
 
Methodology is the systematic procedure for collecting empirical information. 
This helped the author to carefully select the different research techniques and 
paradigms for this study. According to Kuhn cited by Kandadi (2007, p.50), a 
research paradigm is a framework, which comprises perceptions and 
understanding of several theories and practices that are used to conduct research. 
Saunders et al. (2009, p.108) mentions ten research paradigms that have been 
identified in the Western tradition of science, namely; Positivism, Realism, 
Interpretive, Objectivism, Subjectivism, Pragmatism, Functionalist, Radical 
Humanist and Structural Humanist. Saunders et al. (2009, p.119) compare the 
philosophies according to the criteria of sample size, location, theories and 
hypotheses, quantitative and qualitative data, reliability, validity and 
generalizability. The author used the pragmatic philosophy outlined in the 
following sections. 
 
3.2.  Pragmatism 
Pragmatism is described as a deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such 
as “truth” and “reality” and focuses instead on “what works” as the truth regarding 
the research questions under investigation (Saunders et al., 2009, p.109). 
Pragmatism encourages the researchers to consider the research questions to be 
more important in answering the research question and that mixed method designs 
of quantitative and qualitative can be used. Pragmatic philosophy also benefitted 
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the author to achieve better interaction with the respondents through in-depth 
interviews (Saunders et al., 2009, p.152). Miles et al. (2014, p.42) add that use of 
numbers and words are both needed to understand the world better. Since the aim 
of this study was to examine and improve the effectiveness of CL in the security 
context of Malawi to sustain national security, there was need for quantifying 
numbers that support this concept, but also to explain the reasons. These 
requirements necessitated the author to use in-depth case studies and surveys to 
generate both qualitative and quantitative data to enable triangulation (Saunders et 
al., 2009, p.154). The following sections outline these methods. 
 
3.2.1. Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research involves generating and converting data into numerical form 
so that statistical calculations can be made and conclusions drawn (Saunders et al., 
2009, p.151). Researchers will have one or more hypotheses. These are the 
questions that they want to address which include predictions about possible 
relationships between the things they want to investigate. In order to find answers 
to these questions, the researchers will also have various instruments and materials 
and a clearly defined plan of action.  
 
The author used this method through a prepared and structured questionnaire to 
quantify the number of leaders who would support the use of Collaborative 
Leadership in the security context. This also helped the author to check on 
numbers who would consider sharing of information and establishment of joint 
protocols to enable effective collaboration. These numerical figures made clearer 
understanding of the leaders‟ support and different views, which were easy to 
highlight in graphic form. Quantitative figures also helped the author to identify 
leaders‟ perception of the most challenging threats to national security and barriers 
to collaboration. The author, however, noted some challenges in this method 
because it needed more respondents. This problem was, however, overcome in 
that several organisations were represented in this study and also that the author 
used qualitative method, which added some explanations to triangulate the 
findings (Miles et al., 2014, p.43).  
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3.2.2. Qualitative research 
Qualitative research is the approach usually associated with the social interpretive 
paradigm, which emphasises the socially constructed nature of reality. It is about 
recording, analysing and attempting to uncover the deeper meaning and 
significance of human behaviour and experience, including contradictory beliefs, 
behaviours and emotions. Researchers are interested in gaining a rich and complex 
understanding of people‟s experience and not in obtaining numerical figures, 
which can be generalised to other larger groups (Saunders et al., 2009, p.152). 
 
This approach tends to be inductive, which means that they develop a theory or 
look for a pattern of meaning on the basis of the data collected (Saunders et al., 
2009). Data generation and analysis is methodical but allows for greater flexibility 
than in quantitative research. Data is generated in textual form on the basis of 
observation and interaction with the participants, that is, through participant 
observation, in-depth interviews and focus groups. Data generation may be carried 
out in several stages rather than once and for all. The researchers may even adapt 
the process mid-way, deciding to address additional issues or dropping questions, 
which are not appropriate on the basis of what they learn during the process. In 
other cases, the process of data generation and analysis may continue until the 
researchers find that no new issues are emerging (Miles et al., 2014, p.70).  
 
The author used this method through selection of a small sample (Saunders et al., 
2009), in-depth interviews with experienced respondents in the security sector and 
the flexibility of continuing data collection, as security issues are contemporary 
(MacFarlane, 2006). In Malawi, for example, there have been several changes in 
security situations from the time that the researcher started this study in 2011 to 
the time of completion in 2015. There was change of political leadership and some 
top leaders in security organisations including the Police, Intelligence and 
Immigration, which are main actors in collaborative relationships. The qualitative 
research was very useful as it enabled the author to continue shaping the thesis as 
it allows continuous data generation. The author, however, experienced some 
challenges in that this method did not highlight much of the statistical figures. 
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This problem was resolved because the author also used quantitative methods. The 
author also converted qualitative analysis into statistical numbers and codes 
(Saunders et al., 2009, pp.153 & 497). The researcher also resolved some 
challenges through use of effective research design that helped to collect the most 
required data. 
 
3.3.  Research Design and Strategy 
According to Saunders (2009 et al., p. 136), research design is the general plan of 
how you will go about answering your research questions and provides the glue 
that holds the research project together. Yin (2014, p.29) adds that the research 
design comprise five important components: a case study questions, its 
propositions, its units of analysis, the logic linking of data to propositions and 
criteria for interpreting the findings.  
 
The first component necessitated the author to develop the study‟s questions (Qs1-
6 and the detailed questionnaire at Annex B). The second component was used to 
develop hypothetical propositions for the study, which, was indicated in the first 
chapter of this study (Para 1.7). The third component was used for case selection 
and provided a detailed description of the selected case organisations. The fourth 
subsection assisted the author to describe the adopted techniques and the types of 
empirical materials to be gathered. The fifth component enabled the author to 
analyse data and interpret the findings of the study (Chapter 4). To complement 
the design, the author used survey and case studies to collect the required data 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p.141). In the following sections, the researcher justifies 
the choice of strategies and explains how they both operate in this study.  
 
3.3.1. Surveys 
The survey strategy is usually associated with the deductive approach and is 
mostly used to answer who, what, where, how much and how many questions 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p.144). Surveys are popular as they allow the collection of 
large amount of data from a sizeable population in a highly economical way. A 
sample size of 101 respondents from 15 organisations was used for this study, 
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which was an appropriate number for meaningful statistical analysis as it was 
more than 30 (Saunders et al., 2009, p.237).  
 
Surveys enabled the author to obtain data about practices, situations or views at 
one point in time through questionnaires or interviews. The use of surveys 
permitted the author to study more variables at one time than is typically possible 
in laboratory or field experiments, whilst data was collected about real world 
environments. A key weakness, however, was that it was very difficult to realise 
insights relating to the causes of or processes involved in the phenomena 
measured. There are, in addition, several sources of bias such as the possibly self-
selecting nature of respondents, the point in time when the survey is conducted 
and in the researcher him/herself through the design of the survey itself (Saunders 
et al., 2009). The author, however, resolved this through selection of more than 2 
respondents from fifteen organisations who are directly involved with 
collaboration as units of analysis to triangulate the data. 
 
The other challenge, however, was that there were several organisations that 
participated in the study were spread throughout the entire country, making it 
difficult to reach the respondents physically. The author, however, managed to 
overcome this as he used three research assistants, emails and phones in the 
modern technological advancement. Considering the advantages of using a 
questionnaire instrument, which can be sent out to many respondents in a short 
period of time and to have larger statistical figures by using individual 
respondents, the author decided to use the survey strategy in this study. To 
supplement the survey strategy, the author also used the case study research.  
 
3.3.2. Case Study Research 
Case studies involve an attempt to describe relationships that exist in reality, focus 
on contemporary as opposed to entirely historical events and, very often in a 
single organisation (Yin, 2014, p.9). The case study strategy appears to be most 
promising in terms of data collection. This is because the major research questions 
are how and why questions (Saunders et al., 2009, p.146). Case studies give 
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examples of what has happened before and can be used to provide better 
understanding of the complex issues. Within the case study approach, there are a 
number of variables including demographics such as age, education, and positions, 
roles and in-process experiences of numerous individual participants. The author 
found this useful to select leaders of various responsibilities, different positions 
and from several organisations.  
 
Another key feature of the design of case study research is the number of cases 
included in a project. The author used this method through use of fifteen 
organisations and 100 individual participants. The author also studied several 
cases both in Malawi and on international scene from the USA and SADC among 
others on practices of collaborative leadership and identified the gaps that the 
author is striving to improve on. Furthermore, a case study methodology helped 
the researcher in “reading between the lines” to expose and understand realities of 
the situation that participants may not be able or willing to see or discuss due to 
their long-term involvement in such non collaborative effort. A thorough 
evaluation of the case study methodology has revealed its suitability to the 
research of this study. 
 
Case studies, however, can be considered weak as they are typically restricted to a 
single organisation and it is difficult to generalise findings since it is hard to find 
similar cases with similar data that can be analysed in a statistically meaningful 
way (Saunders et al., 2009). Furthermore, different researchers may have different 
interpretations of the same data, thus adding research bias into the equation. The 
author, however, overcame this problem by selecting a number of organisations as 
case study units and individual leaders that deal with common security issues. 
 
3.4.  Units of Analysis (Case organisations) 
The unit of analysis is the major entity that is being analysed in the study (Yin, 
2014, p.31). It is the 'what' or 'whom' that is being studied. In social 
scienceresearch, typical units of analysis include individuals and social artefacts. 
When conducting research, investigators can encounter problems as regards 
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sampling and the incorrect information provided by undesirable respondents 
(Miles et al., 2014, pp.30-32). This can be the result of misunderstanding the 
questions or lack of knowledge about the subject. Several authors suggest 
purposive sampling to build variety and intensity (Saunders et al., 2009, p.237; 
Miles et al., 2014, p.31). In purposive sampling, the researchers need to select the 
units of research based on the characteristics that are important in evaluation and 
to answer the research questions and objectives (Kandadi, 2006, p.67). In this case 
study, the author selected organisations that have direct responsibility in core 
security issues and respond to emergency and disasters. Basing on the problem, 
goal and research questions, three criteria were defined to select the case 
organisations and respondents for this study. First, the cases should be large 
organisations within the National Security sector of Malawi. Second, the case 
organisations should be distributed in all the three regions of Malawi. Third, the 
case organisations and the respondents should be involved in the leadership 
intensive duties and definitive collaborative leadership roles and activities. 
 
This sampling, however, had the challenge in that it could not be considered 
statistically representative of the total population (Saunders et al., 2009, p.239). 
This problem was, however, overcome because the author identified a number of 
organisations and respondents who are conversant with security matters for 
triangulation (Table 3.1).The following sub-sections provide brief description of 
the case organisations selected for this study.  
 
3.4.1. Case study unit 1: Malawi Defence Force 
The Malawi Defence Force (MDF) is established by the Constitution of Malawi 
(2010, Chapter 16, Sec 160) and Defence Force Act (2006). 
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
The MDF was selected for this study because it is the main security actor in 
defence of the nation from external aggression (Constitution, 2010, Chap 16, sec 
160). It is also the first line respondent to assist civil authorities and the police in 
maintenance of law and order and provide technical assistance in time of disasters 
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and emergencies in all the regions of Malawi. A total of thirty officers at MDF 
were interviewed. Ten were from the Defence Headquarters and twenty from the 
regions. Interviewees were mainly working in the command element, directorates 
of operations, training, intelligence, information technology and logistics. The 
Defence Force provided valuable knowledge on the daily operations, sharing of 
information and resources with other organisations in time of joint operations. It 
was also useful because it operates in all the three regions of Malawi and with 
other international security forces in peacekeeping operations. Figure 3.1 depicts 
an overview structure of the organisation of the MDF. 
 
Figure 3.1. Overview structure of the Malawi Defence Force 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MDF Headquarters (2014) 
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Table 3.1. Selected study case organisations 
Case 
Unit 
No. 
Organisation       Distribution of 
operations and Case 
Selection Rationale 
Sector Roles Number of 
Respondents 
1. Malawi 
Defence 
Force 
All 3 Regions Territorial Defence 30 
2. Malawi Police 
Service 
All 3 Regions and 30 
districts 
Public Safety and 
Internal Security 
15 
3. National 
Intelligence 
Bureau 
All 3 Regions and 30 
districts 
State Security 15 
4. Immigration 
Department 
All 3 Regions and border 
districts 
Border Entry 
Control 
10 
5 Malawi 
Prisons 
All 3 regions and 30 
districts 
Correctional 
Services 
5 
6 National 
Registration 
Bureau   
Coordinate all regions 
and districts for 
Malawians identification 
cards 
National 
Identification 
System 
2 
7. Ministry of 
Defence 
Coordinates Defence 
programmes in all 3 
regions 
Management Role 2 
8. Ministry of 
Internal 
Security 
Coordinate all 3 regions Management Role 2 
9. Ministry of 
Foreign 
Affairs 
Coordinates Foreign 
Policy for all 
organisations 
Foreign Policy 2 
10. Disaster 
Management 
Coordinates all 3 regions Disaster 
Coordination 
2 
11. Ministry of 
Local 
Government  
Coordinates all 30 
districts 
Regional and 
District 
coordination 
5 
12. Ministry of 
Justice 
All 3 regions and 30 
districts 
Guarantors of Rule 
of Law 
2 (one 
declined to 
respond) 
13. National 
Assembly  
Oversight of all 
organisations and 
members of parliament 
from all 30 districts. Also 
passes legal bills. 
Oversight on 
Defence and 
Security 
2 
14. Malawi 
Regulatory 
Authority 
Coordinates and regulates 
information policy for all 
institutions 
Information 
Technology Policy 
2 
15. Malawi 
Universities 
Conducts Academic 
Research in Social 
Science and Security 
studies  
Policy Formulation 5 
 Total 
Respondents 
  101 (Actual 
Responses 
100) 
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3.4.2.  Case study unit 2: Malawi Police Service 
The Malawi Police Service (MPS) operates under the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Public Security. Its operations are provided for in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Malawi (2010, Chapter 15, Sections 152-154) and the Malawi Police 
Service Act (2009).  
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
The MPS was chosen for this study because it is the major organisation 
responsible for combating crime and maintaining law and order in Malawi. It also 
has police stations in all the 29 districts and some posts in rural areas. The Police 
are also responsible for coordinating with the community policing who assist in 
maintenance of law and order in the most remote areas and in the city suburbs 
through night vigil patrols (Kainja, 2010, p.32). It was useful for this study 
because it provided critical information on collaborative duties that they conduct 
with other security organisations in Malawi and international peace operations. 
They also meet various challenges in the conduct of their duties due to limited 
sharing of information from other stakeholders to combat crime. 
 
Fifteen officers were interviewed from the MPS. Interviewees were from the 
command element at police headquarters, departments of criminal investigation 
branch, operations and community policing from the three regions of Malawi.    
 
3.4.3. Case study unit 3: National Intelligence Bureau 
The National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) operates under the Office of the President 
and Cabinet, but it established under the Police Act (2009) as it does not have its 
own legislation.  
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
The National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) was chosen for the interviews because it 
is an important organization responsible for State Security. NIB is the leading 
agency in collecting, analysing and dissemination of information to the President 
on all issues related to State Security. They have offices in all the 29 districts of 
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Malawi. They were useful in sharing their knowledge on how they collaborate 
with other organisations on assessment of threats and decision-making processes. 
 
Fifteen officers were interviewed from NIB. Nine interviewees were from the 
headquarters including command element, departments of domestic and external 
intelligence and technical section.  Six were operators from the three regions. 
 
3.4.4.  Case study unit 4: Department of Immigration 
The Immigration department falls under Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public 
Security. Its operations are governed by the Immigration Act 15:03 and the 
Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 2010, Section 47.  
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
Immigration Department was selected for this study because it regulates and 
controls all the people entering and leaving Malawi. It also issues passports, work 
permits as well as processing and issuing Malawi citizenship. They were very 
valuable in providing knowledge on how they collaborate with the police, defence, 
NIB and other stakeholders on prevention of illegal migrants, detection of 
terrorists and other criminals. Ten officers were interviewed working at the 
Immigration headquarters, regions, border posts and Lilongwe International 
Airport, which acts as another border post.  
 
3.4.5. Case study unit 5: Malawi Prison Services 
The Malawi Prison Service operations are provided for under the Laws of Malawi 
Chapter 9.02 and the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (2010, Chapter 17, 
Section 163) and Prisons Act (1966). 
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
The Malawi Prison Services was chosen because it keeps all the criminals in 
detention and act as a correctional department to transform such offenders into 
good citizens. It was useful in this study because it provided information on 
understanding how security organisations could collaborate to prevent criminals 
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repeating same crimes. They also helped in elaborating some challenges they face 
with the judiciary on minimal punishments for core criminals. Five officers were 
interviewed from Prison headquarters in Lilongwe working in operations and 
general administration.  
 
3.4.6.  Case study unit 6: National Registration Bureau 
The National Registration Bureau (NRB) is a government department established 
by the National Registration Act number 13 of 2010 under the OPC. It is 
mandated to establish the National Registration and Identification System (NRIS) 
for Malawi. In Malawi, there are no identification cards (IDs) at national level 
apart from passports and some cards issues by individual organisations. 
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
The NRB was chosen because it contributes greatly to national security through 
up to date registration of all Malawians to differentiate with foreigners. 
Registration is also important to quickly identify possible criminals. Two officials 
were interviewed from the NRB headquarters in Lilongwe dealing with national 
IDs and registration.  They provided valuable knowledge on how they collaborate 
with the police and local community leaders on verification of Malawian nationals 
and foreigners. 
 
3.4.7.  Case study unit 7: Ministry of Defence 
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) was established in 1994 to bridge the gap 
between the civil authorities and the armed forces. It was designed to act as a 
central organisation for strategic management of Malawi Defence Force focusing 
on policy and control. It is also responsible for formulating strategic defence 
programs and preparation of the defence budget (Malawi Constitution, 2010). 
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
The MOD was chosen because it is responsible for overall oversight, management 
and civil control and policy direction of the Malawi Defence Force (Kalilangwe, 
2003). Two officials were interviewed from the Ministry headquarters responsible 
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for Defence Policy and Liaison. They were useful in shedding light on current 
defence policy, collaboration strategies and challenges. 
 
3.4.8.  Case study unit 8: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Security 
The Ministry is composed of the Ministry Headquarters, Malawi Police Service, 
Malawi Prisons Service, Immigration Department, and National Intelligence 
Bureau. The Ministry's mandate is derived from Constitutional Provisions, Acts 
and Government Policies related to the machinery of public service administration 
(Ministry website, 2013). 
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
This Ministry was chosen because it oversees all the operations and overall 
management of key security actors including the Police, Intelligence Service, 
Immigration and Prison Services. It also plays a crucial role in the provision of 
advisory services on specific and general matters of concern in the area of security 
to other ministries, departments and the general public. Two officials were 
interviewed from Ministry headquarters responsible for policy support and liaison.  
 
3.4.9. Case study unit 9: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a link between Malawi and the rest of the world 
including multilateral organisations in facilitating the promotion of political, 
economic, social relations and foreign policy of the Republic of Malawi (Malawi 
Foreign Policy, 2003). 
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
The Ministry was chosen because it oversees international relations and guides all 
ministries on Foreign and International Policy for Malawi including peace and 
security. The Ministry also chairs the inter-ministerial committee on counter 
terrorism and the Joint Permanent Commissions with other countries on Politics, 
Defence and Security. Two officials were interviewed responsible for Foreign 
Policy and International Treaties at the Ministry headquarters. 
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3.4.10. Case study 10: Department of Disaster Management Affairs 
The Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) is under the Office of 
the President and Cabinet (OPC) established through Disaster Preparedness and 
Relief Act (1991).  
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
The DoDMA was chosen because it is responsible for overall coordination of 
disaster management and prevention policy in Malawi. Two officials were 
interviewed from the headquarters in Lilongwe.  
 
3.4.11.  Case study 11: Ministry of Local Government 
Based on the Malawian Constitution of 2010, the Local Government Act of 1998 
and the National Decentralisation Policy of the same year, Malawi is devolving 
decision-making powers, functions, responsibilities and resources to a total of 40 
local governments, called Councils.  
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
This Ministry was chosen because it oversees all the districts and city council 
management and activities. The Ministry is also responsible for coordinating all 
traditional chiefs who have a duty in maintaining peace and stability in the rural 
communities. It is also mandated in promotion of local governance, participatory 
democracy, and socio- economic development of the districts; provide policy and 
legal framework for the efficient and effective operations of the assemblies 
(Constitution, 2010). They also coordinate all security activities with other 
organisations, particularly during disasters and civil demonstrations.  
 
Five officials were interviewed from the headquarters in Lilongwe and three city 
councils of Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.  
 
3.4.12. Case study unit 12: Ministry of Justice 
The Ministry of Justice exist by virtue of the general power vested in the President 
of Malawi under sections 93 and 94 of the Constitution (2010).  
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Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
The Ministry was chosen because it is responsible for drafting and reinforcing law 
and order through effective prosecution of the criminals. They are useful for this 
study because they are also responsible for guiding on the collaborative National 
security policy and prevent conflicts. Two officials were interviewed from the 
Ministry headquarters responsible for formulation of laws and prosecution. 
However, one in the prosecution department declined to respond stating that she 
was not conversant with security issues, despite explaining to her to respond on 
how she feels Judiciary and the courts could assist in security. The author did not 
force her, as it was her consent in line with the ethics of this study. 
 
3.4.13. Case study unit 13: Malawi National Assembly 
The National Assembly has the following functions and powers as provided by the 
Constitution (2010): 
 To receive, amend, accept or reject bills (both Government and Private bills); 
 To debate and vote on motions in relation to any matter including motions to 
indict and convict the President or Vice President, who are key policy makers; 
and 
 To confirm certain public appointments made by the Executive. 
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
The Parliament was chosen because of its great responsibility to oversee the 
activities and operations of all government ministries and institutions. They also 
enact laws that would enhance security, not just to punish criminals, but also to 
safeguard Human Rights. There is also a Defence and Security Committee of the 
National Assembly, which represent proportionally political parties having seats in 
the National Assembly (Chapter XV1, section 162). Their main functions are to 
oversee the Defence and Security organisations including performance and 
lobbying in parliament for the budget to support their duty. Two members of 
Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security were interviewed.  
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3.4.14. Case study unit 14: Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority 
The Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) was established 
pursuant to Section 3 of the Communications Act (1998) of the Laws of Malawi to 
assume the regulatory functions of the communications sector.  
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
MACRA was chosen because it regulates the overall policy on 
telecommunications and security coding for all Ministries and institutions. They 
also promote the development of the ICT sector through investment, monitoring, 
research and training to professionally deliver reliable and affordable 
communication services throughout Malawi (Constitution, 2010). Two officials 
were interviewed from MACRA headquarters responsible for Policy and 
regulating communication technologies.  
 
3.4.15. Case study unit 15: Mzuzu University 
The Mzuzu University (Mzuni) plays an important role in conducting research in 
various aspects and has many “think tanks” that help to shape policy that 
promotes good governance, peace and security.  
 
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees 
This study is for academic purposes and therefore the input by the University 
professionals is important. Since 2007, the centre for Security Studies has been 
interfacing with the security sector in Malawi through executive courses such as 
Parliamentary oversight of the security sector and security sector governance 
(Kakhobwe et al., 2013, p.1). Five lecturers were interviewed from departments of 
Security Studies and Academic Research from MZUNI.  
 
3.5. Research respondents 
In the preliminary stages of the research, a critical reference group from the 
security sectors were established, a selected group of personnel who represent a 
stakeholders‟ interest in the research topic area. This stakeholder group included 
senior officers at decision-making level including heads of organisations and 
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directors, middle managers such as commanding officers and operational staff.  
These individuals provided research perspective, which was grounded in their 
experience with security performance, civilian engagement and the government.  
A total of 100 respondents participated in this study. After a brief orientation to the 
“Collaborative Leadership” concept, the respondents were requested to 
specifically provide responses to the questions and comment on a set of questions 
with reference to their sector unit.  The respondents‟ responses helped the author 
concisely interpreting whether effective Collaborative Leadership could provide 
the answers to the mitigation of national security threats and achieve prosperity. 
To ensure that respondents provided the required answers, the author conducted a 
pilot testing of the questionnaire. 
 
3.6.  Pilot testing and assessing credibility 
The purpose of pilot testing was to refine the questionnaire so that respondents 
have no problems in answering the questions and that there will be no problems in 
recording the data (Saunders et al., 2009, p.394). In addition, it enables the 
researcher to obtain some assessment of the questions‟ validity and the likely 
reliability of the data that will be collected. In this study, the researcher sent 
questionnaires to five people and conducted some interviews and discussions with 
them on one to one basis. These included three research assistants who were also 
professionals in security issues and two senior lecturers from University of 
Malawi and Mzuzu University who were conversant in both academic and 
security related issues.  
 
One question on National Security had challenges to be answered because it was 
left very general and the author was advised to rephrase it to reflect the new 
concept. Another question was on whether collaborative leadership was useful or 
not in the security sector. The academic professionals advised that it was not a 
good research question as answer would just be, “yes or no”, but rather ask about 
its impact and effectiveness in the security sector context in Malawi. The author 
revised these two questions after the pilot testing to eliminate potential problems 
in the desired data collection (Birks and Malhotra, 2007, p.391). 
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3.7.  Data generation and response rate 
Data was generated at several discrete points during the investigation in line with 
the literature cycles (Saunders et al., 2009, p.256). The questionnaire and semi-
structured interviews were the main research instruments of data generation. 
Interviewees were leaders and managers in Malawi security organisations and 
government departments who have significant role in joint operations and 
collaborative leadership in managing security issues when need arise. A list of 
security agencies and security units was prepared to provide a guide to potential 
respondents. This list was later categorised into three groups for the purpose of 
analysis: senior security leaders, middle managers, and officers receiving 
directives.  
 
One hundred and one (101) questionnaires were sent out to 15 organisations, 
which included the Malawi Defence Force, Malawi Police, National Intelligence 
Bureau, Immigration, Prisons, Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign 
Affairs, Local Government, Justice, National Assembly, National Registration 
Bureau, Disaster Management, Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority 
and Mzuzu University (Table 3.1). The questionnaire was distributed personally, 
by e-mail and use of three research assistants, who were recruited to assist the 
author to generate the data and clerical support (Saunders et al., 2009, pp.395-
401).  
 
The response rate was very high as 100 out of 101 participants responded to the 
questionnaire and only one declined. The author used a number of strategies to 
achieve this rate, including using well-known and experienced research assistants 
in the security sector. Research assistants were further trained and carefully 
briefed to ensure that responses were received by email or personally collected 
within three weeks after distribution of the questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2009, 
p.399). The introductory letter also explained the purpose of the study, which 
stimulated the respondents to contribute. The author emphasised that postal 
services should not be used to prevent delays and possible loss of responses. 
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Additional data was generated from reports and documents in these organisations. 
This technique of using multiple data sources is known as data triangulation, 
through which “converging lines of inquiry” build internal validity by 
corroborating data across sources (Yin, 2009, pp.115-16). The collection of both 
qualitative and quantitative data is a means of methodological triangulation that 
also serves to reinforce the validity of the case study (Saunders, 2009, p.154). 
 
The challenge, however, was that this study covered a wider concept of security 
involving other security organisations spread out in the three regions of the 
country and not just the military.  This made it difficult for the author to reach out 
to all organisations in the required research time and was expensive. The author, 
however, resolved this problem by using three research assistants; one to covering 
each region. The other problem was that the author guided the research assistants 
to ensure that responses to the questionnaire were generated within two weeks 
period after delivery to the respondents to increase the response rate. This made 
some respondents to write in their responses that time was short, and that they 
would have given more information if they were given more time. This challenge 
was, however, managed as the author conducted interviews to follow up on gaps 
to responses from the questionnaire (Yin, 2014, p.110). 
 
3.8.  Sampling procedure and sample size 
The multi-stage sampling was used to select organisations and respondents. 
According to Saunders et al. (2009, p.231), multistage sampling is a strategy used 
when conducting studies involving a very large population who are grouped into 
clusters, organisations, regions and individuals. The researcher made clusters of 
core security organisations, supporting and oversight government institutions, 
which were subdivided into three regions of Malawi. Stratified sampling was then 
used to randomly select the individual respondents in the organisations, mainly 
targeting departments and leaders who are involved in day to day management 
and coordination of security operations. Saunders et al. (2009, p.224) state three 
main advantages for using this sampling as; reduced cost and speed that the 
survey can be done, convenience of finding the survey sample and normally more 
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accurate than just cluster sampling for the same size sample. This also ensured 
that all relevant organisations and leaders were represented to prevent bias. 
 
The number of respondents required depended on the survey goals and how 
confident this study wanted to achieve its results. The premise was that the 
research should provide more confidence with the less of a margin of error that 
should be accepted. Based on the prior knowledge of the author from work 
experience that the number of security personnel in Malawi does not exceed 
50,000, which was also confirmed during the interview process, a sample size of 
101 respondents was a reasonable number and statistically sound. This conforms 
to the representative sampling to achieve 95 per cent confidence level with 10 
percent margin of error (Saunders et al., 2009, p.219). Furthermore, respondents 
were from core security organisations and that they freely expressed their views 
(Yin, 2014, p.31).  
 
There were, however, some challenges to decide on the number of respondents 
from each organisation or region to ascertain the sample size or ratio with the 
number of employees. The random sampling also made it difficult to determine 
whether the respondents were of the required leadership professionals. 
Nonetheless, these challenges were overcome as the author interviewed at least 
more than two leaders from each organisation through the questionnaire 
instrument. Again, the guiding emphasis was that interviewees should be leaders 
who work in departments that foster daily collaboration within other 
organisations. The author also indicated in the questionnaire for respondents to 
indicate the number of years that they have worked with the organisation and the 
position held; whether senior management, middle or operational staff.  
 
3.9.  Interview strategy 
The author conducted in-depth face-to-face interviews with twelve (12) leaders 
from the core security organisations, who deal with daily collaborative security 
duties in order to clarify any gaps or misunderstandings from the answered 
questionnaire, thereby triangulating the findings (Saunders et al., 2009, p.235). 
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This was done over a five months period between February and June 2013. The 
author arranged with interviewees through emails and phone calls to agree on date, 
time and quiet location.  
 
Seven interviews were conducted in the interviewees‟ offices, while the other five 
were held at Lilongwe hotel (1), Mount Soche hotel in Blantyre (2) and Mzuzu 
Club (2). These were key individuals identified as having had significant 
leadership positions and roles in collaborative working and joint operations with 
other security organisations. Initially, the author had planned to interview fourteen 
leaders, but two gave excuses that they were busy. As reported by Saunders et al. 
(2009, p.344) the author conducted three focus group interviews in Lilongwe and 
Mzuzu, which lasted between 1.5 and 2.0 hours. In Lilongwe, 7 participants 
attended from MDF, MPS and NIB; while in Mzuzu, 5 participated from MDF, 
MP, and MZUNI. Invitations were through phone calls and made reference to the 
initial questionnaire that they responded to.  
 
Interviews were guided by gaps identified in the questionnaire responses at Annex 
B and analysed data (Yin, 2014, p.110). Some specific questions were; 1). In your 
view, what are the major factors that would improve effective CL among security 
actors? 2) What do you understand by National Security? 3) What do you think 
are the main threats to national security? 4) Who are the security actors to mitigate 
threats in Malawi? 5) Does your organisation encourage collaboration with other 
organisations? 6) Are you involved in collaborative decision making and planning 
on national security requirements and operations with other organisations? 7) Do 
you share information on regular basis with other organisations on national 
security? 8) What is your view on establishment of the national security 
coordinating secretariat and joint committees? What joint security committees do 
you suggest for Malawi? 9) How should the National Security Advisor function to 
enable effective coordination? 10) Do you have a policy to guide inter-
organisational collaboration? 11) What are the positive and negative impacts of 
CL that you have experienced? 12) Do you see the need for establishment of an 
inter-agency collaborative national security policy framework and if yes, what 
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issues should it comprise of in order to be more effective?  Interviews were 
arranged in advance and each interview was focused and took about 30 minutes as 
advised by Yin (2014, p.111). Responses were recorded using the author‟s iPhone 
and transcribed on the questionnaire for later analysis with the permission of the 
interviewee (Yin, 2014, p.110). These interviews provided vast knowledge as 
interviewees said that they were free to express their opinions and felt more secure 
to talk to the person that they could see. The disadvantages, however, were time 
and financial costs for transport to cover all the three regions of Malawi to 
conduct these in-depth interviews.  
 
3.10.  Data analysis 
Data analysis indicates that all evidence has been attended to, analytical strategies 
cover the research questions and prior expert knowledge is used (Saunders et al., 
2009, p.414). The data generated through interviews and literature reviews were 
examined to remove ambiguous information and find the common patterns and 
themes between generated data through the SPSS and thematic theory approach.  
 
3.10.1. Quantitative analysis: SPSS 
This study used the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software 
version 18 for quantitative analysis and descriptive statistics (Saunders et al., 2009, 
p.421). Descriptive statistics is a statistical computation describing the 
characteristics of a sample or the relationship among the variables (Saunders et al., 
2009, p.444). The SPSS measured the central tendency and frequency such as 
mean, median, and measures of dispersion, which included standard deviation to 
produce statistical percentages and tables for the presentation and interpretation of 
the results. Quantitative analysis was very useful as the author used the statistical 
figures to test the hypothesis of the study at Para 1.7 (Saunders et al., 2009, p.450). 
The author, however, noted the challenge in that statistical figures still did not 
fully answer the research questions of how and why collaborative leadership 
would be successful or not (Yin, 2014, p.134).  This problem was, however, 
resolved as the study also used qualitative analysis. 
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3.10.2. Qualitative analysis: Thematic approach 
The data generated from qualitative research was analysed by using thematic 
analysis approach, wherein line-by-line coding was conducted to identify main 
factors that would provide inputs for improvement of CL in the security sector. 
Consistent with Guest (2012, p.12) and Miles et al.,(2014, p.70), this method was 
chosen because it focuses on examining themes within data and incorporates 
respondents‟ experiences, feelings and their free expressions, which was the 
emphasis of this study. According to Guest (2012, p.11), thematic analysis also 
goes beyond simply counting phrases or words in a text and moves to identifying 
implicit and explicit ideas within the data. It should be noted that thematic 
analysis is not a separate theory, but supports many other analysis methods 
Boyatzis, 1998 cited by Anderson, 2008, p.88).  
 
This study was designed to construct theories that are grounded in the data 
themselves. In this study, specific codes were assigned to the pieces of text that 
represented important concepts and distinct responses from the respondents. The 
interpretation of these codes included, comparing theme frequencies, identifying 
theme co-occurrence and graphically displaying relationships between different 
themes and developing a practical collaborative framework model. A theme refers 
to a pattern found in the data that “at the minimum describes and organises the 
possible observations and at the maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon” 
(Anderson, 2008, p.88). Saunders et al. (2009, p.509) lay down a structured 
process for analysing qualitative data using thematic analysis, which is done in six 
phases; Becoming familiar with data, generating initial codes, searching for 
themes, how themes supports the data, what is interesting about the themes and 
deciding on writing the report that make meaningful results of the study. The 
following sections outline these in detail. 
 
3.10.2.1. Phase 1: Becoming familiar with the data 
In this analysis phase, the author read all transcripts in an active way at least three 
times to gain familiarity with them. This was useful in order to begin searching for 
meanings and patterns in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Prior to reading the 
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interview transcripts, the author created a "start list" of potential codes from the 
literature review and quantitative analysis.These start codes were written in a 
reflexivity journal or memo with a description of representations of each code and 
where the code was established (Miles et al., 2014, p.99). The author ensured that 
data that addressed the research question was clearly marked for accuracy and to 
avoid bias in the coding process (Guest and MacQueen, 2012, p.17). 
 
3.10.1.2. Phase 2: Generating initial codes 
The second step in thematic analysis was to generate an initial list of items from 
the data set that had a reoccurring pattern. According to Miles et al. (2014, p.81), 
this systematic way of organising, and gaining meaningful parts of data as it 
relates to the research question is called coding. This coding process evolves 
through an inductive analysis and is not considered to be linear process, but a 
cyclical process in which codes emerge throughout the research process. The 
author followed this cyclical process, which involved going back and forth 
between phases of data analysis as needed until the author was satisfied with the 
final themes, which made more sense of the data and tell an accurate story (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006, p.93).  
 
The coding process is rarely completed the first time. Each time, researchers 
should strive to refine codes by adding, subtracting, combining or splitting 
potential codes (Saldana, 2009, p.19). This made the author to concentrate on the 
actual terminology used by participants during the interview and responses to the 
questionnaire. This was by conducting line-by-line coding, which gave at least 
one code to each phrase, line, or sentence in the data set (Guest and MacQueen, 
2012, p.17). Throughout the coding process, full attention was paid to each data 
item because it helped in the identification of unnoticed repeated patterns (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006, p.96). In this study, jotting and analytical memos were 
techniques used from the beginning of the coding process to the final steps of 
identifying and describing the themes (Miles et al., 2014, p.99).These were useful 
to strengthen emerging codes as well as reactions and feelings from some 
 81 
respondents. The author used different colour marks to easily follow up on the 
themes and the linking factors (Miles et al., 2014, p.93). 
 
3.10.1.3. Phases 3-6: Searching for themes and interpretations 
A theme in qualitative research is defined as an idea that captures an important 
aspect of the data in relation to the research question (Braun and Clarke, 2006, 
p.96). Themes differ from codes in that themes are phrases or sentences that 
identify what the data means. Themes consist of ideas and descriptions within a 
culture that can be used to explain causal events, statements, and morals derived 
from the participants' stories (Saunders et al., 2009, p.511). In subsequent phases, 
it is important to narrow down the potential themes to provide an overreaching 
theme. In this study, thematic analysis allowed for themes or core categories and 
linked factors to emerge from the data through: repeating ideas: similarities and 
differences of participants' linguistic expression (Saldana, 2009, p.69). This phase 
of qualitative synthesis was the most difficult to describe and the most 
controversial, since it was also dependent on the judgement and prior expert 
knowledge of the author (Yin, 2014, p.168). To avoid the author‟s bias and 
misinterpretation, however, this study emphasised on the coding of words of the 
respondents‟ quoting themselves, which is referred to as “In vivo coding” (Miles 
et al., 2014, p.74).  
 
While the thematic analysis was the best tool for this study, the author experienced 
some challenges in that it required more time to do the coding, particularly that 
open ended questions had many different answers. Thus, thematic analysis could 
miss nuanced data (Guest, 2012, p.17). This was, however, overcome because the 
author also had some questions that required the use of quantitative analysis with 
statistical figures for triangulation. 
  
3.11.  Data management 
A data management plan is a formal document that outlines what the researcher 
will do with data during and after completion of the research (Miles et al., 2014, 
p.50). Developing a data management plan can be time-consuming, tedious, and 
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daunting, but it's a very important step in ensuring that the research data is safe, 
easily accessible and sound for the present and future. The author stored data in 
several places including the external disc, computer, email account and a hard 
copy filed as a backup to prevent loss of useful information.  
 
For this study, the author will securely keep data, as it is for academic purposes 
and in case there is need for further reference. The published thesis will, therefore, 
be submitted to the University of Bolton. 
 
3.12. Research ethics 
Saunders et al. (2009, p.184) define research ethics as “the application of ethical 
standards to human action within the research process and write up research 
findings in a moral and responsible way”. For privacy and confidentiality 
agreement of this study, details of respondents were deliberately not mentioned 
(Miles et al., 2014, p.63). In this study of security nature, great care was exercised 
in ensuring that the rights of respondents and organisations were protected (Yin, 
2014, p.77). Consideration was taken into account for the following ethical issues 
during the entire study: 
 
(a) The purpose of this study was clearly explained to all participants in an 
introductory letter (Saunders et al., 2009, p.179) that was sent with the survey 
questionnaire (Appendix 1).  
 
(b) The participants in the study were given an opportunity to give an informed 
consent to participate in the study (Yin, 2014, p.78). Interviewees were also made 
aware that their participation was voluntary and that their names will not be 
disclosed to anyone (Miles et al., 2014, p.59). The detailed consent letter is 
attached at Appendix 111. For focus group interviews, participants were advised 
not to mention their last names and exact job titles. Before the interview session, 
the author also presented his credentials for identity and confidence to the 
interviews. 
 
 83 
(c) Anybody who was not interested to participate was free to refuse or withdraw 
from the study interviews (Saunders et al., 2009, p.190). A good example was one 
interviewee from Judiciary who sent her regret not to participate because she was 
not conversant with security issues, despite explaining to her that she had to 
respond to issues on academic and related to the way Judiciary could help to 
improve collaboration and national security in Malawi.  
 
(d) All responses are kept by the author and names of respondents will not be 
disclosed to anyone, during and after this study as advised by Saunders et al. 
(2009, p.180 & 197). 
 
(e) Great care was also given to the organisations‟ secretive nature and only 
unclassified information from official documents was used in this study (Saunders 
et al., 2009, p.199). For example, the exact numbers, locations and capabilities of 
the security organisations were not mentioned. 
 
3.14. Summary 
In this chapter, the author has presented a detailed account of the research 
philosophy, strategy and methodology that was used for this study. Mixed research 
methods and mixture of survey and case study strategies were used. This included 
a substantial literature review, the enhancement of earlier research models and the 
development of data collection instrument. Finally, the chapter also outlined 
details of the cases, recounting how the author identified suitable organisations 
and respondents for study and detailing the broad procedures for data analysis and 
software intervention. For privacy and confidentiality agreement of this study, 
details of the respondents were not mentioned. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4. Introduction 
“The ultimate authority must always rest with the individual's own reason and 
critical analysis.”-Dalai-Lama (2009) 
 
This chapter analyses the results obtained from respondents through case studies, 
the survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews. It also presents the findings, 
discussion and the proposed CL framework. Fifteen organisations and one 
hundred respondents that deal with security issues and oversight functions 
participated in this study. Two demographic variables consisting of professional 
experience through leadership positions and years of service of the individual 
respondents were also considered in this study. Seventy five per cent (75%) of the 
respondents were in senior/middle management positions and over 10 years‟ 
service, while 15% were in lower positions with less than 10 years‟ service. This 
assisted the author to understand how various leaders and length of service in the 
security organisations viewed issues of CL and its effectiveness on NS.  
 
The goal of this analysis was to examine the effectiveness of CL and how it can 
shape security personnel attitudes, institutional values, actual organisational 
activities and ultimately national engagement that will assist to develop a holistic 
framework for practicing CL by the Security Sector (SS) of Malawi to enhance 
National Security. The study findings are discussed simultaneously by comparing 
with the contemporary CL and NS literature for better follow up and 
understanding. The analysis and discussion are also combined to illustrate the 
transparency and credibility of the findings. Thematic analysis approach was used 
in this study and five main themes to improve Collaborative Leadership and 
National Security were identified. The themes are: Clear focus on national 
security and visionary priority goals, promote national cultural practices and 
change individual mind set, sharing power and influence, creating collaborative 
structures and effective evaluation measures and parliamentary legal authority. 
These themes or core categories overlap and provide a framework for 
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understanding the study results (Saunders et al. 2009, p. 495). The following 
sections outline the findings of this study in detail. 
 
4.1.  Findings and discussion 
Findings confirmed literature that security actors in Malawi are working together. 
Successful cases included joint operations to combat crime and multi-
departmental collaboration to control illicit trafficking of illegal small weapons 
and firearms. However, findings revealed that CL is practiced to a limited extent 
as evidenced by the clashes between the MDF and MYP, increased illegal 
migration and violent civil demonstrations among others. Using thematic analysis 
and the grounded theory approach by Saunders et al. (2009, p.149), however, have 
also resulted in identifying a total of five Core Categories (CC) or themes unique 
to effective and sustainable collaborative leadership and national security (Table 
4.1). The core categories directly answer the main research question, which was: 
“What is the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership and how could it be 
improved in Malawi to achieve sustainable National Security and economic 
development?” The five core categories were further expanded to 25 constituent 
factors (F1-25) in Table 4.1. These relate to strategies and activities that would be 
implemented to achieve the core categories.  
 
Figure 4.1. Core Categories/Themes for improving CL 
 
 
Source: Ngwenya (2015) 
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Table 4.1. Five Core Categories (5CC)/ Themes with constituent factors (F) 
Core Categories Constituent factors Code 
Clear focus on 
national security 
and priority 
goals (CC1). 
Need for agreement on the new concept of national security. F1 
Assessment of threats to national security  F2 
Identification of core organisations to mitigate threats  F3 
Engagement of other supporting organisations F4 
Agreement on collaboration in national security concept F5 
 
Promote national 
cultural practices 
and change 
individual mind-
set (CC2). 
Leadership style is key and review of policies to achieve 
National Security 
F6 
Impact and effectiveness of CL in sustaining National 
Security 
F7 
Identification and mitigation of barriers to CL F8 
Reducing conflicts among collaborative set up 
 
F9 
Sharing power, 
influence and 
training security 
leaders together 
(CC3). 
 
 
 
Conduct joint training, exercises and contingency plans to 
be implemented collaboratively  
F10 
Time for practice of collaborative programmes  F11 
Incentives for practicing CL  F12 
Generation of credible information through fusion centre  F13 
Building trust to share information and avoid leakage F14 
Sharing relevant and credible information  F15 
Implementation of further security sector reforms F16 
Seek support from security and political leaders  
 
F17 
Establishment of 
collaborative 
structures with 
legal mandate 
(CC4). 
Understanding of national security policy  F18 
Organisational written security policies  F19 
Setting up protocols and technology for sharing information  F20 
Establishment of  a joint National Security Coordinating 
Office (NSCO)  
F21 
Organisations represented at the NSCO  F22 
Joint security committees F23 
Integrated national security policy and governance structure  
 
F24 
Evaluation 
measures and 
parliamentary 
approval (CC5). 
Setting out measurable outcomes and impact with 
parliamentary approval  
 
F25 
 87 
The following sections present the analysis and discuss these findings of the core 
categories (CC) and their constituent factors (F) in detail. 
4.1.1.  Clear focus on National Security and priority goals (CC1) 
The study has revealed that in order to improve Collaborative Leadership (CL), 
respondents believe that it is important to have a clear focus and priority goals in 
the identification of threats to national security (Charrett 2009, p.13). However, to 
achieve this, it requires that a number of organisations must clearly identify their 
adversaries, common goals, and strategies to work together so that this new 
concept of CL can be meaningful in a national security context (Myers and 
McConnell, 2009, p.284). Table 4.2 depicts some of the factors that respondents 
considered important for a clear focus on national security issues. 
 
The following sections provide detailed explanations of the factors relating to 
national security focus and priority goals. 
 
4.1.1.1. Need for agreement on the new concept of National Security (F1) 
Agreement and clear understanding that the new concept of national security 
refers to both military and non-military nature of threats, is the focal point for 
effective collaboration among the security actors (Myers and McConnell, 2009, 
p.301).  
 
This study asked respondents to provide their understanding of national security in 
Malawi. Responding to the question, respondents have, however, brought out 
different versions of the definition of national security. Sixty three (63%) of 
respondents defined national security as protection of national interests that 
includes values and non-military threats, while 37% defined it as a procedure that 
deals with threats to external military aggression only (Chart 4.1).  
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Table 4.2 Substantiating quotes on clear focus on National Security and 
priority goals 
Clear focus on National Security and priority goals: Constituent factors and substantiating 
quotes 
Constituent factors 
National security goal and understanding of national security concept (F1), threat 
assessment (F2), core security actors (F3), other security organisations (F4) and 
collaboration in NS context (F5). 
 
Substantiating quotes 
“Leaders should be visionary with clear goals and objectives agreed by stakeholders. This 
could be best achieved if national security is well understood and focussed to include non-
military issues, as it plays a major role in ensuring economic developments if proper 
measures are taken in relation as it attracts foreign investment”. 
“National security is not only about traditional physical/ military security, but also includes 
conditions treat sustain lines and livelihoods and there is need for several stakeholders to 
work together.” 
“National security needs to curb political imbalance, hunger, lack of rule of law, too much 
political power, intolerance among security actors and other threats.”  
“Security organisations or actors refer to those fully engaged to carry out different security 
activities for the benefit of the majority”. 
“Core security actors are those that are mandated to use force like police, military, etc., the 
institution of the Presidency, Ministry of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs and 
National Intelligence Services and they need to work together”.  
“Other actors to achieve security are parliamentary committee on defence – oversight on 
service delivery of security organisations, civil society organisations by offering alternative 
government channels of participation and influence in national security policy making, 
citizen by influencing policy makers in making policies that affect them security wise and 
media – providing information on national security issues and debates”.  
“Academia and think tanks provide a part of knowledge as well as solutions for specific 
threats and are important stakeholders in achieving CL and NS”. 
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Chart 4.1. Concept of National Security (NS): Different Versions 
 
 
These different versions are indicative that not all security leaders understand the 
modern concept of National security and hence difficult for them to understand 
the need to collaborate and achieve a common goal (Watson, 2008, p.5). Table 4.4 
presents the substantiating concepts and quotes for this factor.  
 
Discussion 
The findings of this study are encouraging as the majority of security leaders 
understand the new concept of NS. The author is, however, concerned that 37% of 
respondents who said that National Security only involves military defence of a 
sovereign state is on the higher side. This misunderstanding could result in some 
resistance by leaders to collaborate, as they may not see common threats and a 
coordinated approach to mitigate them as imperative and important. This shows 
the need for more modern professional education and awareness through joint 
courses like the one conducted at Mzuzu University centre for security studies. 
The study also suggests that while a majority of respondents are aware that 
National Security deals with other threats, practically, most case organisations like 
the USA, and SADC models seem to be arranged to look more at external threats 
than internal challenges and coordination (Zegart, 2007, p.40; Adebajo et al., 2013, 
p.5). 
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Table 4.3. Substantiating quotes on National Security includes non-Military 
threats 
Substantiating concepts and quotes for National Security.  
Constituent factors 
Understanding of National Security, National interests and values, human security, 
economic security, societal security, environmental and technological security. 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“For effective collaboration, understanding of the modern concept of NS is vital. National 
security entails measures put in place to safeguard existence of people in a defined territory 
from political, economic, environmental and military threat. The benefits are many; prime 
among them will be peace and security”. 
 
“National security includes non-military threats. The reason is that security these days in 
encompassing. It covers a wide range of areas other than focussing on traditional 
intervention”. 
 
“National interests and values face multi-faced threats hence the need to have multi-
dimensional measures”. Vibrant economy, which can woo investors and synergised effort 
in securing the nation, which would reduce security expenditure. 
 
 “In my view, national security is about defence of a nation that is borders and Lake 
Malawi and other non-military threats. To achieve this, however, there is need for alliances 
or collaboration”. 
 
“National Security is the interest of the whole nation regardless of political, religious, tribe 
affiliation    and can be compromised by entire internal and external factors or combination 
of the two”. 
 
“Security is broad view of people‟s welfare. It is the absence of worry, be it food, freedom 
and war”. 
 
Schnabel (2008, pp.87-95), however, warns that too broad a definition that 
includes everything from protection against HIV to water resources management 
might create a lack of clarity on national security, hence the requirement for 
proper securitisation and assessment. 
 
4.1.1.2. Assessment of threats to National Security (F2) 
Answering the question on what respondents see as threats to national security in 
Malawi, 50% of the responses said military aggression, corruption and 
environmental degradation; 34% said internal crime, robberies, cross border crime 
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and illegal migration; 11% said political intolerance and 5% said health hazards 
particularly HIV and malaria (Chart 4.2). 
 
Chart 4.2.  Major threats to NS in Malawi 
 
 
Discussion 
Respondents identified a number of threats to National Security in Malawi 
including threats of military aggression, cross border crime, illegal immigration, 
corruption, political intolerance, lack of rule of law, environmental degradation 
acts of terrorism and negative economic growth among others as observed by 
other researchers (Gondwe 2003; Ngoma, 2008;Phimbi, 2011 and Masina 2012). 
Ignorance of this vital form of security has resulted in continued laxity by many 
states and other actors in the international political arena in support of their pursuit 
for power and other personal interests otherwise known as „national interests‟. 
National vis-à-vis human security can be emphasised in that it requires the 
cooperation and coordination of all the other actors in one‟s country to avoid spill 
over to the neighbouring countries.  
 
It can be stated here that advancement of national security in conflict situation 
starts with deterring skirmishes or defusing conflicts and crimes in their early 
stages through trust-building and negotiated settlements. The terrorist bombings 
and kidnapping of students by Boko Haram in Nigeria (Straziuso, 2014, p.2) are 
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some examples that need to mitigate conflicts before they escalate. These threats 
are a concern, as they seem not properly mitigated in the absence of a written 
integrated national security policy and strategy. Typical examples are illegal 
immigration and corruption which have been mentioned so many times but until 
now, no specific written collaborative mechanisms have been put in place for 
coordinated effort to root out these malpractices and stop illegal migrants apart 
from verbal statements and some seminars. As a result, more and serious crimes 
are being committed affecting the economy of the country, as is the case with the 
cash gate scandal, where millions of Malawi Kwacha was looted from the Malawi 
Government accounts (Kasunda, 2013, p.1).  
 
This study has also indicated that corruption was a factor for the downfall of past 
regimes in Burundi by-way of undermining legitimacy of the government and 
weakening their structures, reducing productivity, hindering development and 
marginalising the poor and creating social unrest (Gabriel, 2013, cited in Mulata et 
al., 2013, p.287). Threat assessment ensures that priority areas are identified. 
 
It is, however, encouraging that this study has revealed that Malawi has uncovered 
the problem of corruption and taken positive steps to be resolved (Ntata, 2013, 
p.51). The challenge that this study observes, however, is that leaders could be 
talking about solving these through courts or change of appointments, but if there 
are limited written mechanisms for long-term collaboration among the security 
actors, the problems will resurface. 
 
The cash gate scandal for example could have been prevented before getting to the 
level that forced the donor community to suspend their budgetary support (Ntata, 
2013, p.51). This reinforces the author‟s observation that it is time for all core 
security actors to collaborate in an efficient manner through documented strategies 
in order to mitigate such threats to successfully achieve National Security.  
 
 
 93 
Table 4.4 Substantiating quotes from respondents on threats to National 
Security 
Substantiating concepts and quotes from the respondents on threats to NS 
Constituent factors 
 
External aggression, corruption, transnational crime, illegal immigration, robberies, 
terrorism, political intolerance/ violence, democracy without responsibility, population 
growth, diseases, hunger and religious extremism. 
 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“It is important to identify security threats or risks in order to ascertain how they can be 
prevented. In this regard, threats to NS in Malawi include military aggression from 
neighbours, corrupt economic activities, environmental degradation and political harlots 
aiming to be in power all the time for the individual gains”. 
 
“Territorial integrity which is „vital‟ interest. Because it threatens sovereignty = survival, 
land/ lake/ or border disputes”. 
 
“Threats include external aggression e.g. current Tanzania Scenario”. 
 
“Political intolerance, hunger, lack of rule of law, too much political power, Intolerance 
among security actors, political stability, economic development and environmental 
threats”. 
 
“Natural resource competition, illegal immigration, transnational crime org, religious 
extremism, terrorism, population growth and illiteracy”. 
 
“Democracy without responsibility, acute corruption mainly by intelligence and 
investigative agents, non-governmental organisations and government officials”. 
 
 
4.1.1.3. Identification of core security actors to mitigate threats to NS (F3) 
On the question of which core security organisations are responsible for 
mitigating threats to National Security, sixty three percent (63%) of respondents 
mentioned security organisations, which included the Military, Police and 
Intelligence Services, Immigration, government agencies, Private Security 
companies and NGOs. On the other hand, thirty seven percent (37%) of the 
respondents indicated that only Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security 
should deal with these threats (Chart 4.3). The result clearly indicates that there is 
confusion amongst the respondents as to who is responsible for dealing with 
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threats to national security, supporting the case for more collaboration between the 
key players. Even though there are varied indications of who should be 
responsible to mitigate the national threats, what this statement identified in the 
respondents‟ answers signifies the lack of a policy that streamlines how the 
security units in Malawi can deal with them in a more collaborative manner. 
 
Chart 4.3. Core security actors to mitigate threats 
 
 
The goal of collaboration should be to recognise and realise that their missions 
overlap, and work to share resources and achieve common goals for the 
betterment of the citizenry. 
 
Discussion 
Most respondents indicated that core security organisations are actors that deal 
with hard-core security issues, which include sovereignty, crime and disasters. In 
an effort to define security sector reform and formulating its goals and objectives, 
the problem that might arise is that too narrow a definition, for instance, special 
focus on military department alone might lead to an inadequate security 
programmes (Charrett, 2009, p.13). This is because security sector reform is not 
just about disarmament or reducing the size of the army, but also about security in 
the wider sense for the security of every single human being within the 
communities.  
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Table 4.5 Substantiating quotes from respondents on core security actors to 
mitigate threats to NS in Malawi 
 
Constituent factors 
 
Core organisations mandated to use force, oversight organisations and supporting 
institutions. 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Core organisations are agencies which deals with hard-core security i.e. army, police, civil 
intelligence, immigration, prison”. 
 
“Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Climate 
Change Management, Ministry of Finance are oversight bodies”. 
 
“Core actors include Immigration dept., prisons, the civilian intelligence service, 
government agencies, non-governmental organisations, private security companies, the 
general public and civil society organs”. 
 
“Office of the President and cabinet. Foreign Affairs, Information, Human Rights 
Commission, Ministries of Health, Environmental Affairs, Agriculture, Local government, 
the academia, Parliament, Women organisations, think tanks, media, national parks and 
wild life, Financial Intelligence Unit, Civil Aviation, Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development, Disaster and management, Malawi Revenue authority, meteorological 
services and Bureau of standards”. 
 
“Ministry of Information for dissemination of information, Ministry of Finance to support 
on joint activities and necessary equipment”. 
 
“Ministry of Justice for enabling laws and punishing offenders, customs dept. to check on 
illegal items and tax evasion”.  
 
“United Nations Human Commissioner for Refugees, Religious institutions and Traditional 
leaders”. 
 
Core security organisations, however, also need to work with other agencies 
because modern security is wider and dynamic in its scope (Watson, 2008, p.12). 
 
4.1.1.4.  Engagement of other relevant organisations to be involved in 
National Security goals (F4) 
In chart 4.6, responses also indicated the need to involve the media, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Political Parties, Parliament, Judiciary, Civil Society, human rights 
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commission and Universities. However, 14% of the responses indicated Judiciary 
to be vividly involved in national security.  
 
Chart 4.4. Other organisations to be involved in NS 
 
 
 
Discussion 
It is also commended that this study recognised the important role by the media. 
They are crucial in informing the public of some security dangers and the need to 
promote national security through education awareness and balanced reporting 
(Khoviwa et al., 2012). Customs would check on suspicious, illegal and 
dangerous consignments of goods, Judiciary would look at the laws and 
appropriate speedy punishments, as well as informing the victims on the legal 
action taken in order to maintain credibility to investors and other stakeholders, 
while the academia would look into providing their expertise in research and 
development.  
 
Involvement of other organisations in mitigating threats to security is well 
articulated by Cawthra (2009, p.20), who said that security involves various 
components that require several providers working together. The study, however, 
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observes that there is a lot to be done in Malawi and globally to achieve this 
collaboration as there are limited written documents and procedures, as per current 
literature, to affect this desire. 
 
Table 4.6.  Substantiating quotes from respondents on other security actors 
to mitigate threats 
 
Constituent factors 
 
Supportive organisations, Legal Institutions, media awareness and academic research 
institutions. 
Substantiating Quotes 
“Financial intelligence unit, National Parks and Wild life, Malawi Revenue Authority 
(Customs Control) – suspicious and illegal consignments of goods. Malawi Bureau of 
Standards – Detecting dangerous consignments and able to advice consumers and 
Department of meteorological service – advances warning of danger in weather and climate 
changes” (83bs). “Judiciary by overseeing the legal aspect of the national security”. 
“Parliamentary committees to oversee on appointments and make sure qualified individuals 
are heading appropriate organisations. Check and balances on expenditure”. 
 
“Parliamentary committee on Defence-oversight on service delivery of sec orgs. Civil 
society organisations-by offering grassroots alternative channels of participation and 
influence in Nat Sec policy making. Citizenry-Influencing policy makers in making policies 
that affect them security wise.  Media- Providing info on Nat sec issues and debates”. 
 
“Academia in providing their expertise in research and development”.   
 
“Private security firms currently operating in Malawi though there could be a challenge in 
their professional way of handling security matters”. 
 
“Ministry of information and media houses by reporting and exposing issues that can be 
threat to National Security. When they are not corrupt and biased, they can act as whistle 
blowers to matters of national security”. 
 
“Malawi Human Rights Commission, Anti-corruption Bureau, Parliament, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Gender”. 
 
“UNHCR, Religious leaders, communities and traditional leaders”.  
 
“Ministry of Finance to offer the necessary financial support and OPC to coordinate the 
different players/ actors, the donor community to give financial support”. 
 
 “The way media report security matters can help to promote peace or bring conflict. The 
other institutions (Universities) can bring expertise based research or case studies”. 
 
This study indicated that the solution to make different organisations work 
together is to review policies on collaboration. 
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4.1.1.5.  Agreement on collaboration in national security concept (F5) 
In responding to the challenges facing Malawi in the rapidly developing 
environment, as leaders in the security sector, there is an urgent need to make 
imperative assessments about kinds of relationships to be developed with other 
people and organisations. Considering the different understanding of the term 
collaboration by other authors (Linden, 2010, p. xxvi; Thomas et al., 2011, p.3), a 
question was included in this study to identify how the security personnel in 
Malawi understand what collaboration means. This understanding is what was 
partly used in developing proposals for the policy changes. The respondents also 
had different understanding of the term with 10% saying it is alliances, 19% 
saying Networking and 71% saying that it includes all (alliances, cooperation, 
networking and partnerships) with external organisations (Chart 4.5).  
 
Chart 4.5. Understanding collaboration in NS context in Malawi 
 
 
Discussion 
Different understanding of this term would also be another reason for 
organisations not working on full collaboration. While respondents stated that they 
knew the concept of collaboration as alliances, cooperation, partnerships and 
networking, they indicated that this is done among international organisations 
with similar objectives. These differences, in the author‟s view, indicate that some 
leaders are still not aware of true collaborative culture (Glanz, 2006, p.2). The 
author was further amazed to read responses from almost all respondents who said 
that collaboration is the working together of all international agencies to achieve 
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security in the global region. The author noted that both literature and respondents 
did not concentrate much on collaboration at the domestic level. 
 
Table 4.7.  Substantiating quotes from respondents on collaboration 
 
Constituent factors 
Concept of collaboration, Collaborative Leadership, Inter-agency collaboration and 
benefits. 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Collaborating means cooperation with international partners to achieve similar objectives 
in the global security” 
 
“In general terms collaboration means working with others for a common goal”. 
 
“Collaboration means partnering with known agencies with similar objectives. It means 
that there is sharing of ideas, knowledge, or total communication between agencies with 
the aim of solving a problem/having a shared approach in handling matters”. 
 
“Collaboration would enhance holding of joint conferences, threat analysis, planning and 
exercises”. 
 
“Joint strategies on national security policy interactions and financial resource 
harmonisation” 
 
“The coordination of several organisations through appointment of liaison personnel and 
collaborative leaders”. 
 
“Collaboration is seen through holding joint conferences, lectures, interactive meetings, 
radio, and television debates”. 
 
„Collaboration entails cooperating through sharing of information and resources in order to 
achieve shared objectives”. 
 
“Inter-agency collaboration involves two or more organisations working together to 
achieve common or shared objectives”. 
 
“Collaboration encourages the ownership of the desired outcome and the necessary 
procedures and actions to that end and it is motivational”. 
 
“Collaboration is the alliance with international forces and partners”. 
 
“Sharing action plans and measuring the same after implementation”. 
 
 
No wonder, most case studies of collaboration in the security sector are among 
security organisations of different countries as per case examples of North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation forces (Phillips et al., 2000) and SADC Mutual Defence Pact 
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(Ngoma, 2007). Some respondents also said that collaborative leadership is 
working together within the same agency, which is contrary to the real concept of 
collaborative culture (Archer and Cameron, 2013, p.11). This is one of the reasons 
that the author is trying to make both political and security leaders work together 
in Malawi with other organisations to attain the required collaboration as observed 
by Henry Ford (1932) who said, “Coming together is a beginning, staying 
together is progress, and working together is success”.  
 
This study emphasises the need for both horizontal and vertical communication 
and flow of ideas from leaders and employees of different security organisations 
in Malawi. This will help leaders at various levels to share relevant information 
and facilitate a clear understanding of the security situation in order to make 
informed decisions and the right action. To achieve this, it is suggested that 
appropriate and effective leadership style is required to drive the collaborative 
process through appointment of collaborative leaders and formulation of 
coordinating national security policy frameworks. 
 
4.1.2.  Promotion of national cultural practices and change individual mind-
set (CC2) 
This study identified that assessing and application of the appropriate style of 
leadership to a particular situation is an enabling core factor to initiate and 
improve collaboration and national security in Malawi. Some other authors 
support this requirement that appropriate leadership has a major impact on CL and 
NS (Coates, 2011, p.3; Northouse, 2013, pp.4-5). The key element is recognition 
that leadership in collaborative networks should focus on the processes of building 
a new whole integrated relations for a common goal (Table 4.9). This draws 
attention to different styles of leadership that would drive collaboration and the 
impact of collaborative leadership in the national security context. The following 
sections outline these factors in detail. 
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Table 4.8. Substantiating quotes on national cultural practices 
 
Constituent factors 
Use of appropriate style of leadership and review of policies (F6) and Identification of 
barriers to CL mitigation measures (F7) 
 
“Leadership is key and is the ability to lead others through directing and guiding and it is 
important to use the appropriate style in a given security situation”. 
“A good leader must be listening, transformational result orientated, and facilitating skills, 
tolerant and understanding of the group processes. Change mind-set is crucial”. 
“Collaborative leadership shows a system whereby a leader or managers share 
responsibility for set goals or objective to arrive at a successful solution.  This helps in 
allowing subordinates define a problem and find solution with full hopes that leaders will 
assist them in focusing their effort and resources towards the agreed agenda.”  
“Decisions made under collaborative leadership are owned by majority and they are 
responsible for any fault. Existing policies need to be reviewed to suit this collaboration”.  
“Collaborative leadership is more preferred because decisions made would be owned by the 
whole group and everyone would put in effort to achieve them”.  
“Collaborative leadership should be visionary, led by example and ability to think 
strategically.”  
“Sometimes authorisation leadership is important especially in hostile conduct and war 
situation”.  
“Collaborate leaders are able to think out of the box and get new ideas”.  
“Some barriers to collaboration in our organisations are lack of capacity, lack of 
cooperation among security leaders‟ organisations and bad organisational culture”.  
“Silo mentality.  We are barred from collaborating and hand shaking”.  
“Lack of resources, political capital and interest, personal resistance, competitive spirit, 
inadequate orientation and absence of protocols and structures for collaboration”. 
 
4.1.2.1. Leadership style is key and review of policies to achieve NS (F6) 
Leadership is the process of getting followers to comply with the leader‟s wishes, 
achieving group/organisational goals and indeed it is defined as influential 
(Northouse, 2013, p.5). Furthermore, leadership is equivalent to management, as 
the sum of the leader‟s traits and it is transformative. Based on foregone 
statements, thirteen percent (13%) of respondents mentioned that they prefer 
Authoritarian Leadership, 76% attributed Collaborative Leadership as the best 
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leadership style in the security sector whilst 11% of them mentioned that both 
styles are appropriate (Chart 4.6). 
 
Chart 4.6.  Leadership style most preferred to achieve change and goals in 
security organisations 
 
 
Most of the respondents were in strong agreement with the Collaborative 
Leadership, which inspires a shared vision and common purpose, integrity, 
openness, interactive, knowledgeable, tolerance, command and control and 
guidance as advocated by Linden (2010, p.85). They promoted modelling the way 
by leading by example in a way congruent with their stated beliefs and purposes; 
but were sure to incorporate the beliefs and purposes of others in the group 
leadership dynamic. The interviewees very pointedly encouraged the heart by 
supporting the commitment and action of others by being emotionally available 
and open to discourse that would build trust and deeper relationships. Some 
respondents said that leadership should start with top leaders including politicians 
(Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.7). They stated that organisations need effective leaders 
who have persuasion, led by example; understand issues, never emotional and 
ability to think strategically in order to review and implement collaborative 
policies. 
 
Most respondents (76%) denounced Authoritarian leaders who feel that they know 
it all and based on fanatic ideologies, which is usually used in the security 
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organisations (Nordmeyer, 2012, p.1). Some respondents, however, supported 
authoritarian as some situations in the security demand drive (Goldman, 2000). 
 
Discussion 
The issue of choosing leadership styles in security organisations is a much debated 
issue as it has several interpretations. Others feel that as a military leader you 
always need to be aggressive and authoritarian especially in combat scenario 
(Nordmeyer, 2012, p.1). It is, however, recognised in this research that the concept 
of collaborative leadership and the transparency and accountability principles are 
usually well understood and accepted by the security actors as one of the preferred 
styles. However, it is the increased incidences of monopoly of force and self-
interests among different security sector units that bring the research to the 
disadvantages of national security sector tendencies of autocratic leadership.  
 
It was noted in this study that respondents who are supporting Authoritarian 
Leadership are mostly those that lead single organisations with some departments 
of the same institution. They are basically following the tactical and positional 
leadership in a single and bureaucratic organisation (Chrislip, 1994, p.127). Most 
of them were also junior leaders who may not have much experience in 
collaborative working with other organisations and they are used to being ordered 
to act. In the military, it is part of training to brainwash trainees to “act first and 
question later” in what they call, “Chita-chita, siya-siya”. It is also true that in 
tactical battle situations, security leaders use authoritarian commands to defeat the 
enemy (Chrislip, 1994, p.127). These scenarios, however, are being debated 
negatively in democratic dispensation, where orders to kill innocent citizens 
without legal justification is a crime (Cawthra, 2009, p.21).  The author, however, 
is also aware from experience that some workmates would like to see their leaders 
fail and also that they may not be very knowledgeable, hence justification for 
authoritarian/coercive drive in some critical decisions (Northouse, 2013, p.5). 
 
While, this could be a long discourse, this study is more concerned with 
coordinating various organisations and personalities with different roles, beliefs 
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and structures. This is collaborative leadership, and it is different in its nature and 
requirements from the intra-organisational form in which most leaders will have 
been schooled (Saxton, 2012, p.1), which need to be part of the on-going security 
sector reform and review of existing policies. 
 
Table 4.9. Substantiating quotes on preferred leadership style 
Substantiating quotes: Collaborative Leadership more preferred, more benefits  
Constituent factors 
 
Types and styles of leadership, Tactical and Positional leadership, Situational leadership, 
Authoritarian Leadership, Bureaucratic Leadership, Consultative leadership and 
Collaborative Leadership. 
 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“CL is preferred because of the visionary, integrity, moral courage, openness, interactive 
and one who accepts criticisms.  Good listener, good analyser, good decider and good 
implementer”. 
 
“Professional leaders with a heart of patriotism and shared national interests are likely to 
collaborate with other agencies”.  
 
“Collaborative leader is more preferred who is listening, understands possible answers from 
various perspectives and working to achieve objectives as encourages others to be creative 
and find better solutions”. 
 
“I like Collaborative leadership because Mr Know-it-all does not exist in real world. 
Collaborative leaders are able to think out of the box and come out with 360 degrees 
solutions”. 
 
“I prefer collaborative style because I liken it to team work where you benefit from the 
different expertise of the team members rather than matching a boat sinking in an 
authoritarian style”. 
 
“Democratic, participative, leading by example. Giving decisions/solutions based on 
research and consultations from well informed individuals/agencies, enhanced sharing of 
information and synergised efforts on threats”. 
 
“Collaborative leadership would be preferred because decision made would be owned by 
the whole group and everybody would put in effort to achieve them”. 
 
“Collaborative Leadership should not be a choice but a necessity. The world we live in is a 
global village and dynamic. We need to reform and review policies to fit in the situation”. 
 
This is one reason that this study is advancing the thought that good leadership is 
critical to successful security operations. Success comes from aiming high with 
clear vision, ethos and communication that good leadership brings to a team or 
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organisation that have partnered. It is evident that national security is concerned 
with critical and pervasive threats that are on a large scale and are recurrent. A 
substantial body of literature has clearly shown how public administrators and 
leaders create and manage collaborations among successful governments, 
businesses and non-profits organisations. Indeed, collaborative management, 
particularly in government has become a hot topic and programme (Cheema and 
Popovski, 2010, p.2). 
 
4.1.2.2. Effectiveness and the need for collaborative leadership in sustaining 
national security (F7) 
Based on the literature, the author tried to investigate on whether Collaborative 
Leadership is effective in the security context and need to be encouraged as part of 
the security sector reform. There was an overwhelming response (99%) of the 
respondents who gave an affirmative response of yes and merely 1% said not sure 
(Chart 4.7). Collaborative Leadership is effective and desired concept in the 
security context as indicated by almost all respondents. They stated that CL would 
enable effective harmonisation of individual organisation‟s security policies, 
sharing of security information and joint analysis, effective use of resources 
without duplication of effort, timely responses to threats and promote a peaceful 
environment for economic development and increased foreign direct investment. 
One respondent emphasised that Collaborative Leadership should “not be a 
choice, but a necessity”. The effectiveness of CL in increasing achievement of 
common goals and objectives corresponds to Thomas et al. (2011, p.4). 
 
Chart 4.7. Need for collaborative leadership in the security context 
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This study signified that security leaders understand the need for collaboration to 
achieve sustainable National Security. The only challenge is that there are limited 
written frameworks, strategies and laws to guide this collaboration (Cabayan, 
2009, p.96; Hiwa, 2009, p.2; Kakhobwe et al., 2013, p.7). 
Table 4.10. Substantiating quotes from respondents on effectiveness and need 
for CL 
Substantiating quotes: Collaborative Leadership Effectiveness in Security Context.  
Constituent factors 
 
Collaborative Leadership, Stakeholders, working benefits and effectiveness and 
harmonisation of policies. 
 
Substantiating Quotes 
“I think it‟s right and proper to have such collaborative leadership in the security sector in 
order to incorporate various stakeholders relevant in the security sectors so that issues 
should have a multifaceted approach for the common good of the ordinary citizens. Players 
should be identified on the merit to avoid backbiting. It should have no political 
interference. The ruling party‟s crude intelligence groups should be subsumed in this 
grouping because once left out they could become a problem especially when government 
changes. We need a body that can be trusted by anybody”. 
 
“CL is important because it will enhance harmonisation of policies thereby removing 
security bottlenecks”.  
 
“Yes, this has the capacity of increasing the operational capabilities of organisations such 
as operation Chotsa Mbabva and control of illegal small weapons, as it allows better 
understanding of goals, objectives and strategies to achieve them”. 
 
“Yes because collaboration gives people an opportunity to brainstorm on security reforms 
that can help to achieve peace”. 
-  
“The benefits of CL would include accelerated security, economic, social and political 
development”. 
 
“Because collaborative set up gives room to all players and they are able to express views 
and the views benefits whoever is in power”.  
 
“CL is a „peaceful platform‟ where investment and other economic developments can 
survive. It is also useful for an efficient securitisation mechanism and timely response to 
threats”. 
 
“Economy would improve and sustainable development would be assured with increased 
foreign direct investment (FDI) due to proper CL”. 
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Discussion 
This is an important revelation in the security sector where not much literature has 
been written. While most security organisations employ authoritarian, tactical, 
positional and bureaucratic leadership styles, it is time to realise that security 
threats are dynamic and require collaborative and innovative effort to curb them 
(Curtis and McBride, 2011, p.18). This study also indicated that it is time for 
security leaders to accept that as a leader moves closer to the top, focus often 
shifts from the internal workings of the team or organisation, to an increasingly 
external perspective. The objects of interest become more about the environment 
in which the organisation operates, how this is changing, and how the organisation 
is predicting and reacting to these changes in order to maintain strategic edge. The 
positive and negative impact on cases of joint operations and control of small 
arms in Malawi support the findings of this study (Mwakasungura and Nungu, 
2005; Msiska and Lazarus, 2014, p.4; Chauwa, 2014, p.1). In this study, while 
respondents strongly supported CL in the security context, it is also indicated that 
Collaborative programmes could be hampered by a few agencies and individuals, 
who want to promote their own interests or gains (F8; Cawthra 2009, p.27). The 
study, also revealed a number of barriers that hinder effective collaboration that 
result into breakdown of security, which are discussed in the following section.  
 
4.1.2.3.  Identification and mitigation of barriers to CL (F8) 
Responding on the question of the main barriers to CL in Malawi, 58% of the 
respondents said Lack of financial support, political will and intolerance, 36% 
said lack of profession in organisations, 10% said different culture and lack of 
cooperation and 4% said lack of information capability (Chart 4.8). Some 
respondents added that other barriers to collaboration in Malawi are lack of clear 
focus on National Security, lack of appropriate leadership and the secret culture, 
lack of information compatibility, lack of political will and silo mentality. Other 
respondents mentioned additional challenges as political intolerance and 
interference in security matters, democracy without responsibility, too much 
political power and aiming to be in power all the time for individual gains, self-
interest as some are busy trying to survive and enrich themselves, involvement of 
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people with no knowledge on security issues to run or comment on security issues, 
and religious extremism make CL fail (Table 4.11; Archers and Cameron, 2013, 
p.142). 
 
Chart 4.8  Barriers to Collaborative Leadership 
 
 
Some of these barriers, including limited decision making processes, were well 
articulated in literature (Lamb and Marks, 2010, pp.6-8; Linden 2010, p.14; 
Allison and Zelikow, 2013, p.5). The author agrees with these findings as in 
Malawi, there have been cases of political intolerance evidenced by inter-party 
violence and over 46 political parties (Musuva, 2009, p.1; Kaisi, 2013, p.1; 
Nyirongo, 2014, p.1). Kuwali (2012, pp.80-81) adds that security organisations 
should not be politicised in the conduct of security matters.  
 
Discussion 
The main concern identified through this study is that while security and political 
leaders know about these barriers, there has been limited effort to resolve them 
through practical means like written documentation, which is the main gap to be 
addressed (Kuwali, 2012, p.75). It appears that leaders mainly react when there is 
a crisis and they aim to resolve it immediately and yet there are limited strategies 
and policies to implement these actions (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.284; 
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Msiska and Lazarus, 2013, p.4; Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p.5), but without 
proper written long-lasting collaborative mechanisms. Some respondents have 
also noted the lack of empowering traffic police officers in Malawi to carry 
firearms on duty to be more effective in mitigating traffic offences, but also to 
enable them to quickly respond to crime if required. One respondent questioned as 
to how unarmed traffic police could confront armed robbers and drug traffickers 
using a stolen vehicle? Issues of political intolerance have resulted in some inter-
party clashes. 
Table 4.11. Substantiating quotes from respondents on barriers to CL in the 
security sector 
Substantiating quotes: Barriers to Collaborative leadership  
Constituent factors 
 
Lack of professional, political interference, lack of leadership, lack of resources, capacity 
and technology, lack of vision and direction on national security and different culture. 
 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Competition among security organisations has remained a challenge for quite some time 
now. The clashes between MDF and MYP are examples of serious differences”. 
 
“Lack of professionals in these agencies, Political interference and Inter-agency 
competitions are some barriers to CL. For example, traffic police officers move without fire 
arms”. 
 
“Lack of Political will and support from some government officials hinders CL and makes 
it fail”. 
 
“Lack of intellectual capital, Lack of political capital and interest, Absence of vision as 
regards the National Security, Different organisational culture and Working in Isolation and 
religious extremism”. 
 
“Lack of leadership and the Secret Culture also make CL a challenge”. 
 
“Sector leaders who feel threatened that collaboration will lead to loss of authority control 
and Silo mentality for individual gains and political interference”. 
 
“Lack of knowledge of what security is, self interest in people dealing with security and 
many people are poor so they are busy trying to survive”. 
 
“Inferiority complex, high corruption and lack of sound knowledge or professionalism of 
some senior members in the sector”. 
 
“Lack of capacity (economic, institutional, infrastructure, technology etc.), lack of 
cooperation among other security organisations and bad organisational culture”. 
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The study noted that these barriers, therefore, require specific solutions and 
processes to be addressed through a number of mechanisms including reduction of 
conflicts and competition for power. 
 
4.1.2.4.  Reducing conflict among collaborative set up (F9) 
Responding to the question on how competition for power and authority could be 
reduced, 61% said outlining of clear roles in a joint work, 31% said appoint a 
chairperson for collaboration with powers and rights to report to the president, 
while 8% said not sure (Chart 4.9). 
 
Chart 4.9.  Reduction of conflicts and competition 
 
 
Respondents expressed that competition for power and authority is a major 
obstacle to CL as stressed by Lamb and Mark (2010, p.5). Respondents also 
suggested a number of measures to reduce this problem such as writing simple 
and clear roles, establish code of conduct, set up security committees and appoint 
a chairperson who would coordinate security issues. Some respondents 
emphasised that the chairperson should be mandated to coordinate and report to 
the president. Others also suggested rotation of chairpersons as in Table 2.12, 
which the author sees as a reasonable contribution as this is not mentioned in other 
case studies on CL in the security context. 
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The author agrees with respondents who also emphasised that CL can only work if 
there are clear strategies for sharing power and influence and training and 
developing security officers together.(Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.301). 
  
Table 4.12. Substantiating quotes on reduction of barriers to CL 
Substantiating quotes: Reduction on competition for Power  
Constituent factors 
 
Competitions for power, solutions to reduce competition, Chairperson and lead agencies, 
clear roles and Memorandum of Understanding. 
 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
 “Conflicts can be reduced by following respective mandates in the constitution”. 
 
“Political direction can help reduce power struggle as stated above, Selection of a standing 
committee to coordinate the collaborative process can also reduce the power struggle. 
Additionally, rotation of leadership of the Security Sector grouping amongst the leaders of 
different organisations can also reduce the struggle as every will be sure of his turn to lead 
the grouping”. 
 
“There should always be a chairmen / person for any collaborative set up and he/ she 
should be the only one who has the right to report to the Head of State. Chairperson could 
be on rotational basis”.  
 
“Establish code of conduct and discipline and establish central national security office”.
  
“By clear demarcation of responsibilities and transparent security policy and strategy 
formulation”.  
 
“By sharing resources when formulating, implementing and evaluating policies that are 
common to all stakeholders. Flexibility is also necessary so that there is no duplication of 
activities”. 
 
“By signing an agreed MOU”. 
 
“Reduce conflicts by organising seminars, revise laws, establish coordinating bodies, 
educate people academically and develop country to prevent poverty”. 
 
4.1.3.  Sharing power, influence and training security leaders together (CC3) 
This study has indicated that the process of sharing power and influence is crucial 
to improving CL. (Thomas et al., 2011, p.4).  This study sought the views of 
respondents on what they believe are the best factors and mechanisms that 
influence greater collaborative leadership and national security in Malawi? 
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Respondents identified several factors including joint training, threat analysis, 
decision making, operations, sharing credible information, incentives, contingency 
plans and continuous collaboration in peace and crisis periods (Tables 4.13 and 
4.14).  
 
Table 4.13. Substantiating quotes on sharing power and influence 
Constituent factors and substantiating quotes 
Constituent factors 
Joint training, decision making, operations programmes (F9), time for collaboration (F10), 
Incentives (F11), contingency plans (F12), build trust (F13), share relevant information 
(F14), security sector reform (F15), support from leaders (F16), organising security sector 
policy guidance (F17) and manage conflicts and cultural differences (F18) 
„Develop a well-trained workforce, sharing and integrating national security information 
across agencies and creating collaborative organisations”.  
“Formulation of a national security policy clearly spelling out what security institution will 
do and when”.  
“Joint planning and training and it should be a daily routine”.  
“Joint operations humanisation assistance to civil authority, peacekeeping, causes etc. and 
these need to be continuous”.  
“Trust among the security stakeholders”.  
“Deliberate government‟s policy on interagency collaboration”.  
“Availability of resources and joint training, sharing information and these to be done at all 
times because security actor relies on the other to effectively achieve certain objectives”. 
 
The following sections outline these in more detail. 
 
4.1.3.1.  Conduct of joint security training, decisions, exercises and planning 
programmes in Malawi (F10) 
On the question to outline collaborative activities conducted among the security 
actors, 48% of the respondents said Joint Security Course at Mzuzu University 
(MZUNI), 18% said patrols, 5% said sweeping exercises, 3% said road blocks and 
25% said were not sure (Chart 4.10). 
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Discussion 
It is interesting to note that while respondents mentioned that they have joint 
activities in training, monitoring illegal migration, patrols and roadblocks, some 
said that no practical exercises have been conducted jointly. Most respondents 
recorded that they conduct joint programmes with other organisations through the 
joint academic course at Mzuzu University. Only a few mentioned about practical 
training in peacekeeping between MDF and Police at Malawi Armed Forces 
College.  
 
Chart 4.10  Collaborative activities in Malawi security sector 
 
 
Worse still, 25% of respondents said they were not sure whether conducting joint 
training, exercises and planning was good enough. This is a concern that needs to 
be resolved because it means that no practical join activities are done in 
organisations. As Linden (2010, p.60) said, these joint programmes build trust, 
confidence and collaborative profession to reduce cultural differences and achieve 
common goals. This study also solicited ideas from respondents on the question of 
whether security actors need to conduct joint training, exercises and planning 
programmes. The answers received showed that 83% agreed with the questions 
that indeed security actors need to conduct joint training, exercises and planning 
as they indicated “yes”, 10% of them indicated “no” and 7% were not sure 
whether this was a good idea (Chart 4.11). 
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Table 4.14. Substantiating quotes on collaborative activities in Malawi 
Substantiating quotes: Collaborative Programmes in Malawi   
Constituent factors 
 
Academic studies, peacekeeping training, joint patrols, joint international exercises and 
operations, community policing, disaster relief and joint operations to combat crime. 
 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Collaborative programmes include security studies at Mzuzu University, Water resources 
Management and Land Management. Security leaders, however, need to use some 
recommendations by the academia, which seem to be limited”. 
 
- Monitoring of illegal immigrants, Security sweeping and visa applicants clearance”. 
 
“The Malawi Defence Forces has in the past conducted several training and exercises with 
the Malawi Police Services, US Army, UK forces and France Paratroopers. Yes, the 
Malawi Defence has for the past years initiated training between its Officers and those 
from the Malawi Police Service. At Malawi Armed Forces College they conduct a yearly 
course called Managing Defence in a Wider Security Context which is also attended by 
the Malawi Police Service Officers”.  
 
“There is a National Committee for the Control of Small Arms Proliferation, which 
composes the Police, MDF, Civil Society and politicians”.  
 
“No clear programmes, apart from periodical meetings with concerned sectors”.  
 
“Yes, on ad-hoc basis and normally it‟s marred with suspicious and inter service rivalry as 
no enabling culture has been developed to encourage collaboration”. 
 
 
Other respondents applauded the joint convoy training in Salima between MDF 
and the US army as part of the African Deployment Partnership Training (Bartel, 
2012, p.2).  
 
Discussion 
Because of the increasing importance of national security needs in this time when 
terrorism and crime is the order of the day with their complexity, adoption of 
collaborative leadership through comprehensive security policy and strategy 
practices to provide more integrated services is one of the most plausible decisions 
to make (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.316). 
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Chart 4.11.  Need for conduct of Joint training, decision making and 
planning 
 
 
While respondents agree to conduct these activities, this study has, however, 
indicated that some respondents never heard of such programmes in their 
organisations, never seen any and never had any.  Some only mentioned about the 
peacekeeping exercises and operations with SADC, US Army, UK forces, French 
troopers and UN missions and not much of joint training with other Malawian 
security organisations. The study also found another revelation of concern from 
some respondents (10%), who said that there is no need for joint programmes with 
other organisations. The observation by some respondents that there is limited 
coordination between the security actors and the academia to use and adopt some 
of their recommendations, is another factor that both political and security leaders 
need to consider. This is a manifestation that some leaders still need more 
education and skills on the dynamism of issues of security in addition to their 
normal basic training in their respective organisations (Archer and Cameron, 2013, 
p.156).  
 
The need for partnerships is to discover and reconnoitre successful practices and 
lessons that can be learned from operations conducted individually, but for the 
benefit of the nation and analyse their trends and challenges (Myers and 
McConnell, 2009, p.301). Furthermore, a government has the most challenging 
and sensitive task of protecting the public‟s interest, while at the same time, 
meeting the diverse requirements of its population (Constitution, 2010). The 
peoples‟ expectations continue to rise as they demand more and better government 
services, however, at lower costs, which can only be achieved in a stable and 
 116 
peaceful environment. To rate their government as a caring government depends 
on the quality of the services provided and the confidence they put in their leaders. 
While previously those responsible for national security had been largely confined 
to the President as the Commander In-Chief of the armed forces and security 
organisations (all of which include key intelligence agencies), currently officials 
from many more departments, levels of government and the business and 
community sectors play vital roles in national security in Malawi. 
 
Table 4.15. Substantiating quotes from respondents on the necessity of 
collaborative activities in Malawi security sector 
 
Constituent factors 
Peacekeeping exercises, Humanitarian assistance and liaison with other International 
Communication union. 
 
Substantiating Quotes 
“I have never heard of joint training and exercises with other security organisations”.  
 
“Not yet as of now. Only trainings on environmental risk management have done”. 
“Have never had any”. 
 
“Security sector should have inter-agency training institutions whereby a bespoke 
Malawian operating doctrine and culture would be developed and sustained”. 
 
“Yes, we conduct joint training and exercises with police and other stakeholders. We do 
training with SADC and other countries together (UN and African Union personnel) as 
well as USA, UK and France”.   
 
“Yes, we have requested International Communication Union for the past two years to 
supply some satellite phones which we gave the dept. Of disaster management for use 
during the rainy season to rescue victims in the lower shire and other districts of Malawi”. 
 
Archer and Cameron (2013, p.114) noted that collaborative leadership occurs 
most easily when people know one another professionally before the need to 
collaborate emerges. This familiarity with other actors in the national security 
sector allows a degree of trust to be developed which, in turn, gives officers the 
confidence to accept others‟ arguments regarding particular operational issues. 
When used strategically, collaboration produces positive impacts (Myers and 
McConnell, 2009, p.316).  
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The author had practical experience that gives evidence of the benefits of 
collaboration in the security sector. During general elections in Malawi in 2009, 
there was almost total peace and stability as there were minimal incidents of 
political violence. Prior to these elections, the author who was then the NSA 
convinced the president to call for an inter-agency meeting for all the core security 
leaders to discuss the security situation and devise strategies that would mitigate 
political violence. Indeed, for the first time in the history of Malawi, the State 
President Professor Bingu Mutharika called for a joint meeting at Sanjika Palace 
in Blantyre, which was attended by the MDF (Commander, Directors and Brigade 
Commanders), Police (Inspector General and Regional Commissioners), National 
Intelligence Bureau (Director General) and the Chief Secretary to the government. 
 
The leaders briefed the meeting on foreseeable challenges and best mechanisms to 
resolve them. Measures taken, which included among others military flag shows 
and education awareness to all political parties to avoid violent acts, helped to 
mitigate anticipated threats. The security sector was vigilant to ensure that any 
law-breakers, including members of the ruling party, would be answerable to the 
constitution of Malawi (2010). The author believes that this was a great example 
of the successes of collaborative leadership and planning together, as there were 
no violent incidents on the polling day in the 2009 general elections compared to 
elections in 1999 and 2004 (Musuva, 2009, p.1). The only two incidents recorded 
by the author, who was the NSA, was the throwing of stones at a Democratic 
Peoples‟ Party vehicle in Mangochi district, but without damage and interrupting 
United Democratic Front political rally in Thyolo district during campaign period 
(Musuva, 2009, p.1).  
 
To the contrary, while this was very remarkable achievement, in 2011, there were 
a lot of challenges as seen by massive demonstrations and death of 20 citizens, 
shortage of fuel and foreign exchange (Kapito et al., 2011, p.7). This study 
attaches these security breakdowns due to the absence of collaborative leadership 
to enable informed decisions and appropriate actions by the government. In 
November, 2010, the author, who was coordinating issues of National Security, 
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was assigned to other duties and there was no replacement until July, 2011. It was 
during this gap that some challenges were also experienced; stressing the need for 
CL. Although this concern was resolved with the appointment of a new NSA in 
2011, this study still exposes some challenges because of lack of coordinating 
legal mandate and parliamentary authority for the NSA and proper structures for 
effective collaboration.  
 
The violent incidents in 2014 general elections, where a polling station was burnt 
in Blantyre and some property destroyed in Mangochi district (Mpofu, 2014, p.1) 
are some examples that confirm the author‟s argument that there is need for more 
collaboration among security actors and other stakeholders to prevent these crimes. 
According to Nkosi (2012, p.2), when there is peace and stability in a country, 
there is more economic development, as was the case in Malawi in 2009 with a 
record growth of 8%. Kuwali (2012, p.86), however, asked “when and how should 
security actors coordinate”?  
 
4.1.3.2.  Time for conduct of collaborative programmes (F11) 
Chart 4.12 indicates some answers from respondents on the preferred time for the 
Malawi security actors to collaborate. They mentioned that CL should be practiced 
every six months (45%), on weekly basis (37%), routinely and on daily basis, as 
threats are contemporary (15%), while 6% did not comment.  
 
Chart 4.12.  Appropriate time for practicing CL in Malawi 
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Discussion 
These responses are commendable particularly on routine and daily coordination 
basis since responding to threats such as crime, terrorist attacks and disasters 
require speedy coordinated network. This argument is supported by Rabinowitz 
and Renault (2011), who said that collaborative leadership should be aimed at 
addressing challenges and creating new opportunities on regular basis that could 
be impossible to do by one person or organisation. 
 
Table 4.16. Substantiating quotes from respondents on appropriate time for 
practicing collaborative programmes in Malawi 
Substantiating quotes: Time for Practicing Collaborative leadership  
Constituent factors 
Every six months, Weekly, Daily routine and throughout before crisis. 
Substantiating Quotes 
“It should be done every six months or as may be required” 
“CL should be done weekly and also when there is need to do so. CL needs to be 
conducted routinely. Don‟t wait for threats”. 
“CL should be practiced throughout the cycle of a policy from draft formulation through 
to evaluation”. 
“It should be a daily routine and not on ad-hoc basis. CL needs to be implemented before 
the crisis is occurred and practice this all the time. This should be on daily basis as threats 
are contemporary and information updated”. 
 
From the respondents, it can be deduced that respondents showed a spirit of 
hesitation simply because in Malawi, CL is still in its infancy as such there is need 
to cultivate a culture of trust among the security sector units. It has also been clear 
that in Malawi, the call for collaboration is usually done when there is a crisis, 
instead of an on-going activity (Kakande, 2012, p.1). This study suggests that this 
is the opportune time for leaders in the security sector of Malawi to start 
collaborating in a more professional and practical manner to solve the many 
challenges and complex threats to NS. Collaborative leaders also need to be 
rewarded if the process has to be successful, either through promotions, financial 
or higher training opportunities among others (Archer and Cameron, 2013, p.156). 
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4.1.3.3.  Incentives as motivation in Malawi’s National Security collaborative 
leadership (F12) 
Responding to the question on whether their organisations reward people that 
encourage collaborative leadership, 37% said yes, 32% said no and 31% were not 
sure. Some respondents even said that their organisations do not support 
collaborations as they are seen to be interfering with other organisations (Chart 
4.13). Increasingly, organisations are realising that they have to establish an 
equitable balance between the employee‟s contribution to the organisation and the 
organisation‟s contribution to the employee. Respondents mentioned that 
motivation and incentives in their organisations include promotions to higher 
ranks and sending individuals for higher training for those who are doing well, 
which is good for motivation (Thomas et al., 2011).  
 
Chart 4.13  Incentives for collaborative leaders 
 
 
While these are good examples here, this study has exposed some gaps in that 
incentives are only offered to leaders within the same organisation, which has 
fuelled lack of inter-agency collaboration (Zegart, 2007, p.77).In this study, there 
were no real examples for incentives awarded for collaborating with external 
organisations. The only convincing example was in Malawi Communication 
Regulatory authority (MACRA), where a legal lady manager was promoted to 
Deputy Director after initiating a collaborative document with telecom and ICT 
services. While these are commendable cases, they are rare examples done on ad-
hoc basis, which still require written arrangements to be sustainable. What is even 
more worrisome is that most respondents said they have never heard that their 
organisations offer rewards to collaborative leaders, while one respondent 
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emphasised that collaborative culture is discouraged in their organisation to 
maintain superiority (Linden, 2010, p.59). The author sees a lot of work to be 
done in improving these collaborations. Security organisations have intelligence 
components, who receive information that need to be shared and fused for the 
good of the nation. Again, the results have to be looked at with some caution in 
that the results indicated that 37% consider rewards to be important to encourage 
collaboration to motivate security actors. 
 
Table 4.17. Substantiating quotes from respondents on incentives for 
practising CL in Malawi 
Substantiating quotes: Motivation for Collaborative leadership Efforts  
Constituent factors 
Promotions and training. 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Not sure as of now if our organisation provides incentives for collaborative leaders”. 
 
“No comment but it‟s very likely that it does give incentives”. 
 
“I haven‟t seen any direct reward been given in view of the public let alone a thank you. 
Collaborative culture is discouraged”. 
 
“Yes, they are promoted to higher ranks because they perform well and they are sent for 
further training to improve their knowledge”. 
 
“Yes. One of my lady managers in the legal section at MACRA initiated to form Consumer 
Affairs Section so that we can interact/ interwork with consumers of ICT services and other 
organisations. In complementing her effort by the commission, the lady was promoted from 
manager to deputy director in the legal department”. 
 
 
However, if one looks at the proportion of respondents who were not sure and this 
proportion is excluded, the analysis of this question indicate that proportion of 
satisfaction of rewards increases to 53% of the respondents who consider that 
rewards are necessary and can be instituted in the national security programs. The 
predicament here is that what credible conclusion can be drawn from this? It is 
possible that the 37% represents a fair response. It is also possible that almost half 
of the respondents may not be willing to provide the fair answer if the actors are 
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unhappy on the way rewards are given and are wary to voice their opinion. When 
this is the case considering, it may be a challenge, if not impossible to give correct 
conclusions. The author‟s personal opinion and experience, however, help to 
explain this observation. 
 
In 2006, the author had experienced this challenge when the President said that the 
author, who was the Director of Military Intelligence at that time, should not 
interfere with other organisations when he had received some information and 
shared it with NIB that required urgent attention. Looking at the type of 
information received, which was about criminal activities, the author decided to 
share it with the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), which was the rightful 
organisation to look at that issue, even though it was not requested (Linden, 2010, 
p.61). When the author spoke to the NIB and conveyed the information, the NIB 
expressed happiness and thanked the author for this cooperation. To the author‟s 
surprise, however, a few days later, he received a copy of a memorandum that was 
written to the president by NIB reporting that the author was interfering with their 
duties. In his remarks on the memo, the president wrote, “Brigadier General 
Ngwenya, don‟t interfere with NIB functions.” In 2007, the author went to UK for 
further advanced training at the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS), which 
was sponsored by the British government through bilateral cooperation.  
 
When the author completed the course and returned to Malawi, the President 
appointed the author the first National Security Advisor (NSA) in 2008. In his 
brief, the President said that he had a lot of confidence in the author because of the 
genuine reports and well analysed information that was reported from the MDF 
commander, which was well coordinated and analysed by the author. The 
president added that he noted a huge gap during the author‟s absence. The 
president then assigned the author to coordinate security issues with all other 
security organisations including the NIB. The author noted this as one of the 
incentives and responsibility by top political leaders to encourage collaboration, 
while other security leaders may not want to cooperate for personal gains instead 
of focussing on overall national security interests (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6).The 
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author‟s personal experience presented in this study is meant to reinforce the point 
in question. It is a practical issue that demonstrates the need for Malawi to have a 
national security practical policy framework that would enable security actors to 
collaborate and share strategic information without fear of reprimand. 
 
4.1.3.4.  Generation of credible information through systems fusion and 
coding processes (F13) 
On the question to identify mechanisms that would improve credibility of 
information to be shared, 55% said establishing information technology network, 
40% said establishing centralised national intelligence fusion centre, while 5% did 
not comment. Respondents said that credible information would ease the problem 
of funding, reduce duplication of work among security actors and reduce cultural 
differences. Respondents also mentioned that credible information could be 
achieved through creating a central fusion centre, use of proper systems for 
analysing information using both scientific and non-scientific methods, 
employment of intellectual professionals and use of modern technological devices.  
 
Chart 4.14.  Credible information through systems fusion and coding 
processes 
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Discussion 
These are commendable revelations, as information security is a vibrant practice 
and development that must be effectively and proactively managed for security 
organisations to recognise and react to both external and internal threats. The 
author‟s intention, through this study, is to transform both the Malawi Defence 
Force and the entire security sector in Malawi, as embodied in the Constitution of 
1995, to work together and also share credible information to preserve the ability 
to mitigate and respond timely to any threat (Chirwa, 2013, p.10).  
 
 In this regard, the findings of this study support government, parliament and the 
Supreme court of Malawi for approving and facilitating the use of the modern 
technology equipment at Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority 
(MACRA), which others labelled it as “spy machine” (Chibwe, 2014, p.1). 
Considering the many breaches of security, such as communications tax and tariffs 
for customers, intimidation of innocent citizens by unknown phone calls or 
messages and even terrorists or advanced criminal networks, they would be 
resolved through such technologies (Curtis and McBride, 2011, p.115). There are 
good examples of the use of technology that helped to uncover tragic terrorist 
attackers on funs watching the world football cup match in Uganda in 2010. The 
successful operation in France to track down the terrorists in the magazine attack 
on 7th January 2015 was also partly due to advanced technology. Technology 
network is important for Malawi‟s national security. This study, however, 
cautioned the need for individual privacy and rights; and not to abuse technology, 
which needs to be balanced in the conduct of NS (Schnabel, 2008, pp.87-95; 
Charret, 2009, p.25). 
 
It should also be noted that this study is not advocating for infringing on personal 
privacy rights but the need for credible information in case of security breakdown. 
The study suggests that these systems in Malawi can only be effective with 
appropriate revised laws, written security policy and procedures (Katopola, 2009, 
p.1; Chirwa, 2013, p.10; Kuwali, 2012, p.89; Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8). 
 
 125 
Table 4.18. Substantiating quotes from respondents on generation of credible 
information 
Substantiating quotes: Achieving Credible Information through Fusion Centre. 
Constituent factors 
Information and Technology equipment, Central Analysis, Time saving and avoidance of 
resource wastage. 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“A fusion centre is essential for concerted countermeasures, to ease in funding hiccups and 
to avoid wasting resources on one area of interest by different agencies”. 
 
“Credible information can be achieved by being honest and sticking to those who have the 
knowledge. By proving the information to be true using both scientific technological 
network and non-scientific methods”.  
 
“ The approval by Parliament and Supreme Court on the use of MACRA integrated 
communication system labelled “Spy Machine” is commendable to help check credible 
information if required.” 
 
“Credible information can be generated by having one centralised national fusion centre”. 
 
“Relevant information will reduce time and resource wastage in searching for information, 
which is already available. It will also reduce duplication of activities and enable proper 
allocation of responsibilities”. 
 
“Information shared should be up to date, original and timely”. 
 
“Should be shared so that there should learning from each other but caution should be made 
not to release the information to people/ institutions that are not involved security matters”. 
 
“Info is the resource that enables co-ordination and what type of action to take 
collectively”. 
 
“Via common ICT database and computer network with different access levels”.  
 
“By letting the national security authority/ council to formulate intelligence problems for 
intelligence gathering intentions”. 
 
“By use of sophisticated accepted communication gadgets-normally point-to-point type, 
and also ensure sound training for the information sources”. 
 
 
According to Phillips et al. (2000), the best fusion centre is among North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation forces, but the author observed that literature was not giving a 
clear example of fusion centres among security organisations in specific countries, 
which is the main concern of this study. In USA, for example, the fusion centre is 
mainly the collaboration among the intelligence agencies on terrorism after the 
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September 2001 incident (Zagart, 2007, p.40). This fusion centre and joint 
working will also assist to establish high levels of trust and confidence among 
security actors in Malawi instead of gossiping and writing biased intelligence 
reports, which resulted in conflicts (Mandiza, 2002, p.124). 
 
4.1.3.5.  Building trust to share information and avoid leakage (F14) 
Responding to the question on how trust could be achieved in sharing information 
and avoid leakage, 45% of the respondents said defining clear and simple roles for 
each security organisation in collaborative leadership, 42% said conduct 
professional training in security education and 13% said outline legal provisions 
to prosecute offenders and effective security vetting measures (Chart 4.15).  
 
Most respondents also said that it is important to share information, as it is very 
crucial for decision- making and actions. Some respondents said that periodic 
inter-agency awareness briefs and meetings, and sharing action plans and 
measuring the same after implementation are important factors in maintaining 
trust and confidence among security actors. Some respondents, however, 
cautioned that not all security information could be shared as it is on the need to 
know basis, which is also argued by Riggio (2010), who noted that sharing 
operational information by US marines to Pakistan military had leaked and 
jeopardised the operation on Al-Qaeda. In Malawi too, the author recalls that 
during operation “Chotsa Mbabva” in 1995, one criminal suspect had deserted his 
houses and left a written note that he knew that security personnel would come to 
search his residence. This poses a huge challenge as to whether information 
should be shared or not, as too much sharing is also bad (Riggio, 2011, p.1; Archer 
and Cameron, 2013, p.29).  
 
This dilemma is, however, resolved as some respondents said that the leakage of 
information can be prevented through, professional training, protocols on levels of 
information classification and accessibility, vetting and employing only those with 
a heart of patriotism and enacting relevant laws, taking oaths to prosecute those 
that leak secret information and signing MOUs. In Malawi, both the MDF and 
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Police Acts have provisions to punish officers who leak information, but the 
challenge is that there is no proper classification of the levels of secrecy and 
therefore difficult to determine who should be prosecuted (Joji, 2013, p.1). 
 
Chart 4.15.  Building trust to share information and prevent leakage 
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This reasoning is supported by Osman (2012, p.1), who suggest revision of the 
laws of Malawi to strengthen security. Table 4.20 outlines some quotes by 
respondents on building trust and confidence. 
 
Discussion 
It is noted in this study that unless these requirements are addressed in a written 
documentation and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed to outline 
procedures for sharing information and joint working; this problem would 
continue and even get worse in a collaborative set up. The author also advocates 
that information shared should also be accurate and relevant as well as transparent 
for a common goal to instil trust and confidence as this will greatly help to avoid 
leakage (Linden, 2010, p.213). The author considers that the most important 
aspect is sharing strategic information, while actual operational intelligence need 
to be restricted to relevant organisations with the required vetting systems.  
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Table 4.19. Substantiating quotes from respondents on building trust and 
avoid leakage of information 
Substantiating quotes: Building trust and confidence   
Constituent factors 
Building trust, sharing information, training in security, transparency and vetting 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Trust can be achieved by training leaders in security education, vet and employ only those 
with a heart of patriotism and information security should be treated as a priority at all 
times. Sharing and access should be restricted to only those that are allowed to know the 
relevant information”. 
 
“Trust and confidence can be achieved by promising the information provider adequate 
security in terms of concealing his or her identity”. 
 
“To avoid leakage of information and build trust, people should take oaths so that they can 
prosecute whenever they have leaked information”. 
 
“Professionalise security sector and remove political interference”. 
 
“Stop negative cultural beliefs and educate the people academically”.  
“Build trust by working together and paying the people well to avoid security risks”. 
 
“By signing oaths of secrecy for all staff of inter-agencies and also use of multi-level 
password in case of electronic information exchange”. 
 
 
4.1.3.6. Sharing relevant Information to achieve National Security (F15) 
As to the measures that would ensure information is credible and relevant, 58% of 
the respondents said conduct regular checks among security actors and 42% said 
provide true information through scientific and non-scientific methods.  
 
Chart 4.16  Assurance of relevance information to achieve NS 
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Table 4.20. Substantiating quotes from respondents on assurance of sharing 
credible information  
Assurance of Relevant Information : Substantiating Concepts and Quotes 
Constituent factors 
Continuous review of information, laid out protocols, skilled personnel and modern 
technology 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Relevant information can be achieved through joint analysis. Information should be 
shared, as it is the backbone of security work.  Information is vital as all operations have a 
base on a reliable information base”. 
 
“Assurance of relevant information can be done by continuous review of data in a mutual 
trust. Timely collection of data and the data should be the latest”. 
 
“Modern technology for collection and quality analysis are essential tools for achieving 
relevant information”. 
 
“Information synthesis and verification are important factors to provide relevant 
information”. 
 
 
Discussion 
Relevant and important information for safeguarding peoples‟ livelihood cannot 
be more than emphasised. Respondents said that information should be updated 
and should be the latest (Thomas, 2007, p.15). The author finds this as an 
important element to enable that information is updated and shared on daily basis 
as it impacts on effective decisions by security leaders. This calls for proper and 
laid out protocols for sharing relevant information including skilled personnel and 
technology among security organisations. 
 
4.1.3.7.  Implement further security sector reforms (F16) 
On the question of whether the Malawi security sector is reforming, 82% of the 
respondents said yes, 8% said no, 5% said not sure and 5% did not comment 
(Chart 4.17). 
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Chart 4.17. Malawi security sector is reforming 
 
 
Table 4.21. Substantiating quotes from respondents on security sector 
reforms in Malawi 
Substantiating quotes: Collaborative leadership part of security reforming  
Constituent factors 
Democratic reforms of security organisations and joint programmes 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Yes, Malawi security sector is reforming. There are several examples in police and 
defence through employment of female officers and government policies to support 
security. CL is part of reform as it gives people an opportunity to brainstorm on security 
reforms that can help to achieve peace as is the case with joint training at Mzuzu 
university”. 
 
“The Public Service reforms are good examples that government is supportive. There is, 
however, need for more reforms in security to combat crime and collaboration, as well as 
approval by parliament to prevent legal implementation challenges.  
 
“CL is important because it can help to avoid unnecessary duplications and ensure timely 
response to threats”. 
 
“Collaborative leadership is the mainstay for improving national security and is a 
necessary concept for security actors”. We need various players, which is part of 
reforms”. 
 
 
Discussion 
It is encouraging from the responses that the Malawi security sector is reforming 
through examples of active community policing programmes (Kainja, 2010, p.20), 
some joint exercises in peacekeeping, joint operations (Msiska and Lazarus, 2013) 
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and joint academic course at Mzuzu University, to mention but a few. The author 
is encouraged that one interviewee mentioned that Malawi needs a joint training 
institution for the security sector and believes that MZUNI is a good starting point. 
 
However, there is a long way to go because most of these joint ventures are not 
legally documented to bind security actors, as there is no overarching national 
security policy (Kuwali, 2012, p.89). Other security institutions have not sent their 
students to this important and intellectual course arguing that it is mainly for the 
military, police and now NIB, who have joined the course. The author also feels 
that it is time when Malawi needs higher professional joint learning institutions, 
like the Royal College of Defence Studies in the United Kingdom, Defence 
College in Kenya and South Africa to enable more security institutions study 
together for longer period and in a more practical way. This is in addition to the 
joint symposium on security sector governance and national security strategy in 
Malawi organised by the USA Africa Centre for strategic studies (Garrison, 2013 
et al., p.4) and Southern African Defence and Security Management network in 
liaison with Mzuzu University (Kakhobwe et al., 2012). 
 
4.1.3.8.  Support from political and security leaders for collaborative 
leadership (F17) 
Answering on the question of whether there is support on Collaboration from 
Leaders in organisations, 78% said yes, 17% said no and 5% were not sure (Chart 
4.18). Most respondents said that their leaders support CL citing examples that 
they provide funding for training and implementation of their plans including 
inter-departmental seminars (Kakhobwe et al., 2012). However, some respondents 
emphasised that their leaders do not listen and support them. 
 
Discussion 
The author commends this support from top political leadership. In 2009, the 
former President of Malawi, Professor Bingu Mutharika, approved the 
formulation of the National Security Policy. The Joint Security symposium on 13 
September 2012, presided over by the former President, Dr. Joyce Banda, was 
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another proof of government support (Kakande, 2012 p.1). This top leadership 
support for national security was also emphasised by the President of Malawi His 
Excellency Professor Peter Mutharika during the national parliamentary budget 
session on 17
th
 June 2014 to provide enough resources (Mutharika, 2014, p.9).     
 
Chart 4.18  Support from leaders for CL in the security sector 
 
 
The appointment of the professional former Commander of the Malawi Defence 
Force (MDF) in 2011 as the NSA to coordinate national security issues (Tenthani, 
2011, p.1) was another significant support and achievement by the Malawi 
government, particularly that most countries in the world do not have the post of 
the NSA. It is, however, noted with concern as some responses indicated limited 
support. Some respondents said that so far, there were no real indications to 
support CL as funding was only for their routine training.  
 
One respondent also literary said that their organisation discourages any other 
handshakes with other organisations, while others said there is no support because 
when leaders get relevant information, they do not share, but instead want to use it 
by themselves as also observed by Zegart (2007, p.59). One respondent said there 
is limited support due to low funding, also observed in literature (Kruger and 
Martin, 2013, p.3). Some respondents also observed that leaders of opposition 
parties seem to be supportive, but fall in the same dilemma when they get in 
government. The author agrees with these respondents because in most cases 
political leaders seek political mileage and sometimes don‟t support or vote for 
laws that would strengthen security (Chrislip, 1994, p.32). It is, however, noted by 
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respondents that the initiative by the Malawi government on Public Service 
reforms will enable all stakeholders to work together and improve the 
effectiveness and performance of various organisations (Chilima, et al., 2015, 
p.23&26). 
 
Table 4.22. Substantiating quotes from respondents on support from leaders 
Substantiating quotes: Support from leaders for collaborative leadership  
Constituent factors 
Support from political and security leaders, direction, funding and cases for collaboration. 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Yes, my organisation has been very much supported by leaders so that we can use stage-of-
the-art of telecommunications monitoring equipment, which can improve government‟s 
revenue collection”. 
 
“Yes, there is support through formulation of committees on various security organisations 
in targeting specific threats like disaster preparedness committee”. 
 
“So far there is not much support from top leaders, but the hierarchical nature of the 
organisation entails that the top leaders are at the liberty of initiating the collaboration 
process”. 
 
“Somehow yes, there is support from leaders because institutions receive funds to 
implement their plans and they receive training in security matters”. 
 
“No, there is no support from leaders, for example the public can have information but 
instead of sharing and goes to the right organisation they will prefer to handle it 
themselves”. 
 
“The current operating environment discourages any other handshakes with other 
organisations without the blessing of top leaders”. 
 
“There is lack of political will due to low funding. Opposition sometimes act as if they want 
to support but not when they are in government due to personal interests. Sometimes the 
opposition just talk to destabilise the government”. 
 
Some respondents said that other leaders were afraid to say the wrong doings and 
are afraid to do the right things because they wanted to seek sympathy. Some 
political leaders look at their immediate political gains and votes, but they forget 
that by supporting relevant structures to improve national security and economic 
development, will earn them longer political career and successes. The caution by 
some respondents that other opposition leaders just talk without effective 
contribution aimed at destabilising government is another concern to security and 
development that needs to be addressed. It was noted in this study that while 
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leaders may want to support CL, without proper understanding of a national 
security policy that would guide the processes, not much progress will be 
achieved. This study also suggests that support from political leaders need to 
emphasise on the legal framework (Hiwa, 2009, p.2; Osman, 2012, p.1; 
Kanyongolo, 2012, cited by Chirwa, 2013, p.10) and authority for collaborative 
policies. The issue of the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) not having a 
separate legislation since its establishment about 20 years ago and still operating 
under the Malawi Police Act, need to be revisited. The NIB needs to be delinked 
from the Police and have their own Act if they have to perform efficiently. These 
arrangements would be done through efficient structures.  
 
4.1.4. Establishment of collaborative structures with legal mandate (CC4) 
This study emphasises the important need for structures that would be put in place 
to support collaboration in the security context. Respondents were asked to 
indicate critical structures that would be useful in the Malawian security scenario. 
The constituent factors included clear organisational policies to guide 
collaboration with other institutions, protocols and technologies for sharing 
information, central national security coordinating office, joint security 
committees and a written overarching inter-agency national security policy and 
strategy (Table 4.24). 
 
Table 4.23. Substantiating quotes from respondents on collaborative 
structures with legal mandate in the SS 
Collaborative structures, constituent factors and substantiating quotes 
Constituent factors 
 
Integrated national security policy (F19), protocols and technologies for sharing 
information (F20), national security coordinating office (F21), organisations at NSCO 
(F22) and joint security committees (F23). 
“Create collaborative structures with legal mandate to formalise national security policy 
designated to ensure that any threats to the country can be foreseen and managed with no 
or minimal damage.”  
 
“Institute working and operational national security council and joint security 
committees and national security centre with legal mandate”.  
 
 “Establish protocols for sharing information through modern technology and classified 
channels. Share information via common ICT data base with different access levels”. 
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4.1.4.1.  Understanding of national security policy (F18) 
On the question of how respondents understand the National Security Policy, 55% 
said it is a broad concept of action adopted by government at national level, 40% 
said it is a guide for national security management for all security actors while 5% 
did not comment (Chart 4.19). Respondents indicated that they understand the 
purpose of the National Security Policy. They said it is a broad concept of action 
by government at national level, while others said that it is a guide for national 
security management for all security actors. 
 
Chart 4.19.  National Security Policy 
 
 
There were, however, also some differences in that some respondents said it can 
be a written document, while others said it could be a verbal statement. 
 
Discussion 
This study observed that the support for verbal policies on security matters creates 
a danger of non- sustainability of the CL as also stated by Cabayan (2009) in 
collaborative challenges facing the US government. No wonder, in Malawi leaders 
talk about collaboration (Kakhobwe et al., 2013), but most organisations do not 
have written policies to guide this process. 
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Table 4.24. Substantiating quotes on National Security Policy 
Substantiating quotes: National Security Policy  
Constituent factors 
National Security Policy, Existing policies in organisations and its relevance. 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“National security policy (NSP) is a written or not written general guideline giving the 
general coordination of all security agencies on how to relate with others towards national 
security requirement”. 
 
“NSP provides coordinated approach through sound mechanisms”. 
 
“NSP is a practical combination of roles and policies and procedures”. 
 
“NSP is a policy that is designed to ensure that any threats to the country can be mitigated”. 
 
“The feasible basic structure or systems of rules or ideas, which help an entity, make 
decisions. It is a plan of action agreed or chosen by a government to expedite national 
security”. 
 
“National security policy can be defined as guiding principles aiming to keep an object safe, 
in this case the values and interests by providing technical and administrative guidelines for 
the design, implementation and management national security interventions, programmes and 
activities required for the survival of a nation”. 
 
“NSP will specify what roles to be played by what institution when need arise and also it will 
help to discipline security institutions behaviour by minimising ad hoc and costly decision 
making process by promoting the optimal use of resources in pursuit of specific objectives”. 
 
4.1.4.2. Organisational written security policies to guide inter-agency 
collaboration in peace and in crisis (F19) 
On the question of whether organisations have written policies to guide inter-
agency collaboration, 40% of the respondents said that they have written policies, 
50% said no and 10% said not sure. Most respondents said that they do not have 
written policies except the Malawi defence Force, which has a written 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Department of Forestry and 
Wild Life and Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi to guide activities, while 
the Malawi Police Service has a policy to collaborate on community policing. 
Malawi Communication Regulatory Authority (MACRA) also indicated that they 
give an electronic copy of agreement with competition commission and other 
countries. While these are encouraging joint programmes, the author still feels that 
 137 
there is more to be done in the overall collaboration to involve several 
stakeholders in issues of National Security.  
 
The quotes by respondents (Table 2.16) support the author‟s argument that 
organisations have limited written documents to guide collaborative leadership. 
 
Chart 4.20.  Existence of organisations’ inter-agency security policies 
 
 
Discussion 
The views by respondents indicate non-existence of written and practical policies 
on security coordination with more stakeholders as some said that they don‟t know, 
others said not yet, no there isn‟t any and not sure of the existence of any 
document in this regard. This is not surprising to the author as he had already seen 
this gap and he conducted this study to make a contribution to practical 
collaborative policy framework that would also help to improve sharing of 
information among security leaders. These findings also confirm about the limited 
written security policies that would guide multi-departmental coordination, which 
was observed by Kakhobwe et al. (2013, p.8) during the inter-agency seminar that 
was held in Lilongwe, Malawi on 13th September, 2013. 
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Table 4.25. Substantiating quotes from respondents on written policies for 
organisations on CL 
Substantiating quotes: Written Policies for Organisations on Collaborative Leadership.  
Constituent factors 
Written security  Policies in organisations and guiding principles 
Substantiating Quotes 
“Yes we have, but it is so bulky to provide a copy. It is known as the Service Standing 
Orders.”  
 
“I don‟t know that we have a policy to coordinate with other security organisations. What 
we have are out-dated colonial era protocols of which some structures are no-functional”. 
 
“We don‟t have the policy yet, but it is in the process. It will clear demarcation of 
responsibilities, transport security, security policy and strategy formulation”. 
 
“I am not sure of the existence of any document in this regard. The existence of such 
documents will, however, help to seal off all security lapses and reduce duplication of 
activities while ensuring effective and efficient use of available resources”. 
 
“No, there isn‟t any, but there used to be one in the past. This time there isn‟t any since 
the SIS was delinked from the Police service”. 
 
“No, except MOU‟s to guide activities such as with Wildlife and Electricity Supply 
Commission of Malawi” 
 
“Yes, we give electronic copy of agreement with competition commission and other 
countries”. 
 
“Not sure, but we need it. It will specify what roles to be played by what institution when 
need arise and also it will help discipline security institutions‟ behaviours by minimising 
ad-hoc and costly decision making process by promoting the optimal use of resources in 
pursuit of specific objectives.” 
 
4.1.4.3.  Establishment of protocols and technologies for Sharing Information 
with other organisations (F20) 
Responding to the question on whether organisations have policies or protocols to 
ensure systematic procedures for sharing information, 24% said yes, 48% said no 
and 26% said not sure. The large number of respondents (48%) who said that they 
do not have protocols and procedures for sharing information with other 
organisations are clear testimony that important information is not shared as 
required. Some respondents even commented that they have never seen one 
standard format for information sharing, while others said that they have but out-
dated colonial era and they are non-functional.  
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Only one respondent from MACRA said that they have protocols with telecom 
operators aimed at successful provision in a standard format (Table 4.27). 
 
Chart 4.21.  Existence of protocols and technologies for sharing information 
 
 
Discussion 
From the responses, one can clearly observe that there was general agreement 
among respondents that increased collaboration was essential for the government 
to fulfil its responsibilities to keep the country in peaceful atmosphere and 
harmless. However, most of the security professional actors believe that more time 
has been spent talking about improved collaboration by the executive than 
essentially doing the hard work warranting to ensure a unified, coordinated 
response before the nation can be stricken by terrorist attack, calamity or natural 
disasters (Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.2; Table 4.25). 
 
The study relates several cases of insecurity and uncoordinated response to 
security threats such as the violent demonstrations on 20th July 2011, due to this 
lack of information sharing (Chirwa, 2013, p.12). Security and political leaders 
are aware of some threats and the need to mitigate them, but they don‟t share with 
others to enable a coordinated response, as was the case in 9/11 terrorist attacks 
(Zegart, 2007, p.64). The author agrees with Riggio (2011, p.1) for accelerated 
reforms and technologies in the security sector to adopt modern protocols to allow 
sharing of relevant information, otherwise, leaders will continue to talk about 
them but no meaningful collaboration will be achieved.  
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Table 4.26. Substantiating quotes from respondents on protocols for sharing 
information 
Substantiating Concepts and Quotes: Procedures and protocols for sharing Information  
Constituent factors 
Protocols for sharing information and standard format 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Yes, we have protocols for sharing information and we share information with telecom 
operators aimed at successful provision of services in a standard format”. 
 
“I have never seen one standard format for info sharing, but it is very important for 
collaboration”. 
 
“Sharing of information is hampered by out-dated colonial era protocols of which some 
structures are non-functional”. 
 
 
 
4.1.4.4.  Establishment of National Security Central Office (NSCO) 
coordinated by the NSA (F21) 
Responding to the question on the need to establish a National Security Central 
Office (NSCO), 96% of the respondents said that there is need to establish 2% 
said no and 2% did not comment (Chart 4.22). Respondents added that this 
office should be coordinated by the National Security Advisor (NSA), who 
needs to have the mandate to coordinate with other organisations and report to 
the president of Malawi. One respondent emphasised that the NSA should 
provide a high level of leadership, direction and coordination among our 
national security and intelligence agencies. The NSA needs to interact directly 
with agency and departmental heads and the position‟s responsibilities 
complement the roles and responsibilities of the current heads of agencies by 
enhancing whole-of-government coordination (Lamb and Marks, 2010, p.6).  
 
Discussion 
The author agrees with these observations, as literature does not mention 
powers or procedures for the NSA to call for a meeting with other security 
actors. This is also the case in Malawi as there are limited written legal 
mandates or protocols that guide the NSA to liaise with other security actors. 
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The author has experienced that without this office secretariat, when the president 
calls for a meeting with leaders of security organisations, they discuss on 
fragmented information, as there is limited collaboration. In such scenarios, while 
these meetings are important, some leaders still do not contribute much. The 
author recalls one senior leader responding to the President‟s question asking for 
his contribution, he simply said, “Your Excellency, whatever you tell us, we will 
do as directed”. While others may be happy with such responses, the author feels 
that it is non-productive as issues remain unresolved. It would have been better to 
at least, present a brief synopsis of the situation, even if sources of the information 
are not disclosed. Directives and important decisions need to be issued after 
thorough positive contributions by relevant leaders (Linden, 2010, p.129). This 
study indicates that Presidents appoint security leaders to help them with strategic 
and professional guidance. 
 
Respondents observed that the NSA is not given enough powers and mandates 
to coordinate with other organisations, which is a huge setback for Malawi 
and other countries. This is an important contribution from respondents to 
empower collaborative leaders with legal mandates, which contradict other 
researches, who said collaborative leaders usually have no formal powers but 
participate as peers and lead the process (Chrislip, 2002, p.44).  
 
Chart 4.22.  Establishment of the national security coordinating office 
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Table 4.27. Substantiating quotes from respondents on establishment of 
NSCO 
Substantiating quotes: Establishment of Central national Security office  
Constituent factors 
National Security Central Office, National Security Advisor, Secretariat and good flow of 
information. 
Substantiating Quotes 
“There is need to establish the NSCO in order to produce a national security picture easily 
than security sectors working in isolation”. 
“The National Security Coordinating Office is important and would act a secretariat for all 
National Security related issues”. 
“It is important to establish the NSCO. This will help to ensure good flow of information 
and the NSCO will be the office to collaborate information from the different 
organizations”. 
“Focal point is necessary” and the NSCO will serve this purpose”. 
“It is also important that the National Central office and National Security Advisor should 
have coordinating powers”. 
 
This study suggests that a Collaborative leader or NSA should have the 
mandate to ask other organisations to provide information relating to a 
particular situation if he/she has to advise political leaders correctly. This 
could be done in similar arrangement, as is the case with the Anti -Corruption 
Bureau and Public Accounts Committee of Parliament, who are able to call for 
personnel from various organisations to brief them on a special need. As seen 
from literature (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6), the NSA is the primary advisor to 
the President or Prime Minister and he/ she would wish that there were total 
peace and stability in a country, unlike other organisations that have a 
particular field to perform.  
 
From the author‟s experience, some leaders do not want to support CL and 
therefore the desired national security (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.282). A 
good example in Malawi was when the author was drafting a National 
Security Policy in 2009 in liaison with other security organisations as was 
approved by the former President Professor Bingu Mutharika. A letter was 
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sent to all relevant organisations, followed by the author‟s personal discussion 
with leaders. While other organisations including Defence, Police, 
Immigration, Foreign Affairs, Disaster Management, OPC and Mzuzu 
University among others, attended several meetings that were arranged, the 
National Intelligence Bureau did not send a representative. The big question is, 
how do you deal with such scenarios, when the Collaborative leader or NSA 
have no powers to summon other security leaders who refuse to collaborate 
even when the State President has issued a written authorisation as was the 
case in this example? 
 
This study also indicated that leaders who are well trained should handle 
issues of national security (Linden, 2010, p.14). In Malawi, however, at times, 
some key positions like Director General of NIB have been given to political 
leaders who have not done security training. While they may have tried their 
best to perform, realistically, a nation may not achieve sustainable national 
security, as these measures were temporal to try and resolve a particular 
problem. In national security, literature emphasises on relevant skills and the 
need for information sharing as soft power for effective decision-making and 
relevant procedures and protocols (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.305).  
 
This is one reason that the author is arguing that, how could security leaders 
including those at key institutions like NIB and NSA be non-security trained? 
This is not just a problem for Malawi, but other countries too. Currently the 
USA is considering changing the post of a Director of National Intelligence 
from a qualified trained security leader to a civilian leader who would 
embrace transparency in the wake of spy allegations on European political 
leaders. The author is not against this thinking, as it institutes better reforms. 
However, this study notes that it would be ideal to appoint personnel, whether 
civilian or military, who are trained and can handle security issues, otherwise 
nations including the USA could experience other disasters greater than the 
September, 2001 incident, if security issues are not well coordinated (Zegart, 
2007, p.126; Myers and McConnell, 2009). 
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Respondents also said that for effective collaboration, the NSCO should have 
representation of officers from the core security actors who would act as 
secretariat and liaison on daily basis. 
 
4.1.4.5.  Organisations represented at NSCO (F22) 
On composition of organisations that would be at the National Security Central 
Office (NSCO), frequency of respondents said MDF, MPS, Immigration, NIB, 
Prisons, OPC, EPD and Private security organisations (Chart 4.23). Respondents 
also mentioned a number of institutions to be represented at the National Security 
Central Office (NSCO) in order to jointly analyse threats and recommend 
appropriate responses and action plans. Some respondents also added Disaster 
management, Department of National Parks and Wild Life, Financial Intelligence 
Unit (FIU) and Civil Aviation (CA). Inclusion of EPD, FIU and CA are good 
contribution to the NSCO as they were never mentioned in literature.  
 
Chart 4.23.  Representatives at the National Security Central office 
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Discussion 
This study has, however, identified a problem here in that while most 
organisations would want to be represented at the NSCO, it would result in a very 
large office. The study suggests that there is need for Malawi to agree on effective 
“Securitisation” of the threats (Charret, 2009, p.13) and decide on the core 
organisations to mitigate them representation at the NSCO. The responses 
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indicating the large number of MDF representation could be a result of leaders 
who believed that national security is only about military protection or because 
more respondents were from Defence. The other organisations and security actors 
would be included in the security committees and involved in regular meetings 
and symposiums as may be arranged by the NSCO.  
 
Table 4.28. Substantiating quotes from respondents on representation at the 
NSCO 
Substantiating Concepts and Quotes: Representation at the Central National Security Office 
Constituent factors 
Representation at NSCO and Responsibilities 
Substantiating Quotes 
 
“The NSCO need to comprise the MDF, Malawi Prison, Malawi Police, NIB, Immigration 
Department, and Ministry of Economic Planning”. 
 
“Office of the President and Cabinet is an important high level government office to guide 
NS matters and should be represented at the NSCO”. 
 
“The NSCO should include MDF, MPS, Immigration, NIS, Financial Intelligence Unit, 
National Parks and wild Life Dept. And Civil Aviation”. 
 
“Main representation should include the OPC, Ministry of Foreign affairs, Home Affairs, 
Education, Health, Ministry of Information, Prisons, and Disaster Management, NGOs and 
Civil society organisations”. 
 
 
4.1.4.6.  Joint security committees (F23) 
On the need for establishing joint security committees, 97% said yes, no one said 
no and 3% did not comment (Chart 4.23). Respondents and focus group 
discussions recommended that Security Committees include National Security 
Council (NSC) chaired by the President, Strategic Policy Committee chaired by 
the Chief Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee chaired by the National Security 
Advisor (NSA), Border Protection and Internal Security Committee (ISC) chaired 
by Defence/Home Affairs/NSA and Disaster Management Committee chaired by 
the Office of the President and the Cabinet. Some interviewees, however, 
indicated that too many joint committees might complicate security issues, while 
others stressed to have them for effective collaboration and implementation. 
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Chart 4.24.  Need for establishment of joint committees 
 
 
Discussion 
This study noted that some similar committees are also established in the USA, 
Australia, Japan and United Kingdom (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6; Gyngell, 2010, 
p.7; Kano, 2013, p.2; Joji, 2013, p.1; Devanny and Harris, 2014, p.26). The 
suggestions by interviewees, however, have some few variations. In the USA 
model, it is the National Director of Intelligence that report to the President on 
coordinated intelligence, as the NSA has no coordinating powers (Lamb and Mark, 
2010, p.6). This study looks at this as a gap, as the DNI mainly coordinates the 
intelligence community (Best, 2010, p.6; Pico, 2013, p.21), unlike the NSA who 
could liaise with other security actors in a broader perspective. In Japan, they have 
the best NS model with a well-established NS secretariat office (Kano, 2013, p.3). 
However, the Special Advisor, who is like the NSA, does not fully coordinate the 
NS secretariat. The post is more of political advisory and may not have much 
authority for coordinating with other security organisations, as is also the case 
with the USA model (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6).  
In the Malawi scenario, interviewees recommend that issues of National Security 
should be coordinated by the NSA through the secretariat based at the NSCO 
(Gyngell, 2010, p.7). The NSA would have powers to coordinate and report to the 
President and National Security Council. This arrangement would have proper 
analysed information from organisations as well as joint security committees. 
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Table 4.29. Substantiating quotes from respondents on establishment of joint 
committees 
Substantiating Concepts and Quotes: Joint Committees  
Constituent factors 
Joint security Committees, and Responsibilities. 
Substantiating Quotes 
“Joint committees can be effective in that they will bring different experts together who 
would brainstorm and come up with an informed decision/solution to a problem. The 
chairpersons of the committees could be on rotational basis, while the National Security 
adviser coordinates the daily office collaboration”. 
 
“Yes we need joint committees to critically look at collaborative policies, internal security, 
joint intelligence and disaster management. After all we have the military being involved 
such as disaster activities both within and outside the country. So it‟s better to formalise it”. 
 
“Yes, these joint structures will form the basis for collaboration as well as tuning the 
security structure to be pro-active rather than current reactive state”. 
 
“These committees will be key (core) players that can mobilise the people in time of crisis. 
They have the expertise They should include Strategic policy committee, border protection 
and security committee, joint intelligence and management of disasters”. 
 
This study, however, cautions here that individual organisations will still have 
their powers, mandates and responsibilities to report direct to the President on 
issues affecting their individual roles as per constitution of the Republic of 
Malawi (2010, Chapter V111, section 93-1). A comprehensive inter-agency 
committee for the security sector is shown in Figure 4.1.Some may object that this 
model is complicated and a radical departure from current practice. In fact, this 
model is simply a more effective and explicit means of balancing competing 
authorities that draws upon a number of partial precedents (Lamb and Marks, 
2010, p.6). For example, like the Director of National Intelligence, and the lead 
agency/organisation would be given presumptive authority for horizontal 
integration (unity of effort) defined not by organisational boundaries but by 
mission imperatives. Similarly, the rights of the senior functional leader in the 
vertical chain of command (that is, the department or agency head) request a 
Presidential guidance and decision whenever a subject is so contentious that the 
Security Committee cannot resolve them. The arrangement of these Committees 
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and the coordination role by the NSA will apply in a collaborative manner through 
the establishment of an integrated National Policy Framework and Strategy. 
 
Figure 4.2. Inter-agency National Security Committees for Malawi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ngwenya (2015) 
 
4.1.4.7. Integrated national security policy framework and governance 
structure for Malawi (F24) 
The author was aware through his work experience that there was no single 
National Security Policy to coordinate all security actors in Malawi. A question 
was put forward to respondents on whether there is need for an integrated 
National security Policy Framework and strategy? Ninety two per cent of the 
responses (92%) said yes, 5% said no and 3% did not comment (Chart 
4.25).Interviewees stressed the need for written policies and strategies in Malawi 
that would outline roles and procedures in a collaborative setting as per Table 4.30 
(Gyngell, 2010, p.8). 
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Chart 4.25.  Need for integrated national security policy framework and 
governance structure 
 
The majority added that the Framework should include the structure, mode of 
operation, code of conduct and chain of command or governance and indicators to 
measure the successes of CL among others.  
 
Discussion 
The responses by some respondents to ensure that National security issues should 
not impinge on individual privacy was an important revelation for Malawi and 
other countries to balance the two concepts (Charret, 2009, p.25). In fact an 
effective National Security Policy would allow citizens to live in harmony with 
their environment, live comfortable while enhancing human and national 
development. This undertaking and inclusion in the National Security Framework 
will reduce the conflict among the security actors and enable close collaboration 
(Cabayan, 2009, p.9). These findings concur with Allison and Zelikow (1999, 
p.143) that proper established governance structures would improve decision 
making process. It was, however, clear from the respondents that most 
organisations do not have policy frameworks that could guide their organisations 
to work with others. One respondent said that their organisation has a written 
Framework known as the “Service Standing Orders”, but could not provide a copy 
saying it was so bulky. Another respondent said that their organisation was 
drafting a policy now but could not be availed for this study as it was still not 
official.  
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Table 4.30 Substantiating quotes from respondents on integrated national 
security policy and structure 
Substantiating quotes: Integrated National Security Structure  
Constituent factors 
Integrated National Security Policy and Strategy and Issues to be included in the Policy.  
Substantiating Quotes 
“Integrated NSP will ease information sharing and flow”. 
“We definitely need the National Security Policy and it must be free from political 
contamination. The governance structure should be chaired by the President and 
Commander in-chief; and security actors need to collaborate both horizontally and 
vertically”.  
 
“Not sure, our political players do not speak with one voice. There is no commitment 
especially those in power. It‟s easier to talk about it when you are in opposition”. 
 
“An effective National Security Policy would allow citizens to live in harmony with their 
environment, live comfortable live while enhancing human development”. 
 
“NSP is a guide for national security management for all security actors which should 
include common complementing doctrine, standard names, channels of communication, 
roles and responsibilities and critical success factors”. 
 
“It is a blue print regarding how security related issues would be dealt with, it addresses 
priorities and spells out Malawi‟s primary defence national interest.  Policy usually 
involves a series of more specific decisions regarding national security”. 
 
“NSP is a written (or not written) general guideline giving the general co-ordination of all 
security agencies how to relate with others towards N-security requirement”.  
   
“NSP is important because Malawi is a democracy and we have part ways with the old 
ways of doing things”. 
 
“Integrated Collaborative Framework Model for the Security Sector should include; 
-Draw up critical national interests, How to protect these national interests and 
threats, Reporting procedure, Hierarchy of the organisation/joint committee, 
Funding source and end state”. 
“NSP and structure should include chain of command (who reports to who) and Inter 
Agency Liaison, how to resolve differences of conflict parties, who will be the main 
stakeholders and how conflicts will be mitigated”. 
 
“The NSP is important because there is hardly any collaborated effort in the security sector 
in Malawi that results in slow economic growth”. 
 
“The NSP should be approved by parliament to be effective”. 
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While these are some very good examples, they only highlight about a few 
institutions collaborating in their field, but this study was more concerned with an 
overall integrating policy among several security organisations, which is yet to be 
developed in Malawi (Chirwa, 2013, p.8). It is, however, encouraging that almost 
all respondents (93%) agreed that developing a coordinated National Security 
Policy is the key to successful collaboration in Malawi. In follow up interviews, 
some of the respondents that said no clarified that it was due to the fact that they 
still had a narrow traditional view of national security as being military protection 
from external aggression only. Some interviewees also emphasised that for 
effective governance, there is need to establish the National Security Council 
(NSC) and that security actors should liaise both horizontally and vertically. Based 
on this study, Malawi needs to formulate a collaborative NSP framework and 
governance structure (Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3. Malawi National Security Governance Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ngwenya (2015) 
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leaders and employees and security committees, particularly on issues of strategic 
importance and those that require collaborative effort. Evaluation of the set goals 
is also vital to measure the success. 
4.1.5.  Evaluation measures and Parliamentary legal authority (CC5&F25) 
This study further sought to identify measureable evaluation and indicators to 
check if collaborative leadership is improved and effective in the security context 
of Malawi. It was found that evaluation should include measurable successes such 
as establishment of joint committees, timely response, peace and stability and that 
the CL and NSP should be graced by Parliamentary legal mandate. Responding to 
the question on how successful collaboration could be measured, 55% of 
respondents said through formation of regional groupings and committees, 33% 
said when organisations start talking about the importance of other organisations, 
7% said looking at the safety and political landscape, while 5% said legal binding 
policies (Chart 4.36). Respondents also said that the number of joint operations, 
exercises, timely response and, when there is peace and stability in a country 
would measure successful CL.  
 
Chart 4.26. Evaluation measures for successful CL and NS 
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reforms on security collaboration are not just in Malawi but also in other countries 
like USA (Lamb and Marks, 2010, p.7). Myers and McConnell (2009, p.285), 
however, points out that the USA has put in several mechanisms to improve 
national security collaboration through the appointment of the National Director 
of intelligence.  
 
Table 4.31. Substantiating Concepts and Quotes: Evaluation measures for 
Successful CL and NS 
Substantiating Concepts and Quotes: Measuring Success in Collaborative Leadership and 
National security  
Constituent factors 
 
Indicators for successful CL, mechanisms for implementation and actions to effect 
implementation. 
- Substantiating Quotes 
 
“Monitoring measures should be looking at the nature of security and political landscape. 
It may not be easy as of now and therefore, continuous review is important”. 
 
“Success of collaboration will be measured when organisations start to talk about 
importance of other organisations. Evaluation could also be done by monitoring the 
number of joint operations being done and what the junior staffs say about collaboration”. 
 
“There is need for putting in place clear indicators during planning process that would be 
used to measure the results”. 
 
“Evaluation could be measured through efficient distribution and co-ordination 
approaching to operations, - all without duplication”.  
 
“Progress will be evaluated by level and amount of information shared, number of security 
threats contained and number of security breaches. Successes in CL can be measured when 
achievement in goals and objectives are seen, improvement in performance and when 
there is peace in the country”. 
 
“Collaboration can be measured by the level of reduced corruption in various services 
mainly public services and by level of successful border control measures such as volume 
of human trafficking”.  
 
“Collaborative leadership could be measured if issues of corruption are addressed with 
very harsh punitive measures and when agreed objectives are implemented”. 
 
“For effective measurement and agreement, parliamentary approval and legal binding is 
critical”.   
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4.2. Summary 
This chapter presented data analysis, findings and discussion of this study. An 
application of various analytical tools of thematic and grounded theory approach 
were used and enabled the identification of a comprehensive list of five core 
categories (CC1-5) and factors (F1-25) that influence Collaborative Leadership 
and National Security (Table 4.1). These key findings are; Strategic focus on SNS 
priorities, Promotion of national cultural practices and mind-set change, Sharing 
power, information and training security officers together and Establishment of 
collaborative structures with legal mandate. Others include evaluation measures 
and parliamentary approval of the practical policy framework. 
 
This study also suggested that Malawi could formulate a much better National 
Security Policy, which would be well written with monitoring mechanisms for 
success and be a model for the entire world to prevent threats. What is also very 
important is to formulate practical regulations that would deal with leaders who do 
not want to support CL, as some do not share information at the expense of the 
desired NS (F8 and 15; Zegart, 2007, p.40).  
 
Whilst the majority of respondents support CL, they indicated that it is mostly 
about alliances with international security organisations (F5; Chart 4.5). A few 
respondents also indicated some reservations to engage CL in the security sector 
(F7; Chart 4.7). These are critical findings that need to be considered and resolved 
as Allison and Zelikow (2013, p.5) argued that the few leaders in top or influential 
positions could affect the entire collaborative process and NS. This study, however, 
indicated that in Malawi, there is high political will to support CL and NS (F17). 
 
From literature review and findings, a practical framework was developed termed 
“NACUSSEPA” model to guide collaborative leadership among the security 
actors to achieve sustainable national security and prosperity in Malawi, which is 
discussed in Chapter five. 
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CHAPTER 5. A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COLLABORATIVE 
LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN MALAWI 
 
“Reforming the Public Service is not a matter of multiple choices. It must be done 
and will be done.” -Vice President Dr Saulos Chilima (February, 2015) 
 
5. Introduction 
As stated earlier, the main objectives of this study was to examine the 
effectiveness of collaborative leadership (CL) among security actors (SAs) and 
factors that would improve greater inter-agency collaboration to achieve 
sustainable national security (SNS) in Malawi. Presentation and discussion of the 
findings in Chapter four show that in Malawi, SAs are fairly working together. 
However, findings also reveal that adoption of CL approach among SAs is limited. 
Consequently, breakdown of some security issues such as border disputes, illegal 
migration, internal crime, violent demonstrations, corruption, and political 
intolerance have been the case. In turn, these issues have compromised both 
security and economic development of Malawi; hence the need for further policy 
reviews and reforms.  
 
In view of the findings in Chapter four, Chapter five, therefore, proposed and 
outlined the practical policy framework for improving CL and SNS in Malawi. As 
threats to SNS are dynamic and vary depending on the environment, this 
framework describes a flexible approach that can assist government and national 
security actors to review and improve their institutional and inter-agency security 
policies. 
 
5.1. A Practical Policy Framework (NACUSSEPA model) 
Pursuant to the findings of this study, a practical policy framework and strategy 
for Collaborative Leadership and National Security in Malawi called 
“NACUSSEPA” was developed. The NACUSSEPA policy framework (Figure 
5.1) was named from the core categories (CC1-5) or themes of this study‟s 
findings, which are; clear focus on National Security and priority goals (NA), 
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promote national collaborative Cultural practices and mind-set change (CU), 
Sharing power and influence and training security officers together (S), 
establishment of collaborative Structures with legal mandate (S), Evaluation 
measures (E), and Parliamentary Approval (PA). It is an inter-agency 
collaborative model for CL, SNS, and hence prosperity in Malawi.  
 
Figure 5.1. A Practical NACUSSEPA Framework Model 
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business intelligence, analytics and performance management initiatives. 
Regarding national security management, a framework is a guide that enables all 
security actors to work together, which should include agreed common goal and 
objectives, complementing doctrine, channels of communication, roles and 
responsibilities and critical success factors in preventing crime and insurgence as 
well as anarchy from within and outside the country (F24). This study, however, 
noted that implementation of CL is challenging and at times, it fails (F8). It is 
therefore, important to continue reviewing each phase of the framework back and 
forth as per contemporary security situation (F25). The following sub-sections 
outline the phases of the framework in more detail. 
 
5.2. Phase I: Clear focus on the National Security and priority goals 
The main issue of national security in Malawi is to create a country in which both 
the government and its citizens are secure and safe from threats to their well-being 
and dignity and enjoy political stability, sustainable economic development and 
social fulfilment. This phase involves setting a clear vision, goal and objectives, 
identification of risks and security actors (CC1, F1-4 & 24), which are more 
highlighted in the following paragraphs. 
 
5.2.1. Agreement on the new concept of national security and objectives 
Some of the typical tasks to consider in this phase include defining the high-level 
objectives to be accomplished in a specific time frame, usually 3-5 years (F1&20). 
 
5.2.2. Assessment of threats to national security 
One of the key elements of a CL and national security policy (NSP) framework is 
the national threat assessment (F2). Threat assessment is a scientific and 
technologically based process consisting of three steps: threat identification, threat 
analysis and threat evaluation. The scope of the assessment is to coordinate the 
use of resources and to monitor, control, and minimise the probability and/or 
impact of unfortunate events that might put at risk the objectives of the vision.  
Threat assessments provide valuable information for developing, executing and 
evaluating a strategy for CL. By carrying out a national threat assessment and 
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aligning the objectives of the strategy with national security needs, it is possible to 
focus on the most important challenges with regard to national security. In most 
cases, governments adopt an all-hazard approach, such as incorporating all kinds 
of national security threats like transnational crime and technical failures or 
breakdowns when assessing the risks at national level. Typical tasks to consider in 
this step are agreeing on a risk assessment methodology or securitisation to use. 
This study has, however, indicated that whereas Malawi‟s security actors work 
together in analysis of the security situation, it is on ad-hoc levels as there is still 
no full time established central coordinating office that comprises core security 
actors (F21 & 22).  
 
5.2.3. Identification of national security actors to mitigate threats, agreement 
on collaboration and assign duties 
A successful national security strategy requires proper co-operation between public 
and private stakeholders (F3 & 4). Public stakeholders are important as they 
usually have a policy, regulatory and operational mandate. They ensure the safety 
and security of the nation‟s critical infrastructures and services. Selected private 
entities should be part of the development process due to the fact that they are 
likely the owners of most of the critical infrastructures and services. Tasks to 
consider in this phase include identification of the owners of all critical 
infrastructures and services such as energy, transport, telecommunications and 
business premises among others. Engagement of both public and private 
stakeholders in the process by clearly defining their roles and responsibilities and 
defining the appropriate incentives that allow private and public stakeholders to 
participate in the process, are important factors to consider (F12). It is also vital to 
take into account the possible different or even conflicting interests of the public 
and private sector.  
 
The involvement of the right stakeholders at the right time in the process of 
developing the strategy cannot be over-emphasised. Stakeholder involvement is 
necessary from a strategy content point of view and in order to gain commitment 
for executing the strategy later on. There is also need to explain how and why these 
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stakeholders contribute to the objectives of the strategy, the individual tasks and the 
actions plans such as pursuing a collaborative approach together with critical 
infrastructure owners and critical service providers in assessing threats and risks. 
Assign the government the role of a facilitator. The government can facilitate 
activities on a national level, such as information-sharing, cooperation and risk 
management (F13-15). It is also necessary to involve top-level representatives in 
order to create ownership and assign an alternate for each representative. Include 
civil society and civilians in executing the strategy from an awareness point of 
view, as they are the end users. By raising awareness at a national level, citizens 
will better understand national-security risks and this will enable them to 
proactively take measures to lessen or mitigate risks.  
 
Also involve ministries with responsibility for security, safety and crisis 
management, such as defence, internal security, foreign affairs, justice, national 
telecommunication regulator and other national interest groups among others in 
developing the strategy (F3, 4, 21-23).  
 
5.3. Phase II: Promotion of national collaborative cultural practices and 
change mind-set 
This phase involves a critical assessment of the effectiveness and impact of 
collaborative leadership in achieving sustainable national security and mitigation 
of threats (CC2). Main tasks would include taking stock and review of supportive 
policies, available resources and barriers that hinder collaborative efforts. 
 
5.3.1. Leadership Style, review of policies and analyse impact on national 
security collaboration 
Before defining in detail the objective of the national security strategy, it is 
important to take stock of the status of the key elements of the strategy at national 
level including collaborative leadership set up as a key factor. At the end of this 
activity, important gaps must be identified. Some of the tasks to consider include 
taking stock of existing policies developed over the years in the area of national 
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security such as electronic communications, data protection, information sharing 
and security (F5). It is also important to identify all regulatory measures applied in 
different security sectors and their impact, so far, in improving national security 
(F7). Malawi need to analyse the roles and capabilities of existing public agencies 
mandated to deal with national security policies, regulations and operations such 
as the MDF, Police, NIB, Immigration and other stake-holders and identify 
overlaps and gaps to develop a clear collaborative policy (F19).  
5.3.2.  Identification of barriers to collaboration and mitigate them 
This is an important step to identify barriers and challenges that would hinder 
effective collaboration and identify strategies to resolve them (F8, 9&24). These 
would include reviewing the old policies on security, compatible equipment and 
technological infrastructure among others. 
 
5.4. Phase III: Sharing power and influence and training security officers 
together 
The process and strategy phase outlines the what, how and when actions need to be 
done. For the National Security policy framework, these would include best 
strategies to be adopted such as joint training and assigning of specific roles to 
security actors (CC3). 
 
5.4.1. Development of national security contingency collaborative plans, 
joint training and awareness programmes 
National Security contingency plans are the interim structures and measures for 
responding to, and recovering services following, major security incidents that 
involve national interests (F10). The objectives of a NSP are to present and 
explain the criteria that should be used to define a situation as a crisis, define key 
processes and actions for handling the crisis and clearly defining the roles and 
responsibilities of different stakeholders during a national crisis (F19). Exercises 
enable competent authorities to test existing emergency plans, target specific 
weaknesses, increase cooperation between different sectors, identify 
interdependencies, stimulate improvements in continuity planning, and generate a 
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culture of cooperative effort to boost resilience (F10). National security exercises 
are important tools to assess preparedness of a community against natural 
disasters, technology failures, cyber-attacks and emergencies. Notable objectives 
for this phase are to identify what needs to be tested including plans and processes, 
people, infrastructure, response capabilities, cooperation capabilities and 
communication among others. Agree on the scenario of the exercise; make sure 
that the scenario is pragmatic and based on real incidents, agree on the evaluation 
and monitoring approach to be followed, define a clear media and public affairs 
strategy and agree on international cooperation as well as identifying and 
engaging the players of the exercise.  
 
This is an important phase in raising awareness about national-security threats and 
vulnerabilities and their impact on society. Through awareness programmes, 
individual and security actors can learn how to behave in the online world and 
protect themselves and Malawi‟s national interests from typical risks including 
leakage of sensitive information (F14). Awareness activities occur on an on-going 
basis and use a variety of delivery methods to reach broad audiences. Security 
awareness activities may be triggered by different events or factors, which may be 
internal or external to an organisation. Major external factors could include: recent 
security breaches, threats and incidents, new risks, updates of security policy 
and/or strategy and new laws.  
 
Principles to follow in order to support an awareness-raising programme include 
defining the target of the awareness-raising campaign such as citizens and 
developing mechanisms for reaching out to these communities as is the case with 
community policing. It is also critical to create the national information security 
unique identity: choose specific information security topics that support the 
strategy objectives and then organise and advertise, not only in Malawi but also 
internationally, local events by using appropriate communication channels. 
Organise a national security week or day in order to engage the public, and 
private- and public-sector partners through events and initiatives like workshops 
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and conferences, with different subject matter every time (F11). Some 
presentation materials should also be translated into other Malawi local languages.  
 
5.4.2.  Building trust through joint operations and educational programmes 
National security is continuously changing. It requires constant joint operations 
and education as noted in different versions of the concept by respondents (F1). 
Universities, military and security colleges, research and development institutions 
need to be empowered to train and educate more national security experts to meet 
the increasing needs of national security (F10). It is also important to support the 
security accreditation and certification of skilled personnel in key working posts 
in the industrial sector and create a national register with teaching skills.  
 
National security threats and vulnerabilities are also international in nature. 
Engaging in cooperation with partners abroad is important to better understand 
and respond to a constantly changing threat environment (F4 & 16). The 
following points should be followed during the development of the framework; 
use the strategy as an instrument for fostering international cooperation, identify 
the countries to cooperate with and clarify the context of cooperation with each 
one. Assign this task on a national level to a lead organisation such as Ministry of 
Foreign affairs to provide the benefit that all national efforts to cooperate 
internationally are consolidated (F23). Promote international cooperation through 
information sharing like benchmarking, technological knowledge, and basic threat 
assessments and top-level public–private partnerships (F2 &15).  
 
It is also important to join bilateral, multilateral or international treaties and 
conventions related to improve national security such as SADC and others (F4). 
Contribute to international efforts towards formulating standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) to be used for information sharing and response to real and 
major cross-country crises. Encourage participation in regional and international 
exercises as a means of supporting cooperation with strategic partners (F10).  
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5.4.4.  Outlining reforms to balance security with privacy 
Counter-terrorism measures and tools that tackle crime often invade privacy in the 
most brutal ways and, at the same time, lack of personal online security leads to 
breaches of that same privacy. A national security framework should seek for the 
right balance between these two concepts. Issues to consider should include 
national legal requirements for data and private protection when drafting national 
security-relevant regulatory policies (F14, 18 & 19).  
 
5.5. Phase IV: Establishment of collaborative structures with legal mandate 
This phase comprises established structures for implementing collaboration. They 
include a clear governance structure, joint infrastructure such as national security 
coordinating office (NSCO), technologies for sharing information and measurable 
timetable and written framework (CC4). 
 
5.5.1.  Establish clear national security and organisational policies 
The national security strategy will succeed only if a clear governance and 
collaborative structure is in place (F18-20). A governance structure defines the 
roles, responsibilities, accountability and relationships with all relevant 
stakeholders (Figure 4.3). A public body or an interagency/inter-ministerial 
working group should be defined as the coordinator of the strategy (F23; Figure 
4.2). This will be the entity that has the overall responsibility for the strategy 
lifecycle and the strategy documentation itself. Some of the tasks to consider in 
this phase would be to define who is the ultimate responsible for the management 
and evaluation of the strategy; usually it is a National Security Advisor as per 
findings of this study, that is appointed by the President of Malawi and is 
ultimately responsible for managing the national-security strategy (F21).  
 
There is also need to define the management structure including an advisory body 
that advises the national security advisor of the strategy. Specify the governmental 
and private parties taking part in this structure. Usually this is done through a 
national security coordinating office, which has members from both public and 
private sectors, as found in this study (F21). Try to cover the widest spectrum of 
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stakeholders involved. The roles, mandates, responsibilities, processes, decision 
rights and tasks of this advisory body need to be outlined. These would include 
management of the national risk assessment and prioritising emerging threats, 
response to critical situations, engaging relevant stakeholders and fostering 
international cooperation needs to be clearly outlined.  
 
5.5.2. Setting up protocols for sharing information and technologies 
Information sharing among private and public stakeholders is a powerful 
mechanism to better understand a constantly changing environment (F13 & 15). 
Information sharing is a form of strategic partnership among key public and 
private stakeholders and is one of the soft powers. Owners of critical 
infrastructures could potentially share with public authorities their input on 
mitigating emerging risks, threats, and vulnerabilities, while public stakeholders 
could provide on a 'need to know basis' information on aspects related to the status 
of national security, including findings based on information collected by 
intelligence and other security actors units. Combining both views gives a very 
powerful insight on how the threat landscape evolves.  
 
Some of the procedures for trusted information sharing include setting up internal 
and joint procedures to continuously review the implementation of adopted 
measures, properly defining the information-sharing mechanism and the 
underlying principles and rules that govern the mechanism such as non-disclosure 
agreements, and antitrust rules (F14). It is also important to provide the 
appropriate rewards for stakeholders, mostly for private ones, to participate and 
share sensitive information (F12). Keep the size of the information sharing 
scheme relatively small, but representative of all security actors to allow trust 
among experts to flourish (F14). Organise regular face-to-face meetings to share 
sensitive information. Identify modern technology for sharing information and 
scientific analysis (F13-15). Government should facilitate the process and provide 
logistical support. The initiative could be chaired both by the public sector and 
industry to symbolise the joint responsibility of the two stakeholders‟ categories 
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(F23). Development and use of modern technology is very critical for speedy 
sharing of information and secure means (F20). 
 
5.6. Phase V: Establishment of joint national security evaluation measures 
and parliamentary approval 
Once the strategy has been developed and is being executed, the extent to which 
the objectives are achieved should be assessed (CC5). By assessing the achieved 
results of the activities, it is possible to take any required corrective and 
preventative actions in order to align with or change the objectives of the strategy. 
Respondents also said that this phase should accommodate legal authority for 
effective implementation.  
 
5.6.1.  Setting measurable objectives and evaluate outcomes 
This study has indicated that more joint threat analysis, decision making process, 
information sharing, recognition by security organisations about the good work 
done by other institutions and peace and economic development are some KPIs of 
a successful CL (F10-15 & 25). 
 
5.6.2.  Parliamentary authority and political support 
Legal mandate through act of parliament is one of the key findings for successful 
implementation of collaborative leadership among security actors and other 
stakeholders (F25). It is, therefore, important that the process of developing the 
National Security Policy and Strategy should involve legal experts and members of 
Defence and Security committee of Parliament before it can be tabled in the 
National Assembly for final approval and authority. If there are no legal mandates, 
collaboration will fail, as there are several barriers such as culture, political and 
limited information sharing among others (F13 & 15). Based on the evaluation 
results, the CL strategy, activities, structures and identification of further national 
security needs and issues need to be enhanced accordingly in line with the practical 
NACUSSEPA framework model.  
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In summary, the author is confident that findings of this study and the practical 
framework are credible and trustworthy, as they have been subjected to a number 
of tests. 
 
5.7.  Credibility and Trustworthiness of the Study 
Validity and reliability are the two assessments that should be carried out in a 
survey instrument to determine its quality (Saunders et al., 2009, p.156). 
Reliability is the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure 
yields the same result on repeated trials (Yin, 2014, p.46). Validity refers to the 
degree to which a study accurately reflects or assesses the specific concept that the 
researcher is attempting to measure. In a qualitative study, these are realised 
through conducting a pilot study, triangulation, and peer review and member 
checking (Yin, 2014, pp.45-49), which the author conducted as explained in a 
paragraph on pilot testing and validity (Para 3.6). The credibility of gathered data 
was also achieved through careful selection of the units of analysis and mixed 
methods outlined in the following subsections that enabled triangulation (Yin, 
2014, p.121). 
 
5.7.1. Selections of multiple case units that deal with security matters 
In this study, multiple organisations that are involved in the topic of the study 
were represented (Yin, 2014, p.31). The author selected fifteen organisations for 
this study using the following criteria: 
 
a. The organisations were involved in the daily coordination and activities related 
to National Security in Malawi; and 
 
b. To overcome bias, organisations were those that are spread in all the four 
regions of Malawi. 
 
5.7.2. Respondents were represented from all core security organisations 
For accuracy of the collected data, in the sampling stage, efforts were taken to 
ensure that the respondents were representatives of all core organisations that deal 
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with national security matters in Malawi as per units of analysis (Para 3.4, Table 
3.1). Each organisation identified had more than two individual respondents who 
were involved in daily security activities. A total of 100 respondents were also of 
different leadership positions, varied years of work experience and different levels 
of academic and professional training to triangulate the findings. Furthermore, in-
depth face to face interviews conducted by the author helped triangulation and to 
remove bias (Yin, 2014, p.115). 
 
5.7.3.  High response rate from individual participants 
Various strategies were also adopted to achieve high response rate, which included 
use of three assistants and specific period of three weeks for submission of 
responses (Para 3.9). This resulted in 100 respondents and only one declined, 
which was a remarkable representation of the needed participants for this study. 
In-depth face to face and focus group interviews also enabled more credibility 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p.343). 
 
5.7.4.  Benchmarked with several international organisations 
In phase II, the empirical study was undertaken by studying the successful and 
failure cases of other organisations and countries including the United States of 
America and the Southern Africa Development Community. The adoption of a 
multiple case study approach helped to identify the benefits across different 
organisations (Yin, 2014, p.57). Moreover, the developed framework is an 
enhancement of the framework developed from the analysis of the best practice by 
these organisations and a comprehensive review of literature. Hence, the 
developed framework is rigorous and valid.  
 
5.8. Summary 
This chapter presented a practical policy framework proposed for Malawi termed 
“NACUSSEPA” model to guide collaborative leadership among the security 
actors in order to achieve the highest state of national security and prosperity in 
Malawi. The practical framework emphasises on the requirement to set clear 
priority goals for national security, promote a culture of national collaboration 
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among security actors and mind set change, create collaborative structures with 
legal mandate and put in place well written measures for evaluation of the agreed 
objectives. More importantly, the policy should be approved by the Parliament of 
Malawi to be meaningful and effective. Credibility and trustworthy of the findings 
and practical framework were assured in this study as all core security actors were 
represented. Furthermore both surveys and case study approach were used to 
clearly indicate quantitative and qualitative data. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“Collaboration isn't an easy destination to reach. But while the journey might be 
arduous, the payoff once you arrive can be well worth the effort."  -Alice Dragoon 
(November 15, 2004). 
 
6. Introduction 
This chapter provides conclusive remarks of this study under six headings: 
Research problem, goal and objectives; Theoretical and practical contributions; 
Research methodology and validity; Limitations of the study; Recommendations 
and areas for further research. 
 
As a general conclusion, this study indicated the effectiveness of Collaborative 
Leadership (CL) such as joint operations among security actors (SAs) to combat 
crime, which has resulted in making Malawi one of the most peaceful and 
developing countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The study has, however, 
also revealed that whileMalawi is a peaceful nation; adoption of CL approach for 
sustainable national security (SNS) management is still limited. Findings further 
indicated that as a consequence of limited CL among SAs, breakdown of some 
security issues have occurred such as border disputes, transnational crime and 
corruption among others (F2; Omolo, 2012, p.1; Chalabi, 2013, p.1-4); Mulata et 
al., 2013, p.287; Mahoney et al., 2014, p.1). It is, however, pleasing to note that 
there is willingness for security actors and support from government to engage 
more in collaborative leadership (CL) to achieve sustainable national security (F3-
7; Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8). There are, however, still some misunderstanding 
on what the new concept of National Security (NS) and CL means and therefore 
difficult to clearly agree on the security players (F1-4; Coates, 2011, p.4; Myers 
and McConnell, 2013, p.84). 
 
The study, however, identified common principles and themes that characterise 
successful collaboration; clear focus on national security and common agreement 
on the goals and objectives, assessment and appropriate application of cultural 
practices such as effective style of leadership, sharing power, information and 
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influence through participative decision making, training and developing security 
officers together, creation of collaborative structures with legal mandate and 
effective evaluation measures and parliamentary approval. It is, however, 
indicated that there are several barriers that hinder effective collaboration 
including different cultures and absence of an overarching national security policy 
and strategy (F6 &18; Kuwali, 2009, p.89; Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8).    
 
This study has also emphasised that an integrated written National Security Policy 
and Strategy Framework, to be approved by parliament to guide collaboration, is 
an important document, which Malawi needs to develop with utmost urgency 
(F18; Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.285). The issue of establishing more joint 
security committees and a central National Security office with legal authority for 
daily coordination by the National Security Advisor, even in peacetime, were 
found to be very important. The study has also highlighted that the current 
practice is that security actors mainly collaborate and share information during 
crisis period, which does not achieve the desired NS (F5; Kakande, 2012, p.1).  
The inclusion of Economic Planning and Development, Financial Intelligence 
Unit and Civil Aviation to the National Security Coordination Office are good 
contributions (F3), as they were never mentioned in literature. The following 
sections outline how the research problem and objectives were achieved. 
 
6.1.  Research problem, goal and objectives 
The research problem of this study was, “to examine the effectiveness of 
Collaborative Leadership (CL) and consequently explore the major factors that 
would improve this CL among the security actors to achieve sustainable national 
security and prosperity in Malawi.” To address this research problem, a goal was 
formulated, which was, “to develop a holistic and strategic framework for 
practicing collaborative leadership by the security actors of Malawi.” 
 
The development of the collaborative leadership practical framework with five 
core categories and constituent factors including national security focus, 
promotion of national cultural practices, sharing influence and training security 
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officers together, creating collaborative structures and effective evaluation 
measures and legal authority have addressed the research problem and achieved 
the goal for this study. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of how 
the objectives for this study were accomplished. 
 
6.1.1. Objective 1: To understand the extent of collaborative leadership 
within the security sector of Malawi and its effectiveness on national 
security and economic development. 
To understand what security partnerships are capable of doing to reduce the 
misconception and collaboration gap in order to achieve national security, the 
study included a question for respondents to comment on the effectiveness and 
need for Collaborative Leadership (CL) in the National Security context. There 
was an overwhelming response (99%) of the respondents who gave an affirmative 
response of yes and merely 1% said not sure if CL was required or effective 
(Chart 4.7). Respondents stated that CL would enable effective harmonisation of 
individual organisation‟s security policies, sharing of security information and 
joint analysis, effective use of resources without duplication of effort, timely 
responses to threats and promote a peaceful environment for economic 
development and increased foreign direct investment (F7; Table 4.10). One 
respondent emphasised that CL should “not be a choice, but a necessity” (Table 
4.9). 
 
Based on literature review, a number of cases were identified where the security 
sector in Malawi had done some collaboration and achieved meaningful security 
and resulted in accelerated economic development. Such cases were control of 
illegal small arms, joint operations to combat crime and disaster relief operations 
(F10). A variety of examples in breakdown of security were also revealed where 
security organisations did not practice collaborative leadership (Table4.15). The 
violent civil demonstrations on 20
th
 July 2011, where 20 people died, the large 
number of illegal immigrants transiting through Malawi to other countries, 
robberies and corruption are some examples of this security breakdown due to 
limited collaboration amongst other reasons (F7). This study, however, noted that 
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both literature and respondents had mainly indicated that collaborative leadership 
is done with international partners in peacekeeping operations or disaster 
reconstruction programmes (F5), a misconception that could affect the need for 
collaboration among security actors within Malawi and other countries. 
 
6.1.2. Objective 2: To identify key factors that would influence greater and 
successful collaboration among the security actors in Malawi. 
This study identified a total of five (5) core categories or themes and 25 
constituent factors (F) that are unique to improving collaborative leadership and 
national security in Malawi. These are; Clear focus on national security and 
priority goals, promoting national cultural practices and change mind-set, sharing 
power, influence and training security officers together, creating collaborative 
structures with the NSA coordinating with legal mandate and effective evaluation 
measures and parliamentary approval (Table 4.1). 
 
6.1.3. Objective 3: To understand the new concept of National Security, 
threats and relevant security actors 
To assess the progress in the understanding of the term “National Security” since 
the democratic dispensation was ushered in 1994, a question was included in the 
questionnaire to seek views of this term. This study revealed that this concept is 
different from the old traditional security, where the main focus was on protecting 
the nation from external aggression only, as it also covers measures to protect 
various national interests and values including sovereignty, economic 
development, safety of citizens and their property as well as environment from 
threats both internal and external. To achieve meaningful national security, several 
stakeholders in the security sector need to work together in a professional 
collaborative manner. It was, however, noted that some respondents still believe 
that national security is the protection of the borders only by the military, hence 
difficult to understand the need for CL (F1; Chart 4.1). 
 
The second research question that was put forward for the respondents to provide 
their views was; “Who are the actors in achieving National Security in Malawi? It 
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was overwhelmingly noted that in addition to the core security organisations, 
legislation plays a key role for implementation of collaborative activities in the 
country. Some security agencies have operated as rivals as exemplified in clashes 
between the MDF and MYP a paramilitary wing of the Malawi Congress Party in 
1993, even though the MYP had their positive roles in Malawi‟s security and 
development. Respondents further indicated that leadership for the security sector 
should start from the top political leaders (F17). 
 
Respondents further indicated that the public and private security actors in Malawi 
need to coordinate on the security sector landscape including the Judiciary, 
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs and 
Internal Security, Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security, the Media 
and Civil Society Organisation among others (F3&4). Furthermore, the 
importance of systematic securitisation matrix to identify threats and priority goals 
is important for achieving successful CL and NS. 
 
6.1.4. Objective 4. To identify barriers that hinder effective collaboration 
among the security actors and strategies for mitigating them. 
The study identified several barriers to CL, which included different 
organisational culture, political intolerance, individual interests, limited resources 
and lack of skills and professional knowledge in collaboration, as most security 
leaders command single organisations (F8; Allison and Zelikow, 1971; Halpern, 
2006 cited by Cawthra, 2009, p.27). The other prominent barrier is that 
collaborative leaders such as the NSA have no legal powers to coordinate with 
other organisations as noted both in Malawi and USA (F10; F23; Lamb and Mark, 
2010, p.6). These barriers affect CL and consequently, results in breakdown of 
national security, hence the need for mitigation strategies, particularly the 
development of a practical and holistic framework for practicing CL in Malawi. 
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6.1.5. Objective 5: To develop a holistic strategic practical framework for 
Collaborative Leadership in Malawi in order to achieve sustainable 
NS and prosperity. 
 A practical framework for collaborative leadership termed “NACUSSEPA” model 
(Figure 5.1) was developed for the security actors of Malawi based on five core 
categories or themes of clear focus on national security and priority goals (NA), 
national cultural practices (CU), Share power, influence and training security 
officers together (S), creating collaborative structures with legal mandate (S), 
effective evaluation measures (E) and parliamentary approval (PA), which were 
identified from the findings of this study (Table 4.1). The National Security 
governance structure was also outlined in Figure 4.2. The following section 
further highlights more of these contributions by this study.  
 
6.2. Theoretical and practical contributions 
“Research is to see what everybody else has seen, and to think what nobody else 
has thought.”-Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (1893-1986), Cited by Michelle Annett (2009) 
 
The main goal of this study was to develop a holistic framework for practicing 
collaborative leadership among the security actors of Malawi in order to achieve 
sustainable national security and prosperity. This study has provided an overview 
of national security and collaboration across organisational boundaries on the 
basis of an in-depth review of international and Malawi literature. Through a 
questionnaire and interviews, considerable findings have been developed as 
contributions, which are highlighted in the following sub-sections. 
 
6.2.1.  A Comprehensive list of factors to effectively improve collaborative 
leadership and national security on domestic and international level 
A major contribution of this study was the identification of a comprehensive list of 
factors (F1-25) influencing collaborative leadership (CL) and national security 
(NS) among the security actors, particularly on domestic level, which is a main 
concern in modern emerging security threats. A set of measures and best practices 
were provided for each factor, which will guide stakeholders in implementing CL. 
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It was noted in this study that respondents had different versions of the definitions 
of National Security and Collaborative Leadership, which meant different 
understanding on how security actors could work together to achieve a common 
goal. These findings will therefore help inter-agency policies, structures and 
strategies to enable full collaboration and attainment of the desired highest level of 
National Security and prosperity in Malawi. 
 
6.2.2.  Empowering collaborative leaders and the NSA with legal mandate to 
coordinate with other organisations 
The respondents recommended that the National Security Advisor (NSA) through 
the secretariat based at the National Security Coordinating Office should 
coordinate issues of National Security in Malawi (F23). The NSA would have 
legal powers to coordinate with other organisations and report to the President and 
National Security Council. This arrangement would have proper analysed 
information sieved from organisations as well as joint security committees (Figure 
4.2). Currently, the NSA works as a personal assistant to the president. This is not 
just for Malawi, as the USA has similar arrangements, where the NSA is 
considered more of a political advisory position and does not necessarily 
coordinate other security organisations (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6). 
 
6.2.3.  Fusion of information and a joint coordinating centre for all security 
actors during crisis and peacetime 
“Sharing today, shinning tomorrow.”-Kim Hwang-Sik (Prime Minister of South 
Korea, 20
th
 October, 2012). 
 
The study has identified the importance of information fusion, as one stop centre, 
for all security actors for effective analysis, decision-making and implementation 
of security programmes at domestic level and not just on international threats 
(F21). Fusion and sharing of information need to be on daily basis even during 
peace time as it is the basis for analysing the security situation and make long 
term strategies to prevent foreseeable threats that would have negative effects on 
Malawi‟s peace and economic development. This fusion arrangement would also 
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mitigate threats that are generated internally including thefts and robberies, 
violence, and corruption. 
 
6.2.4. Addition to knowledge: Filled literature gap on effective collaborative 
leadership in the security sector of Malawi on domestic level and 
globally. 
The Malawi national security system has traditionally relied on international 
institutions for higher professional training and doctrine in security operations and 
collaborative working. This has served the national interest to a certain extent as 
most collaborations were in form of alliances, partnerships and mainly 
concentrated on international peacekeeping operations rather than domestic 
security, which are the major challenges at the moment in Malawi and globally. 
Like many other countries, Malawi is facing a more demanding national security 
environment on domestic level. Citizens and their representatives expect a system, 
which is able to understand, mitigate and respond effectively to the full breadth 
and depth of contemporary security issues to achieve the desired sustainable 
national security and economic development. To influence performance in an 
original and sustainable way, new tools and techniques are needed, as well a 
change in the mind-set. This study identified common principles that characterise 
successful collaboration both at international and domestic level, which will help 
to fill the literature gap at academic institutions and security professionals.  
 
6.2.5. Development of the first ever integrated National Security Policy 
framework for Malawi with written protocols and parliamentary 
approval to guide collaboration. 
If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange these apples, then you 
and I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea 
and we exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas."-George 
Bernard Shaw (1856-1950, cited by Genius media group, 2014). 
 
This study developed a practical inter-agency collaborative National Security 
Policy and Strategy Framework termed “NACUSSEPA” model (Figure 5.1), 
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which Malawi and other countries might consider to adopt. The framework for 
inter-organisational committees was also highlighted (Figure 4.1). The overall 
governance and linkage between the top government leadership and various 
security actors was also developed and illustrated (Figure 4.2). These are useful 
frameworks as this study made several improvements to the gaps in the previous 
case studies and the reviewed collaborative models of the USA, Japan and SADC. 
 
6.3.  Research methodology and credibility of findings 
In this study, several measures were adopted at various stages to ensure the 
credibility of the findings (Yin, 2014, pp.45-49). The adoption of surveys and 
multiple case study approach helped to benchmark with other organisations and to 
generate a rich value of quantitative and qualitative data. The interview data of 
each case was verified and evaluated by comparing with data generated from other 
sources within respective case organisations (Yin, 2014, p.110). To further 
improve the validity of the findings, three main qualifying criteria were used:  
 
a. The selected fifteen organisations and 100 respondents were involved in 
daily coordinating activities in national security programmes in Malawi;  
 
b. Organisations were those that are spread throughout the three 
administrative regions of Malawi; and   
 
c. Each organisation was represented by more than two respondents. In-depth 
face to face interviews also provided triangulation and removed bias (Yin, 
2014, p.115) 
 
Whereas this study identified valuable findings, the author experienced some 
limitations, which are worth mentioning (Saunders et al., 2009, p.550). 
 
6.4.  Research Limitations 
“If you accept your limitations, you go beyond them.”- Brendan Francis cited by 
Shade Dream (12 October 2012). 
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6.4.1. Limited literature and models on effective collaborative leadership 
among security actors 
The major challenge with this study was limited availability of relevant literature 
and practical models on effectiveness of CL among security organisations, 
especially in the sub-Saharan Africa. There has also been limited research focused 
on improving the effectiveness of collaborative leadership in the security sector. 
Generally, research has been on separate topics of collaboration and leadership 
particularly in the private sector. In Africa, a few countries like Botswana and 
Ghana have National Security collaborative arrangements and the author visited 
their offices in 2008. However, there were no written frameworks available for 
reference, as they were also in the process of developing their inter-agency 
security policies. This problem was, however, addressed through benchmarking of 
some collaborative structures of the United States of America and the Southern 
Africa Development Community Defence Pact, who have the best security 
collaborative models. 
 
The other challenge was on the decision to choose the number of respondents 
from each of the fifteen organisations. This was, however, resolved as more than 
two respondents, who were directly involved in daily coordination of national 
security issues participated in this study. 
 
6.5.  Recommendations 
“The task of a leader is to get people from where they are to where they have not 
been.” - Henry Kissinger (July 13, 1995). 
 
“Leadership is solving problems. The day soldiers stop bringing you their 
problems and recommendations, is the day that you have stopped leading them. 
They have either lost confidence that you cannot help them or concluded that you 
do not care. Either case is failure of leadership.” Collin Powell (2005). 
 
This study indicated that Malawi security actors have achieved more in 
collaborative leadership through conduct of several seminars, joint training and 
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operations as well as joint decision-making. However, for Malawi to achieve the 
highest level of National Security and prosperity, the study further recommended 
the following: 
 
6.5.1. Develop a Practical inter-agency National Security Policy and Strategy 
Framework that would outline written protocols and modalities for all 
security actors to work together in a collaborative manner. 
 
6.5.2. Establish joint committees on security to enable them discuss and analyse 
national security issues and make coordinated decisions and 
implementation plans. 
 
6.5.3. Create a joint national security coordinating office that would have 
personnel representation from the core security organisations and other 
institutions as may be deemed necessary. This will enable effective and 
systematic fusion of all essential information and joint action plans. 
 
6.5.4. Empower the National Security Advisor with practical legal mandates and 
authority to enable him/her coordinate with other security actors to effect 
meaningful collaboration and assessment of the security situation.  
 
6.6.  Further research 
The author suggests the following areas for further research to complement the 
recommendations outlined above. 
 
6.6.1 Detailed structures and implementation of the framework 
This study has outlined the framework for successful collaboration by the security 
actors. Further research could examine the detailed processes, structures and 
implementation measures that could be agreed by all stakeholders in Malawi. 
 
6.6.2. Codes and protocols for sharing information 
Since this study has highlighted the need for use of codes and protocols for 
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sharing information among the security actors, it would be a viable research to 
look at in detail how this could be done and the technological aspects required. 
This could also explore how this protocol should not be abused and leaked to the 
benefit of external users. 
 
6.6.3. Constitutional authority and coordinating mandate for the National 
Security Advisor 
An important revelation has been made here that a collaborative leader, especially 
the National security Advisor (NSA) need to have constitutional legal powers and 
mandate if he/she has to successfully coordinate other organisations. This could be 
another good further research to find out, especially what powers and how they 
could be legalised. Since collaborative leaders are required to work as peer with 
other participants, how the empowering of the NSA would be understood by other 
organisations. The study could also look at how much powers would the NSA 
require to prevent being too powerful, and distort the required collaboration. 
 
6.6.4. Involvement of the civil society organisations and other NGOs 
Collaborative leadership requires the involvement of several actors. In this study 
the main focus was on core security organisations. However, it was revealed that 
the civil society organisations (CSO), the academia and other players are also 
crucial in National Security and they are already performing some of their roles, 
but they are not much consulted. A lot of research is done by the academia, but 
there is limited coordination with core security actors and government to 
implement some of their recommendations. This could be an important study to 
ascertain exactly how these could be involved and consulted in Malawi through 
practical mechanisms. 
 
6.7. Summary 
“Collaborations are the vehicles for those of us who believe that we can make a 
difference.”- Hank Rubin cited by Glanz (2006, p.88). 
 
Chapter six concluded this study by providing an overview of how the research 
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problem to examine the effectiveness of collaborative leadership in the security 
context and improve inter-agency collaboration was addressed. It also outlined 
how the research goal and objectives were achieved. The research methodologies 
for this study, validity of findings, the author‟s contributions, recommendations 
and areas for further research have also been highlighted. While this study is for 
academic purpose, it is also a valuable opportunity for the Malawi security actors 
and other businesses to consider for improved collaboration and achieve the 
highest level and sustainable National Security and economic development. 
 
In conclusion, time is of essence. General George Patton cited by Boone Pickins 
(September 2, 2008) emphasised that, “Be willing to make effective decisions. 
That’s the most important quality of a good leader. Don’t fall victim to what I 
call the ready-aim-aim-aim and aim syndrome. You must be willing to fire at the 
right time before you are fired.” This quote supports this study‟s findings; that 
this is the right time for the Malawi national security actors to improve their 
collaborative effort by implementing the recommended factors and become the 
most peaceful country in the sub-Saharan Africa and be a global model!  
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APPENDICES I: Letter of Introduction 
 
     7th January, 2013 
Department of Business Management 
T4-18, Eagle Building 
Greater Manchester, BL3 5AB, UK 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
 
Introduction Letter: Inter-agency Collaborative Leadership Research 
Questionnaire 
I am conducting a study entitled “Collaborative Leadership for achieving 
sustainable National Security in Malawi: A practical framework”.  The goal of the 
study is to develop a Practical Framework that would guide the Security Sector or 
Actors/organisations to collaborate more efficiently. While Malawi is known for 
its peaceful environment, today‟s threats to Security are dynamic and require 
coordinated effort to prevent them.  
 
The questions ask you to provide useful information and to express your 
perceptions about the impact of collaborative leadership in the security sector. The 
research is not about sensitive information but general policy management and 
leadership direction.  Your responses will be treated with strictest confidence and 
your anonymity will be assured as your name or identity will not be used in any of 
the documents. Should you have any questions to clarify about the research, 
please contact me at email: nr6mpo@bolton.ac.uk or ngwenyareuben@yahoo.com. 
This study is for academic purpose and a partial fulfilment of a PhD dissertation 
from the University of Bolton. 
 
I thank you for your cooperation. 
Reuben Paulos Ngwenya (Major General) 
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APPENDICES II: Research Questionnaire 
  
Q1 Details of Interviewee                                                                                                                               
a. Name of Organisation 
…………………………………………………………………… 
b. Years you have served in Organisation (Please Tick one) 
 
  1-10 Years,   10-20 Years,    30 Years and Above 
 
c. What are your Highest Qualifications? 
 
 Secondary School/ Diploma  Degree   Masters degree   
 PhD  
 
d. What is the level of your position in the organisation? 
 
 Senior Management    Middle Management   
 Operational staff 
 
Q2 
 
Concepts of Inter-agency Collaboration 
a. What do you understand by the term Collaboration? (Please tick) 
1. Networking 
2. Cooperation 
3. Alliance 
4. Coordination 
5. Coalition 
6. Partnership 
7. Includes all of the above 
 
Explain your answer 
         
 
 b. In your view, explain the meaning of Inter-agency collaboration 
          
 
Q3 
 
Collaborative Leadership 
 
a. In your view what are the qualities or characteristics of a 
Collaborative Leader? 
         
          
b. How do you see Leadership in strengthening Inter-agency 
collaboration or collaboration with other organisations? 
  .       
 
3 2 1
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c. Which type of the two Leadership styles do you prefer and why?  
 
 1. Collaborative, who is listening, understands possible answers 
from various perspectives and working to achieve objectives 
as encourages others to be creative and find better solutions. 
 
2. Authoritarian, who tends to do all the talking “has the 
answer” and Imposes solutions and making decisions as one 
person as it pleases him/her. Usually heads one organization 
or department. Give comment to your answer 
         
 
e. In your review, what is Collaborative Leadership? 
         
 
 
Q4 Concept of National Security 
 
a. In your view, what do you understand by the concept of National 
Security?  (Tick one answer). 
 
1. Protection of the Nation from external aggression using the 
Military only. 
 
2. Measures to protect National Interests and Values from threats 
that would endanger Sovereignty from External military 
Aggression, Economic Development, Political Stability, 
Human Security and Environmental Security. 
 
 Explain reason for your choice above. 
         
 
b. What threats do you consider would endanger National Security in 
Malawi?        
c. In your view, do you think that threats mentioned above could be 
dealt with or mitigated by one organization or assisted by other 
organizations? (Tick one answer and explain why? 
 
1. One Organisation 
2. Assisted by other organisations 
 
Provide comment for your answer. 
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d. Sometimes other people have not taken National Security or 
Peaceful environment as an important factor in their Policies. In 
your view, what would be the most benefits of National Security? 
         
Q5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security Sector/ Actors 
 
a. What do you understand by the term Security Sector or Security 
Actors? 
         
 
b. In your view, to combat threats to National Security in Malawi 
such as external aggression, cross border crime, illegal migration, 
terrorism, disasters etc., which main organisations/institutions 
would comprise the cluster of Security Sector or Actors? 
         
c. Mention other organisations that would play supportive role in 
achieving National Security and explain how. 
         
 
d. In the nature of modern Security situations, do you see non-
government organisations such as media, civil society 
organisations, and human rights bodies; think tanks and 
universities, women organisations, etc. playing a role in National 
Security? 
 
1. Yes 2. No 3. Not Sure 
 
Explain your answer. 
         
Q6 Collaborative Leadership among the Security Sector/Actors 
 
a. In September 2012, Malawi Government held a Multi-sector or 
Inter-agency symposium to mitigate ~Security threats in Malawi.  
In your view, do you think the Security Sector need to collaborate 
in managing security threats? 
 
 Yes    No    Not sure 
 
b. If your answer is yes, in what ways or practical mechanisms could 
the security Sector collaborate? 
 
Provide comment for your answer to above? 
         
 
c. In your organisation, which would benefit more from a 
collaborative set up? 
 
1. Top Leaders/ Managers 
2. Lower employees 
3. Other Organisations 
 200 
4. All Organisations 
 
Provide Comment to your answer. 
         
 
In your organizations, who usually initiates the collaboration 
process? 
 
1. Top Leaders 
2. Lower employees 
3. All Employees 
 
Give reasons for your answer.     
f. Does your organisation reward or give incentive to people who 
initiate collaboration? 
 
1. Yes 2. No 3. Not Sure 
 
Provide comment or examples for your answer. 
          
 
g. Do you see Collaborative Leadership as an important part of the 
Security Sector Reform that the Security organisations are 
undergoing to improve collaboration and National Security? Why? 
          
 
Q7 Challenges/Barriers to effective Collaborative Leadership 
 
a. Mention the major challenges or barriers that hinder effective 
inter-agency collaboration among the Security Sector.  
        
 
b. Culture or different organisational beliefs and practices are one of 
the main barriers to inter-agency collaboration. What mechanisms 
would help to resolve this problem? 
          
 
c. In your view, what would be the main benefits if Security 
organisations collaborate efficiently? 
 
Q8 Improving Inter-agency collaboration in the Security Sector 
 
a. In your view, what are the key factors that would improve 
inter-agency collaboration in the Security sector? 
         
 
b. When or at what time do you think Collaboration should be 
done among the Security actors? 
         
 
c. Has your organisation conducted joint activities with other 
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organisations such as joint training, exercises in disaster 
management, sharing of resources, decision making etc. to 
promote Security? 
 
 1. Yes 2. No 3. Not Sure 
 
Provide Comment to your answer. 
        
 
d. In your view, how could you measure whether collaboration 
is implemented successfully? 
         
Q9 Sharing of Information in the Security Sector 
 
a. Security issues are usually sensitive to be discussed in public and 
yet sharing of information is also very important to enable 
effective decision making by leaders at various levels. 
 
In your opinion, should information be shared among the Security 
Sector/Actors/organisations? (Tick answer below) 
 
 1. Yes 2. No 3. Not Sure 
 
b.  Give reasons for your answer on why information should be 
shared or not. 
         
 
c. How would you ensure that information shared is relevant and 
credible aimed at achieving the National Security goals? 
         
 
d.  Systematic Fusion and Coding of information helps to ensure 
that all relevant information has been received from various 
sources and gives a clear picture for decision makers. How could 
this be achieved in the Security Sector? 
         
 
 How could you instil trust and confidence among the Security 
Sector to share information and to prevent leakage of vital 
information? 
         
 
Q10 Leadership Support for Inter-Agency collaboration 
 
a. In your view, do you think there is support from leaders to 
improve collaboration in the Security Sector and your 
organisation? Give examples of the support. 
         
 
b. So far, what programmes does your organisation have to 
collaborate with other institutions? 
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c. Does your organisation have a write up to support or guide 
collaboration with other organisations? (If yes, give a copy) 
         
d. How do you mitigate or reduce the problem of competition for 
power and authority among leaders of various organisations in a 
collaborative set up? 
         
 
f. Does your organisation have a policy or standard format or 
protocol for sharing information with other organisations that may 
require coordinated decision making or operation? 
 
 1. Yes   2. No   3. Not Sure 
 
Provide Comments to your answer (and Give a copy if you 
have).        
 
Q11 Strategy and Practical Framework to improve Inter-agency 
Collaboration in the Security Sector. 
 
a. What do you understand by the term Practical Framework?  
         
 
b. In your view, what is National Security Policy? 
         
 
c. In a democratic society, there is great demand for reforms.  In 
Malawi, do you see the formulation of the National Security 
Policy and Integrated Framework as a desired Security Sector 
Reform? 
 
1. Yes   2. No 3. Not Sure 
Give reason for your answer. 
         
 
2. Does your organisation have the written Framework or 
Strategy to guide inter-agency collaboration? (if yes, give a 
copy). 
         
 
3. In your view, do you think there is need to have an Integrated 
Framework or legally binding Policy as is done in some 
countries like USA, Japan and UK that would enable Security 
Actors to work more closely in addition to individual 
organisational roles spelt out in the Constitution and Acts? 
Give reasons. 
        
4. If your answer is yes, do you think there is need for a separate 
National Security Central Office where core organisations 
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would be represented to facilitate this Framework and 
Collaboration while respecting the individual roles and 
mandates of the other organisations as is also done in the 
countries mentioned above?  Give reasons. 
         
 
5. Which organisations do you suggest should form part of this 
National Security Central Office? 
         
 
6. Do you see the need for forming Joint Security Committees 
such as National Security Council, National Disaster 
management Committee, etc. to jointly collaborate in policy 
decisions and preventing threats, while maintaining lead 
departments? 
 
1. Yes 2. No 
 
7. What Joint Security Committees do you suggest for Malawi to 
establish to effectively discuss and improve NS? 
………………………………………………………….. 
 
Provide reasons for your answer. 
         
 
8. In your view, what major components or guiding issues 
should be included in the integrated Collaborative national 
Security policy Framework Model for the Security Sector in 
Malawi? 
         
 
Q12 General Comment 
 
a. Give your additional comments on your perception about the 
effectiveness and improving inter-agency Collaborative 
Leadership in the Security Sector. 
          
 
  
APPENDICES III: Informed Consent Letter for Interviews 
 
 
The University of Bolton 
Department of Business Logistics and Information systems 
Informed Consent Form for Interviews 
 
Collaborative Leadership among Security Actors for sustainable National 
Security in Malawi: A practical framework. 
 
Reuben Paulos Ngwenya  
nr6mpo@bolton.ac.uk 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am a student in Strategic and Change Management programme at the University 
of Bolton. I am studying on the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership in 
achieving high level and sustainable National Security in Malawi. 
 
During this study, you will be asked to answer some questions as to why and how 
you think collaborative leadership would be an effective leadership style to 
improve national security.  This interview was designed to be approximately a half 
hour in length However, please feel free to expand on the topic or talk about 
related ideas.  Also, if there are any questions you feel you cannot answer or that 
you do not feel comfortable answering, feel free to indicate this.   
 
All the information will be kept confidential. I will keep the data in my personal 
flash disc and at a secure place in case of my reference only. In case of 
clarification, contact me through my email. This interview is designed to learn 
first-hand information about this topic.  Upon completion of this study, all data 
will be destroyed. 
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Participant’s Agreement: 
 
I am aware that my participation in this interview is voluntary.  If, for any reason, 
at any time, I wish to stop the interview, I may do so without having to give an 
explanation.  I understand the intent and purpose of this research. The researcher 
has reviewed the individual and social benefits and risks of this study with me. 
 
I am aware the data will be used for academic purposes.  I have the right to review, 
comment on, and/or withdraw information prior to the thesis submission. I 
understand that if I say anything that I believe may incriminate me, the 
interviewer will immediately delete the recording and ask if I would like to 
continue the recording. The data gathered in this study are confidential and 
anonymous with respect to my personal identity unless I specify/indicate 
otherwise.  I grant permission for the use of this information for a: 
 
...........................................Thesis (Interviewee permission) 
 
I grant permission to use: 
...........................................Just a pseudonym 
 
I will be given a copy of this consent form that I may keep for my own reference. 
 
I have read the above form, and, with the understanding that I can withdraw at any 
time, and for whatever reason, I consent to participate in today‟s interview. 
 
_____________________   ___________________ 
Participant‟s signature  Date 
 
_____________________ 
Interviewer‟s signature 
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